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Generic Location Accident Sub-
Category r-~B~ert~h -----;H-:;:-a-r-;-b-ou-r------C::::-o-a-s-ta--=-l------A-t-s-e-a-----D-r-y-d-o-c-k-
Engine room 
Bridge 
Cargo Hold 
FSS1(S) 
F1 S2 (2) 
FS S2 (6) 
F1 S3 (3) 
FS S3 (7) 
Table 4.3 ExampJe of a risk table 
4.3.4 "Equivalent Total" 
The purpose for calculating the "Equivalent Total" is to provide a means of integrating 
the risks evaluated for each hazard of the accident sub-category. It will also provide a 
means of comparing each accident category to determine and justify the allocation of 
resources - to elinlinate or reduce the level of risk. 
Table 4.4 represents an example for a fire accident category. The data has been drawn 
from MAIB reports and Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are used to assign the values of Sand F 
respectively. A RRN is assigned for each accident sub-category at different generic 
locations. This table can be generated for each accident category by analysing the 
incident/accident data in terms of its recurrence and severity of consequences. 
Accident Sub- Berthing/ Manoeuvring At sea At sea Dry dock 
Cate~ory Un berthing (Harbour) (Coastal) (Open sea) Maintenance 
Fish Room F4 Sl=4 F4 S2 = 5 F4 S3 = 6 F4 S3 = 6 F4 Sl = 4 Space 
Galley F4 Sl =4 F4 S2 = 5 F4 S3 = 6 F4 S4 = 7 F4 Sl = 4 
Crew 
Accommodati F4 S2 = 5 F4 S2 = S F4 S3 = 6 F4 S3 = 6 F4 Sl = 4 
on 
Bridge F3 Sl = 3 F3 Sl = 3 F3 Sl = 3 F3 S 1 =3 F3 S 1 = 3 
Engine Room F5 Sl = 5 F5 S2 = 6 FS S3 = 7 F5 S3 = 7 FS S2 = 6 
Table 4.4 Fire rankings using Risk Matrix Approach- expert judgement 
Table 4.5 hows the number of times each RRN appears within an accident cat gr. 
For example RRN 4 appear 5 time (a highlighted in table 4.4). A the RRN f r lh 
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accident sub-category is considered for different generic locations. an "Equi\aknt 
Total" is calculated to give the accident category an index which \vill later be used to 
compare and rank it against other accident categories. 
RRN No. of occurrence for accident. sub category 
4 5 
5 5 
6 7 
7 3 
Table 4.5. Number of occurrences of risk ranking scores 
The calculation makes use of the fact that both the frequency and severity bands of the 
risk matrix are approximately logarithmic (e.g. a risk level of 6 is treated as 106 ) [MSC, 
1997b]. Using 7 as a base then: 
"Equivalent Total" = 7 + Log (3.000 + 0.700 + 0/050 + 0.005) 
= 7+ Log (3.755) 
= 7.57 
Alternatively using the risk ranking score of 4 as the base, then: 
"Equivalent Total" = 4 + Log (3000 + 700 + 40 + 5) 
= 4 + Log (3755) 
= 7.57 or rounded off = 7.6 
It can be noted that the risk ranking score does not change with the base chosen. 
Similarly, for each accident category an "Equivalent Total" can be calculated and the 
value obtained will give a direct indication of the areas needing attention. The higher 
the value of the 'equivalent total', the higher the associated risk with reference to that 
category. 
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4.3.5 Recommendations 
For particular risk factors, there is a range of risk control options (RCO). It is most cost 
effective to reduce risk factors at the design stage. Additional costs are incurred in 
redesigning or modifying plant or processes once they are being used. However. 
redesigning a fishing vessel or related systems - as an alternative RCO could prove 
useful for new vessels. Hence, this option should be considered while carrying out a 
safety assessment for existing ships. 
The various objectives and attributes of a RCO are discussed in section -1-.2.3. At this 
stage, practical RCOs are recommended while considering the effectiveness of each 
option. The RCO could be in the form of a preventive measure - where the RCO 
reduces the probability of occurrence, or a mitigating measure - where the RCO reduces 
the severity of the consequences. Other factors that need to be considered are the cost of 
the RCO and the stakeholders who will be affected by its implementations. 
Stakeholders can be defined to be any entity (e.g. person, organisation, company, nation 
state or grouping of these), who is directly affected by accidents or by the cost 
effectiveness of the industry. For any particular stakeholder, their stake in a generic 
vessel can be a definite committed monetary value such as an investment or payment. 
Stakeholders can be voluntary, involuntary or a mixture of both. In the decision making 
process, the stakeholders may be affected directly, indirectly or by representative 
groupings. The following stakeholders are identified for a generic fishing vessel: 
• Crew • Port state 
• Coastal state • Other vessels 
• Designer/constructor • Flag state 
• Classification society • Insurance companies 
• Owner • Emergency services 
• Port authority • Suppliers 
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The next step of the proposed method is to determine the best RCO for the identified 
risks of the generic vessel. This could be achieved by determining the cost and benefit 
of each RCO with respect to each of the stakeholders mentioned above. Each RCO can 
then be represented by a Cost per Unit Risk Reduction (CURR). The CURR is gi\'en by: 
CURR = Cost - Benefit 
Risk reduction 
(1) 
The cost and benefit for each RCO has to be calculated in terms of its Net Present Value 
(NPV). Hence the numerator in equation (l) is represented as: 
NPV = I[(C~ -Bt )(l+rr'] (2) 
t=O 
where B = the sum of benefits in period t 
C = the sum of costs in period t 
r = the discount rate 
t = time horizon for the assessment, starting in year O. 
The risk reduction is given by the difference between the risk level of the given event in 
the base case and the risk level of the given event following the adoption of the RCO. A 
negative CURR suggests that implementation would be a financially beneficial (cost-
effective). All that is left now, is to rank the RCOs using their CURR value and 
recommending the most appropriate RCO for an accident category. 
4.4 An Example 
The example presented in this section is for a generic fishing vessel as defined in 
section 4.3.1. The information gathered for the accident category and sub-category in 
section 4.3.2 is used to demonstrate the proposed method. For the purpose of this 
demonstration. only three accident categories are considered. namely. collision/contact. 
fire and loss of hull integrity. Using the accident data provided in chapter 2, by the 
MAIB reports and complementing this data with expert judgement - where the data \\as 
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absent or incomplete, tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 are generated. Expert judgements \\ere 
drawn from ship owners and operators during a round table discussion. These tables 
represent the evaluation of the three accident categories identified. The RRN definition 
and interpretation of the values for frequency of occurrence are given in tables ..j., I and 
4.2 respectively. 
Accident Generic Location 
Sub-category 
Berthing/ Manoeuvring At sea At sea Dry dock 
Unberthing (Harbour) (Coastal) (Open sea) Maintenance 
Berthed F3 S2 (4) 
Loading/ F4 S2 (5) 
unloading 
Departure F5 S2 (6) 
Manoeuvring F5 S2 (6) 
Passage open F4 S3 (6) 
sea 
Loading fish F6 S3 (8) 
at sea 
Entering F5 S2 (6) 
harbour 
Manoeuvring 
close to berth 
F5 S2 (6) 
Shutdown F4 S2 (5) 
Abnormal 
operation 
F4 S2 (5) F4 S2 (5) F4 S3 (6) F4 S3 (6) F4 S 1 (4) 
Maintenance F3 S 1 (3) 
Anchored F5 S2 (6) 
Dry docked F4 S 1 (4) 
Table 4.6 Collision/contact risk ranking 
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Accident Sub- Generic Location 
category 
Berthing/ Manoeuvring At sea At sea Dry dock 
Unberthing (Harbour) (Coastal) (Open sea) Maintenance 
Fish room F4 S 1 (4) F4 S2 (5) 
space F4 S3 (6) F4S3(6) F4 S 1 (.f) 
Galley F4 S 1 (4) F4 S2 (5) F4 S3 (6) F4 S4 (7) F4 S 1 (...J.) 
Crew F4 S2 (5) F4 S2 (5) 
accomm. F4 S3 (6) F4 S3 (6) F...J. S 1 (.f) 
Bridge F3 S 1 (3) F3S1(3) F3 S 1 (3) F3 SI (3) F3 S 1 (3) 
Engine room F5 S1 (5) F5 S2 (6) F5 S3 (7) F5 S3 (7) F552(6) 
Table 4.7 Fire risk ranking 
Accident Sub- Generic Location 
category 
Berthing/ Manoeuvring At sea At sea Dry dock 
Unberthing (Harbour) (Coastal) (Open sea) Maintenance 
Hull plating F3 S 1 (3) F3S2(4) F3 S2 (4) F352(4) F3 51 (3) 
Framing F3 SI (3) F3 S2 (4) F3 52 (4) F352(4) F3 51 (3) 
Bulkheads F3 S 1 (3) F3 S2 (4) F3 52 (4) F3 S3 (5) F3 S 1 (3) 
Welds and F4 S 1 (4) F3 52 (4) F4 52 (5) F4 52 (5) F4 51 (4) joints 
Penetrations F5 SI (5) F5 Sl (5) F5 52 (6) F5 52 (6) F5 S 1 (5) 
Seals F5 S 1 (5) F5 S 1 (5) F5S1(5) F5 S 1 (5) F5 SI (5) 
Appurtenances F4 S 1 (4) F4 S2 (5) F4 S2 (5) F4 S3 (6) F4 SI (.f) 
Doors F4 S 1 (4) F4 S2 (5) F4 S2 (5) F4 S3 (6) F...J. S 1 (...J.) 
Windows F4 S 1 (4) F4 S 1 (4) F4 S2 (5) F4 S2 (5) F4 51 (4) 
Table 4.8 Loss of hull integrity risk ranking 
In order to calculate the "Equivalent Total", the number of occurrence of each ranking 
score for the three accident categories is determined and summarised here in table 4.9. 
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RRN 
No. of occurrence for accident category 
Collision/contacts Fire Loss of hull integrity 
'- . 
4 3 5 18 
5 4 5 17 
6 8 7 -1-
7 - 3 -
8 1 - -
Table 4.9 Number of occurrence of each ranking score (three accident categorics) 
Using 4 as the base score, the "Equivalent Total" for accident category collision!contact 
is given by: 
EquivalentTotal = 4 + 10g(10843) = 8.0351 
Using 4 as the base score, the "Equivalent Total" for accident category fire is given by: 
EquivalentTotal = 4 + 10g(3755) = 7.574 
Using 4 as the base score, the "Equivalent Total" for accident category loss of hull 
integrity given by: 
EquivalentTotal = 4 + 10g(400 + 170 + 18) 
= 4 + 10g(588) 
= 6.769 
I 
I 
I 
The result of this analysis is presented in a tabular format to enable easy reading and is 
given in table 4.10. A larger risk ranking number ("Equivalent Total") indicates a high 
risk, but the values only represent the relative risk levels. Hence, this ranking gi \'CS an 
indication as to which areas of the generic vessel are of higher priority. 
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Accident category Collision/contact Fire Loss of hull 
integrity 
Equi valent Total 8.035 7.574 6.769 
Table 4.10 Summary of analysis 
The next step of the analysis is to determine the possible RCOs for the generic vessel 
considered. As data to quantify each RCO is difficult to obtain, hypothetical RCOs are 
considered for the demonstration of this method. The cost and benefit column represent 
the cumulative values for all the stakeholders involved in the study. The views 
presented by each stakeholder, will considerably affect the outcome of the CURRo 
Considering the four RCOs given in table 4.11 and the associated cost, benefit and risk 
reduction, a CURR for each RCO can be obtained. Note that the value for risk reduction 
represents the total number of equivalent deaths for the system under consideration. 
Risk Control Cost Benefit Risk reduction Options 
RCO 1 £50000 £25000 5 
RC02 £10000 £25000 5 
RC03 £10000 £15000 5 
RC04 £30000 £40000 5 
Table 4.11 RCOs determined for generic vessel 
Assuming that the time horizon for the safety assessment is for 25 years at a discount 
rate of 3%, and using equation (1) and (2) in section 4.3.5, the CURR calculation for 
each RCO is given as follows: 
_ (50000 - 25000)(1 + 0.03)-25 = 2388 07 CURR - . -
I 5 
_ (10000 - 25000)(1 + 0.03r25 = -1 13/ 08 CURR - '-t _. 
, 5 
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CURR _ (10000-15000)0 +0.03r
25 
3 - 5 = -796.00 
CURR _ (30000-40000)0 +0.03r
25 
4 - = -95521 5 . 
A large negative CURR suggests that this implementation would be financially 
beneficial. From the results obtained, it is determined that RCO 2 is the best option 
(from a cost-benefit point of view) and can be recommended for implementation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It should be noted that the FSA approach differs significantly from the safety case 
regimes found in many industries. The main intention of FSA (during the development 
stages of the approach) was to be applied to the regulatory regime for shipping. 
However, over the years, its potential has been recognised not only as a tool to develop 
safety rules and regulations but as a tool to identify safety related problems with design, 
operation and procedures of a maritime entity. 
The FSA method has several benefits to offer the fishing vessel industry, these benefits 
are summarised here: 
• FSA provides a consistent regime that addresses all aspects of safety (design and 
operation) in an integrated manner. 
• FSA is a pro-active approach. Hence, it enables hazards that have not yet given rise 
to accidents to be properly considered. 
• Owners and operators can rest assure that safety investments are targeted where it 
will achieve the greatest benefit. 
• It provides a rational basis for addressing new risks posed by the changes in marine 
technology. 
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This chapter has described a trial application of the proposed FSA technique for a 
generic fishing vessel. Several problems have been identified with the use of the current 
method as proposed by the MCA to the IMO, these include: 
• Reliabl'e data is not available for fishing vessels - and when it is available, there is a 
high level of uncertainty associated with the data. 
• The risk matrix approach is a simple subjective method to quantify the probability 
of occurrence and severity of the associated consequences, however, it lacks a 
formal approach to quantifying expert judgement and opinion when using the risk 
matrix. This would entail that conflicting opinions of two different analysts on the 
severity of an accident could result in a deadlock. 
• It is difficult to quantify the cost and benefits of each RCO for each of the identified 
stakeholders. A more subjective approach is needed to express the preference of one 
RCO over the other. 
• Human reliability can be considered In the FSA methodology, however, 
quantification may be impractical due to the lack of human reliability data 
associated with maritime tasks. As such there is a need to address this problem using 
a formal subjective approach. 
The setbacks of the FSA methodology identified here are addressed by the development 
of various methods that are presented in the following chapters of this thesis. The 
interaction of the proposed FSA framework and the parts developed in this thesis can be 
seen in figure 4.4. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RISK ASSESSMENT USING FUZZY SET APPROACH 
Summary 
The failure data available for fishing vessels are scarce and often accompanied with a 
high degree of uncertainty. For this reason the use of conventional probabilistic risk 
assessment methods may not be well suited. In this chapter a proposed method using 
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) to model the occurrence likelihood and consequences of the 
identified hazards on a fishing vessel is presented. The different ways uncertainties can 
manifest in an analysis are discussed and this is followed by a review of FST, 
identifying the various applications of the theory in the past. The proposed method uses 
fault tree analysis to calculate the fuzzy probability of the system failure. The 
consequences of failure for each basic event within the fault tree are considered for four 
different categories. The risk of the basic events is determined by combining the 
likelihood of occurrence and consequences of failure in linguistic terms and is further 
defuzzified to produce a risk ranking. The application of this method is demonstrated 
using a hydraulic winch operating system of a fishing vessel. 
5.1 Introduction 
Where a major decision regarding cost or safety implication has to be made, it has 
become increasingly difficult to defend the traditional qualitative process called 
"engineering judgement". Thus, there has been a steady trend towards quantifying risks 
and/or costs, in particular the techniques of HAZard IDentification (HAZrO), 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), have come 
very much to the fore. 
QRA is a process of investigating potential accidents and expressing the results in terms 
of measures that reflect both the frequency and the potential loss severity of each type 
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of accident that can occur [Henley E.J. and Kumamoto H., 1992]. The measures in most 
common use are Potential Loss of Life per annum (PLL)l. Fatal Accident Rate (FAR).2. 
Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA)3 and the FN curve4. 
Upon identifying the list of potential hazards and its contributing factors, which could 
be achieved by several methods including HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP) 
[Villemeur A., 1992], Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [MIL-STD 1629A]. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [Henley E.J. and Kumamoto H., 1992] etc, the next step is to 
quantify these events for the risk estimation phase. Quantification of risk considers two 
parameters, namely, 
1. Probability of failure event occurrence. 
2. Consequence severity. 
These are the two parameters that are considered in many risk assessments utilised by 
the industry at present [Preyss C., 1995]. Risk is defined to refer to a probability 
distribution over a set of outcomes [Banard R.C., 1996]. When the outcomes in question 
are hazards or injuries, risk can be understood to refer to different potential severity of 
hazards or injuries. 
The frequencies of hazardous events are usually based on historical failure data. Often, 
little is known of the basis of the data or its processing and interpretation. The little that 
is known often raises doubts as to its quality, completeness and relevance. In the case of 
data relating to material or equipment failure, the attributes of the material or equipment 
are often not recorded and insufficient data is given in the context of its use. Almost 
invariably, failures are assumed to be random in time, that is, an observed number of 
failures is divided by an exposure period to give an annual failure rate and this is 
assumed to be age-independent. In reality, some modes of failure are more common in 
the earlier or later years of the life of a component or a system (application of the 
'bathtub' curve). Even where data is of high quality, sample sizes are often small and 
statistical uncertainties are correspondingly large. As such, a fuzzy set modelling 
I The estimated numher of fatalities over a given future period of time. 
2 The number of fatalities per I OOMh of exposure to a particular hazard. 
J The estimated probability per year of a particular member of the workforce being killed in an accidental 
event. 
4 A graph displaying frequency F of l'VL'nts killing N or more people (a societal risk measure). 
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approach may be more appropriate to model the probability of a hazardous e\cnt 
occurrIng. 
The quantification of severity can be accomplished in several ways, subjective reasoning 
and expert judgement is one of the common methods. As accidents on fishing vessels are 
rarely reported, it may be difficult to quantify the severity of an accident. Once again, 
the use of a fuzzy set modelling approach integrating expert knowledge is well suited for 
this purpose. 
Many fishing companies in the UK have very poor organisational structure and most are 
skipper owned vessels. This would entail that documented records on vessel, system and 
component would be difficult to come by and the availability of data for quantitative 
analysis is either unavailable or far from the ideal format. This has led to the need of 
developing a risk assessment method that could address the high level of uncertainty in 
the data. 
5.2 Uncertainty 
There is a close relationship between complexity and uncertainty and it is said that as 
the complexity increases, certainty decreases [Friedlob G.T. and Schleifer L.L.F., 1999]. 
Albert Einstein said that so far as mathematics refers to reality, it is not certain, and so 
far as mathematics is certain, it does not refer to reality [McNeill D. and Freiberger P., 
1993]. In his "Law of Incompatibility", Zadeh states "As complexity rises, precise 
statements lose meaning, and meaningful statements lose precision" [McNeill D. and 
Freiberger P., 1993]. In 1965, while pondering this loss of precision, Zadeh conceived 
the notion of fuzzy logic, the first new method of dealing with uncertainty since the 
development of probability [Zadeh L.A., 1965]. 
5.2.1 T."\'pes of uncertainty 
Uncertainty comes about when information is deficient, but information can be deficient 
in different ways. Uncertainty may be divided into several basic types [McNeill D. and 
Freiberger P., 1993: Klir G.J. and Yuan B .. 1995: Klir G.J .. 1989]: 
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• Fuzziness 
• Ambiguity resulting from discord 
• Ambiguity resulting from non-specificity 
5.2.2 Fuzziness 
Fuzziness is uncertainty resulting from vagueness. Most natural language descriptors 
are vague and somewhat uncertain, rather than precise. Following are a few examples of 
fuzzy, uncertain events in engineering within a ship: 
i) Change lubricating oil within 100 days of operation. 
ii) Filters should be cleaned when differential pressure is high. 
iii) Maintain heavy fuel oil temperature above 90°C. 
The vagueness in these operating instruction may lead the crew to use their own expert 
judgement to carry out the operation and hence there will be a non-uniform approach to 
maintenance and this could lead to failures within the operating system. From a safety 
assessment point of view, it would be difficult for the safety analyst to interpret these 
instructions and determine the interval of maintenance or the storage temperature of the 
heavy fuel oil. 
5.2.3 Ambiguity resulting from discord 
Discord can be defined as a conflict or dissonance. For example, in a probability 
distribution, P(x) , each probability measure is for a specific alternative in a set of 
exhaustive, mutually exclusive alternatives. Each P(x) expresses the "degree of belief' 
(based on some evidence) that a particular alternative is the correct alternative. Thus. 
the beliefs expressed in a probability distribution are in conflict with each other. 
To illustrate this point, take the probability of failure of a component as an example. A 
90% belief (probability) that the component will fail under certain conditions is in 
conflict with a 10% belief that the component will not fail. Probability theory can modcl 
only situations where there are no conflicting beliefs about mutually c\clusi\'e 
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alternatives. If there are other aspects to the uncertainty (perhaps fuzziness). they are not 
captured in a probability theory model [Klir G.J., 1991]. 
5.2.4 Ambiguity resulting from non-specificity 
Non-specificity is a lack of informativeness resulting from not clearly stating or 
distinguishing alternatives. Non-specificity is characterised by cardinalities (sizes) of 
relevant sets of alternatives. The more possible alternatives a situation has. the less 
specific the situation is (a situation is completely specific if there is only one possible 
alternative)[Klir GJ., 1991]. Because each probability in a probability distribution is 
completely specific to a particular alternative, probability theory is not capable of 
conceptualising non-specificity [Klir GJ., 1991]. Figure 5.1 shows the types of 
uncertainty along with a brief description of each uncertainty [Klir GJ. and Yuan B., 
1995]. 
1 
FUZZINESS 
Lack of definite or 
sharp distinction 
• Vagueness 
• Cloudiness 
• Haziness 
• Unclearness 
• Indistinctness 
• Sharplessness 
UNCERTAINTY 
DISCORD 
Disagreement in choosing 
among several alternatives 
• Dissonance 
• Incongruity 
• Discrepancy 
• Contlict 
AMBIGUITY 
One-to-many 
relationships 
1 
NONSPECIFICITY 
Two or more alternatives 
are left unspecified 
• Variety 
• Generality 
• Diversity 
• Equivocation 
• Imprecision 
Figure 5.1 Types of uncertainty 
Uncertainty in a safety analysis can be caused by three main factors as li"ted below 
[Villemeur A., 1992]: 
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i) Uncertainties linked to the parameters - for vanous reasons, the a\'ailablc 
information on dependability is uncertain: a small sample leading to a wide 
confidence interval, extrapolation of data from one installation to another, etc. 
Certain other parameters (delayed appearance of physical factors, time available 
after losing a system before undesirable effects ensue, etc.) connected with 
design or operation are also familiar but with elements of uncertainty. 
(Dependability is defined as the ability of an entity to perform one or several 
required functions under given conditions. This concept can encompass 
reliability, availability, maintainability, safety, durability, etc - or combinations 
of these abilities. Generally speaking, dependability is considered to be the 
science of failures and faults). 
ii) Uncertainties connected with modelling - these are due to the use of an 
approximate dependability model. It is particularly true in the modelling of 
failures with a common cause, human error or software bugs. Generally, 
modelling can integrate all relevant variables without assessing their relationship 
in sufficient detail. 
iii) Uncertainties connected with the non-exhaustive nature of the analysis - the 
analyst cannot be totally sure that his modelling has taken all important factors, 
relevant figures and significant interactions into account. 
Analysing uncertainties therefore consists of identifying all the uncertainties and their 
repercussions on the assessment. Usually, only the first source of uncertainty is taken 
into account; an attempt is then made to assess the uncertainty of the final result (a 
measure of dependability) caused by the parameter uncertainty. 
5.3 Fuzzy Set Theory Background 
Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) was formalised by Prof. Lofti Zadeh at the University of 
California in 1965. The significance of fuzzy variables is that they facilitate gradual 
transition between states and consequently, possess a natural capability to express and 
deal with observation and measurement uncertainties. 
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Traditional variables, which may be referred to as crisp l'([riabZes do not ha\e this 
capability. Although the definition of states by crisp sets is mathematically correct, it is 
unrealistic in the face of unavoidable measurement errors. A measurement that falls into 
a close neighbourhood of each precisely defined border between states of a crisp 
variable is taken as evidential support for only one of the states, in spite of the inevitabk 
uncertainty involved in decision. The uncertainty reaches its maximum at each border, 
where any measurement should be regarded as equal evidence for the two states on 
either side of the border. When dealing with crisp variables, the uncertainty is ignored; 
the measurement is regarded as evidence for one of the states, the one that includes the 
border point by virtue of an arbitrary mathematical definition. Bivalent set theory can be 
somewhat limiting if we wish to describe a 'humanistic' problem mathematically 
[Zadeh L.A., 1987]. For example, figure 5.2 illustrates bivalent sets to characterise the 
temperature of a room. 
The limiting feature of bivalent sets is that they are mutually exclusive - it is not 
possible to have membership of more than one set. It is not accurate to define a 
transition from a quantity such as 'warm' to 'hot' by the application of one °C of heat. 
In the real world a smooth (unnoticeable) drift from 'warm' to 'hot' would occur. The 
natural phenomenon can be described more accurately by FST. Figure 5.3 shows how 
the same information can be quantified using fuzzy sets to describe this natural drift. 
A set, A, with points or objects in some relevant umverse, X, is defined as these 
elements of x that satisfy the membership property defined for A. In traditional 'crisp' 
sets theory each element of x either is or is not an element of A. Elements in a fuzzy set 
(denoted by -, eg A) can have a continuum of degrees of membership ranging from 
complete membership to complete non-membership [Zadeh L.A., 1987]. 
The membership function Il(X), gives the degree of membership for each element x E X. 
fleX) is defined on [0,1] (The actual degree of membership of a system parameter in a 
particular group is indicated by the values between ° and 1 inclusive). A membership of 
° means that the value does not belong to the set under consideration. A membership of 
I would mean full representation of the set under consideration. A membership 
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GRT 
HAZID 
HAZOP 
HEI 
HEP 
HLA 
HRA 
lEE 
ILO 
ILU 
IMO 
IRPA 
ITF 
LOA 
MAIB 
MAPPS 
MCA 
MIDS 
MINMOD 
MSC 
MTBF 
NCSR 
NPV 
ORCA 
OREDA 
OSHA 
P&I 
PHA 
PLL 
PM 
PMO 
Gross Tonnage 
HAZard IDentification 
HAZard and OPerability 
Human Error Identification 
Human Error Probability 
Helicopter Landing Areas 
Human Reliability Assessment 
Institution of Electrical Engineers 
International Labour Organisation 
Institute of London Underwriters 
International Maritime Organisation 
Individual Risk Per Annum 
International Transport-workers Federation 
Length Overall 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation 
Maritime Coastguard Agency 
Marine Incident Database System 
Marine Investigation Module 
Maritime Safety Committee 
Mean Time Between Failure 
National Centre for System Reliability 
Net Present Value 
Operator Reliability Calculation and Assessment 
Offshore Reliability Data 
Operating and Support Hazard Analysis 
Protection and Indemnity 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Potential Loss of Life 
Preventive Maintenance 
Preventive Maintenance Optimisation 
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somewhere between these two limits indicates the degree of membership. The manner 
in which values are assigned to a membership is not fixed and may be established 
according to the preference of the person conducting the investigation. 
Membership Function 
1 
COOL 
-10 o 
Figure 5.2 Bivalent set to characterise room temperature 
Membership Function 
COLD COOL WARM HOT 
/ /,~ '/ ~ 
1 ~ :0. / ~ ~ /, ~ '/ ~ 
/ ~ 
-10 0 10 20 30 
Figure 5.3 Fuzzy set to characterise room temperature 
Formally A is represented as the ordered pair [x, jl(x)] : 
A- = {(x, jl(x)) I x EX. and 0 s jl(X) s I} (1) 
The use of a numerical scale for the degree of membership provides a convenient way 
to represent gradation in the degree of membership. Precise degrees of membership 
generally do not exist. Instead they tend to reflect sometimes subjective 'ordering' of 
the element in the universe. 
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Fuzzy sets can be represented by various shapes. They are commonly represented by S-
curves, Tt-curves, triangular curves and linear curves. The shape of the fuzzy set depends 
on the best way to represent the data. In general the membership (often indicated on the 
vertical axis) starts at ° (no membership) and continues to 1 (full membership). The 
domain of a set is indicated along the horizontal axis. The fuzzy set shape defines the 
relationship between the domain and the membership values of a set. 
5.3.1 Types of membership functions 
In principle any function of the form A: x ~ [0,1] describes a membership function 
associated with a fuzzy set A. that depends not only on the concept to be represented, but 
also on the context in which it is used. The graphs of the functions may have very 
different shapes and may have some specific properties (e.g. continuity). Whether a 
particular shape is suitable can be determined only in the application context [Klir OJ. 
and Yuan B., 1995]. In many practical instances, fuzzy sets can be represented 
explicitly by families of parameterised functions, the most common being: -
1) Triangular functions 
A.(x) = 
0, if x ~ a 
x-a 
--, if x E [a,m] 
m-a 
1,ifx=m 
b-x 
--,ifxE [m,b] 
b-m 
0, if x ~ b 
where m is a modal value and a and b denote lower and upper bounds, respectively, for 
non-zero values of A(x). Sometimes it is more convenient to use the notation explicitly 
highlighting the membership function parameters, in this case it is given by: 
A(x; a,m,b) = 17lax{min[(x-a)l(m-a),(b-x)/(b-m)},Oj (2) 
2) Trapezoidal function. 
A(x) = 
0, if x < a 
x-a 
--, if x E [a,m] 
Ill- a 
1, if x E [m,n] 
b-x 
--, if x E [n,b] 
b-n 
0, if x> b 
Using equivalent notation, it is given by: 
A(x; a,n,b) = max(mill[(x-a)/(m-a), J, (b-x)/(b-n)}, O} (3) 
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a parameterised trapezoidal function. This is a 
graphical representation of the explicit families of parameterised functions defining the 
bounds of the function. In this example, the parameters a, m, nand b in equation (3) is 
given by -2.5, 0, 2.5 and 5, respectively. 
-5.0 -2.5 
(a) ° (m)
2.5 
(n) 
5 
(b) 
Figure 5.4 Parameterised trapezoidal function 
Fuzzy sets can be characterised in more detail by referring to the features used in 
characterising the membership functions that describe them [Kandel M .. 1986: Dubois 
D. et. al.. 1993]. 
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The "Support" of a fuzzy set A, denoted by Supp( A), means that all elements of X 
belong to A to a non-zero degree [ Kruse R. et aI., 1994]. Formally. this is gi\cn by: 
Supp(A) = (XEX I A(x) > O} (4) 
Alternatively, the "Core" of a fuzzy set A is the set of all elements of X that exhibit a 
unit level of membership in A [Kruse R. et aI., 1994], Formally, this is given by: 
Core(A) = ( XEX I A(x) = 1 } (5) 
Figure 5.5 shows a graphical representation of the "Support" and "Core" of a fuzzy set. 
The "Support" and "Core" of fuzzy sets may be viewed as closely related concepts in 
the sense that they identify elements belonging to the fuzzy set and they are both sets. 
All elements of a "Core" are sub-named by the "Support". Interval [a,d] is called the 
"Support" and interval [b,c] is called the "Core". 
- x a b c 
.......... ./ ~ "-- '( Core 
---v 
Support 
Figure 5.5 Representation of fuzzy set "Support" and "Core" 
5.3.2 Representation theorem 
Any fuzzy set can be regarded as a family of fuzzy sets. This is the essence of an 
identity principle known also as the representation theorem. To explain this 
construction, it is required to define the notion of an a -cut of a fuzzy sct. The a -cut of 
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A, denoted by Alb is a set consisting of those elements in the UnIyerse X \\host? 
membership values exceed the threshold level a. This is formally represented by: 
Aa= (xl A(x) ~a} (6) 
In other words, Aa consists of elements of x identified with A to a degree of at least a. In 
particular, the highest level, a = 1, determines a set of x totally belonging to A. Clearly 
the lower the level of a, the more elements are admitted to the corresponding a-cut, that 
is, if a1 > a2 then Au1 c Au2 . The representation theorem states that any fuzzy set A can 
be decomposed into a series of its a-cuts. This can be represented by: 
A = U (a4a ) , or equivalently 
aE(O,I) 
A(x) = SUp[a4
a
(X)] (7) 
aE[O,I] 
Conversely, any fuzzy set can be "reconstructed" from a family of nested sets (assuming 
that they satisfy the constraint of consistency: if a1 > a2 then AUl C Au2. This theorems' 
importance lies in its underscoring of the very nature of the generalisation provided by 
fuzzy sets. Furthermore, the theorem implies that problems formulated in the framework 
of fuzzy sets (such as risk and reliability analysis) can be solved by transforming these 
fuzzy sets into their corresponding families of nested a-cuts and determining solutions 
to each using standard, non-fuzzy techniques. Subsequently, all the partial results 
derived in this way can be merged, reconstructing a solution to the problem in its 
original formulation based on fuzzy sets. By increasing the number of quantisation 
levels of the membership values (that is the a-cuts), the reconstruction can be made 
more detailed. Figure 5.6 shows a diagrammatic representation of a-cuts. Clearly. the 
lower the level of a, the more elements are admitted to the corresponding a-cut, that is. 
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A (x) 
~--------------~~--~ .. ----------al 
(j, 
A cx2 
Figure 5.6 Representation of a-cuts on a fuzzy set 
5.3.3 Application of FST 
Since FST was proposed almost four decades ago, it has found many useful 
applications. The linguistic approach based on fuzzy sets has given very good results for 
modelling qualitative information. It has been widely used in different fields, for 
example, information retrieval [Bordogna G. and Pasi G., 1993], clinical diagnosis 
[Degani R. and Bortolan G., 1988], marketing [Yager R.R. et. al., 1994], risk in 
software development [Lee H.M., 1996a; Lee H.M., 1996b], technology transfer 
strategy selection [Chang P. and Chen Y., 1994], education [Law C.K., 1996], decision 
making [Bordogna G. et. al., 1997], environmental engineering [Deshpande A.W., 
1999], and many more. A review by Maiers and Sherif in 1985, covered over 450 
papers addressing FST application in areas of automation control, decision making, 
biology and medicine, economics and the environment [Maiers 1. and Sherif Y.S., 
1985]. 
The use of FST in system safety and reliability analyses could prove to be a useful tooL 
as these analyses often require the use of subjective judgement and uncertain data. By 
allowing imprecision and approximate analysis, FST helps to restore integrity to 
reliability analyses by allowing uncertainty and not forcing precision where it is not 
possible. However, the theory can be difficult to use directly. The use of linguistic 
variables allows a tlexible modelling of imprecise data and information. A lingui"tic 
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variable differs from a numerical variable in that its values are not numbers but words 
or sentences in a natural or artificial language. Since words in general are less precise 
than numbers, the concept of a linguistic variable serves the purpose of providing a 
means of approximate characterisation of phenomena, which are too complex or ill 
defined to be amenable to description in conventional quantitative terms [Schmucker 
KJ., 1984]. More specifically, the fuzzy sets, which represent the restriction associated 
with the values of a linguistic variable, may be viewed as summaries of various sub-
classes of elements in a universe of discourse (a universe of discourse is the range of all 
possible values for an input to a fuzzy system). This is analogous to the role played by 
words and sentences in a natural language. 
5.4 A Proposed Approach 
The proposed approach is divided into two main modelling categories, that is, likelihood 
probability (Part 1) and severity of consequences (Part 2). It involves several steps, 
which are represented in the flowchart shown in figure 5.7. A combination of FST and 
expert judgement is used to accomplish the modelling of the two parameters. The 
outcome of which is used to rank the risk associated with an event failure according to 
its priority. Part 1 of the approach uses Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to identify the critical 
components of a system [Pillay A. et. aI., 2000]. Using this FTA, fuzzy arithmetic 
calculation is performed on the basic events to obtain the fuzzy probability estimates of 
the primary events. The results are left in the linguistic state to enable integration with 
the analysis of severity of consequences. 
In Part 2 of the approach, the severity of a failure is assessed for its effect on four 
categories, as will be discussed later. The results of the analysis in Parts I and 2 are 
combined using the min-max inference rule to obtain a linguistic term for the risk. This 
linguistic tenn is then defuzzified using the weighted mean of maximum method to 
produce the risk ranking. 
Part I 
1- - - - --
Construct FT A 
Structure selection 
Membership function 
and estimation 
Fuzzy calculation 
Bas ic/pri mary even t 
probability 
A vailable Data 
r------------- Part 2 
NO 
Use Expert 
Jud!.!cmcnt 
Assign consequences 1 ...... _.._----' 
score for eac h grou 
I 
Personnel Environment ./ 
o 
Equipment Catch I j 
Calculate Total Score for each f-I ________ ---, 
Risk Synthesis 
& 
Ranking 
event (~x 
Use fuuy rules to obtain 
m em hersh in fu nction 
Figure 5.7 Flowchart of the proposed approach 
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The first step of the proposed approach is to establish the type of data that is available 
for analysis. Depending on the size and organisational structure of the company, this 
data will vary in terms of its format and availability. The data available from fishina 
c 
vessels are most likely repair data that would just reflect the date the repair was carried 
out and the spares consumed. Such data should be restructured to enable analysis using 
the fuzzy set approach. 
The consequences of an event may not be documented in a format where it is readily 
useable for analysis. The severity of the consequence could be determined by the cost 
incurred from the result of the failure. This however may only be limited to equipment 
loss, production loss, environmental clean up cost, etc. The injury or loss of life (due to 
the failure of an equipment) is normally expressed in terms of number of casualties and 
the extent of the injury (bruises, required shore medical assistance, permanent 
disablement or death). 
5.4.1 Part 1: Probability of failure event occurrence 
Constructing fault tree - Once the failure data has been gathered, it is grouped and 
sorted by its equipment/sub-system and finally the system to which the component 
belongs. The top event of the fault tree will be the failure of the equipment (e.g. main 
winch failure) while the initiating events and basic events will be the component failure 
(e.g. seal leakage, brake failure, control valve failure, etc). A full description of FT A has 
been provided in chapter 3 (section 3.8). It is best to construct a fault tree for equipment 
within a system separately as it enables data handling and analysis to be conducted. The 
individual fault trees can later be collated to analyse the system failure. Fault tree 
construction can be achieved with the use of computer software packages such as Fault 
Tree + V6.0 and AvSim+ [Fault Tree +, 1995; AvSim+, 1998]. 
Structure selection - In the structure selection phase. the linguistic variable is 
determined with respect to the aim of the modelling exercise. Informally. a linguistic 
variable is a variable whose values are words or sentences rather than numbers. 
Considering the available data at hand and the aim of this approach. the linguistic 
variable is determined to be the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired critical e\cnt 
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PMS 
PSF 
QRA 
RAM 
RCM 
RCML 
RCa 
RCOL 
RCT 
RNLI 
RPN 
RRN 
SART 
SFE 
SHA 
SLIM-MAUD 
SNAMES 
SRM 
SSHA 
STCW 
THERP 
UKEAE 
USCG 
Preventive Maintenance Schedule 
Performance-Shaping Factor 
Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability 
Reliability Centred Maintenance 
Risk Control Measure Log 
Risk Control Option 
Risk Control Option Log 
Risk Contribution Tree 
Royal National Lifeboat Institution 
Risk Priority Number 
Risk Ranking Number 
Search And Rescue Transponder 
System Failure Analysis 
System Hazard Analysis 
Success Likelihood Index Method-Multi-Attribute 
Utility Decomposition 
Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 
Sandia Recovery Model 
Subsystem Hazard Analysis 
Standard of Training, Certification and Watch 
keeping 
Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
United States Coast Guard 
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that is, the probability of failure occurring. The linguistic terms to describe this variable 
are then decided, for example, Very High, High, Moderate. Low and Remote. 
Membership function and estimation - Six classes of experimental methods help to 
determine membership function: horizontal approach, vertical approach. pairwise 
comparison, inference based on problem specification, parametric estimation and fuzzy 
clustering [Pedrycz W. and Gomide F., 1998]. The method selected depends heavily on 
the specifics of an application, in particular, the way the uncertainty is manifested and 
captured during the sampling of data. The membership function chosen must be able to 
represent the available data in the most suitable and accurate manner. Due to the nature 
of the arithmetic involved, the shape of the membership function suited for the proposed 
approach would either be triangular or trapezoidal, therefore the horizontal or vertical 
approach for function determination is applied [Pedrycz W. and Gomide F., 1998]. The 
vertical method takes advantage of the identity principle and 'reconstructs' a fuzzy set 
via identifying its a-cuts. After several levels of a are selected, the investigator is 
required to identify the corresponding subset of X whose elements belong to A to a 
degree not less than a. The fuzzy set is built by stacking up the successive a-cuts. 
Figure 5.8 shows an example of the stacking process of a-cuts. 
1 
o 
.i~~--------~--~ •. ' Aa2 
.,~~--~------~----~ __ .Aa3 
Figure 5.8 Vertical approach for function determination 
Fu;.;.y calclliation in fault trees - Given the critical e\'ent or undesired condition (top 
event). a fault tree can be developed using backward logic to create a net work of 
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intermediate events linked by logic operators (usually AND and OR operators) down to 
the initiating basic events. The fault tree itself is the logic structure relating the top event 
to the primary events. These primary/basic events may be related to human error 
(operators, design or maintenance), hardware or software failures, environmental 
conditions or operational conditions. 
The probability of an event defined as a fuzzy set is developed as below [Bowles J .B. 
and Pahiez C.E.,1995]. Let S be a sample space and P a probability measure defined on 
S. Then, 
peS) = LdP = 1 
If E c S is an event then 
Where CE(x) = 1 if x E E 
o otherwise 
Zadeh has observed that peE) can be viewed as the expected value of the characteristic 
function that defines the set E [Zadeh L.A., 1987]. By analogy, he defines the 
probability of the fuzzy set A as the expected value of the membership function for A : 
On a discrete sample space, S = {Xl, X2, X3 ....... XII}, this is, 
11 
peA) = Lf.1 A (Xi )P(xi ) (9) 
i=l 
Intuitively, equation (8) and (9) define the probability of a fuzzy event as the summation 
over all elements, of the probability the event occurs weighted by the degree to which 
the element is a member of the event. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the probability 
of the possibility of the fuzzy event. 
The following properties of the probability of ordinary events also hold for the 
probabilities of fuzzy events [Terano T. et. al.. 1992]. 
• P( A ) ~ P( B ) if A c B 
- -
• P( A ) = 1- P( A ) 
- - -
• P( A u B ) = P( A ) + P( B ) - P( A n B ) 
For most system and components, the organisational structure can be described as either 
'parallel' or 'series' or a combination of series and parallel as seen in figures 5.9, 5.10 
and 5.11 
-----IL....-.. __ ----'I-------iL....-_
2
_-----'lmm!L-__ '_I __ 1---
Figure 5.9 Series System 
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2 
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1/ 
Figure 5.10 Parallel System 
J 
Figure 5.11 Series-Parallel System 
System reliability can be analysed probabilistically as shown below: 
Let Pi = probability of failure of component i. Then 
Ri = reliability of component = 1 - Pi 
Let P~ys = system probability of failure. Then 
Rsys = system reliability = 1 - Psy<, 
For a parallel system, the system will work as long as at least one component is in 
operational order. If, as is traditionally assumed, components are independent and the 
system is either working or failed, the system probability failure (PsyJ is the product of 
the individual component failure probabilities: 
Psys=P\.P2·P3· ...... Pn. (10) 
Applying equation (10) to a two component (A and B) parallel system with fuzzy 
probabilities will give: 
(11 ) 
In a series system, all constituent components must be operational for the system to 
work. Series systems are analysed in terms of their component reliabilities: Rsys = R\ • R2 
• R3 • Rn. The analysis of a series system using reliabilities is identical to that of a 
parallel system using failure probabilities. In terms of failure probabilities for the series 
system: 
Applying equation (12) to a two component (A and B) serIes system with fuzzy 
probabilities will give: 
When two basic events represent the input to an AND gate as shown in figure 5.12, it 
can be assumed that these two events are in a parallel configuration. It denotes that the 
occurrence of both events will cause the AND gate to be operative and the prohability 
will be given by equation (11). For an OR gate with two hasic c\ents as its input as 
shown in figure 5.1 J. it can be considered that the two events are in a ~eries 
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configuration. This denotes that if either events occur, the OR gate will be operati\c and 
the probability will be given by equation (] 3) [Bowles J.B. and Pahiez C.E., 1905]. 
AND 
Figure 5.12 AND gate 
OR 
~ ~ ~ 
~'\S = [1- (1- PA )(1- PB )] 
Figure 5.] 3 OR gate 
Fu;;y arithmetic operations - In standard fuzzy arithmetic. basic operations on real 
numbers are extended to those on fuzzy intervals. A fuzzy interval A is a normal fuzzy 
set on R (set of real numbers) whose (X-cuts for all CXE (0, 1] are closed intervals of real 
numbers and whose support is bounded by A. 
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Two common ways of defining the extended operation are based on the a-cut 
representation of fuzzy intervals and on the extension principle of FST [Kaufman A. 
and Gupta M.M., 1985; Klir G.J. and Yuan B., 1995]. When a-cut representation is 
employed, arithmetic operations on fuzzy intervals are defined in terms of arithmetic 
operations on closed intervals. To define the individual arithmetic operation 
specifically, let the symbols [af ,a~] and [bf ,bf] denote for each aE(O,IJ the a-
cuts of fuzzy intervals A and B, respectively. Using this notation, the individual 
arithmetic operations on the a-cuts of A and B are defined by the well known formulas 
from interval analysis [Kaufman A. and Gupta M.M., 1985; Klir GJ. and Yuan B., 
1995J given below: 
Aa + Ba = [af + bf ,a~ + bf] (14) 
Au -Ba= [af -bf,a~ -bf] (IS) 
Au x Ba = [afbf ,a~ bf] (16) 
Aa / Ba = [af / bf ,a~ / b1a ] (17) 
Aa±k= [af,a~]±k = [af +k,a~ +k] (18) 
Aa x k = [af ,a~]x k = [kaf ,ka~] (19) 
Equations (16) and (17) are true for all non-negative numbers. Figures S.14 and S.lS 
illustrate simple addition and subtraction operations of a -cuts of sets A and B 
respectively. 
Figure S.14 Addition operation on a-cut 
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Figure 5.15 Subtraction operation on a-cut 
5.4.2 Part 2: Severity of consequences 
List of consequences - When carrying out a comprehensive analysis, it is important that 
all the consequences of a failure is considered. It has been noted that due to the poor 
documentation of accidents on fishing vessels, the list of identifiable consequences are 
limited to the serious or life threatening ones, for example, death of a crew, complete 
loss of a vessel/equipment and so on. Therefore, expert judgement should be used to 
compile a list of consequences and complement the historical data. This can be achieved 
in the form of a FMEA [Smith D.J., 1992]. Upon being satisfied that all the 
consequences for each event/failure have been compiled, the analyst has to assign them 
into their respective groups. In the proposed approach, four groups have been identified, 
that is, Personnel, Equipment, Environment and Catch. For each event or failure , a 
rating from 1 - 4 is given for each of the groups. The ratings describe the consequences 
of an event occurring in linguistic terms such as 'Negligible ', 'Marginal ', ' Critical' and 
'Catastrophic'. The significance of each of the ratings are listed and described as 
follows: 
Personnel: 
Effect of failure of the item on personnel (worst case always assumed). 
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Rating 1 = Negligible (No or little damage- bruises/cuts) 
Rating 2 = Marginal (Minor injuries - treatable on board) 
Rating 3 = Critical (Major injuries - requires professional attention) 
Rating 4 = Catastrophic (Death/permanent disablement) 
Environment: 
Effect of failure of the item on the environment 
Rating 1 = No effect (No or little effect) 
Rating 2 = Marginal effect (Can be controlled by ship-staff) 
Rating 3 = Critical effect (Requires shore assistance) 
Rating 4 = Catastrophic effect (permanent damage to the environment) 
Equipment: 
Effect of failure on machinery or system in terms of down time if failure occurs and cost 
of repair. 
Rating 1 = Negligible (No or little attention needed - cleaning up/drying) 
Rating 2 = Marginal (Minor repair - few hrs lost) 
Rating 3 = Critical (Major repair - few days lost) 
Rating 4 = Catastrophic (Destruction of equipment - Total plant shutdown) 
Catch: 
Effect of failure on fishing operation in terms of catch effected: -
Rating 1 = No effect (No or little effect) 
Rating 2 = Marginal effect (Catch affected for a few hours) 
Rating 3 = Critical effect (Catch affected for a few days) 
Rating 4 = Catastrophic effect (No catch for a few months) 
Caiclilate Total Score (Lxij) - Upon assIgnmg a score for each group, a table is 
generated as shown in table 5.1. From this table. a "Total Score" is calculated by 
summing the score of each individual group for an event. This total score will later be 
llsed to assign the membership function for that event using fuzzy rules. 
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Personnel Environment Equipment Catch Total Sc()n.'(~:X,,) 
Failure Y1 X Il X21 X31 ~l IX,I 
Failure Y2 X 12 Xn X'2 X-t2 IXi2 
Failure Y 3 X13 Xl-' X33 X-t3 IXi3 
Table 5.1 Event score 
Fuzzy rules - The fuzzy rules determining the membership function of each event are 
divided into 4 categories i.e. Hazard Class 1(HC1), HC2, HC3 and HCt . The maximum 
score of an event is used to assign that particular event to the appropriate hazard class. 
Therefore, if an event has a score of [2,2,1,1] for each group respectively, it would be 
assigned to HC2 (the maximum score for that event is 2 for the Personnel and 
Environment categories). 
Fuzzy rules are generated based on available historical data, expenence and 
complemented by expert knowledge. Where possible, logbooks are analysed for 
casualty and accident reports to develop the following rules: 
Hazard Class 1 (HC]) 
If an event has a score of [1,1,1,1], which entails that for all categories considered, the 
effect of the failure is negligible, then the total effect of that failure on the system and 
environment should be negligible as well. Hence, 
1) If I.Xij = 4, then Negligible ................ ( 1.0) 
Hazard Class 2 (HC2) 
The minimum score possible in the HC2 category is 5, i.e. [2,1,1,1] or any variation of 
this score. The maximum possible score is 8, i.e. [2,2,2,2], therefore the range of 
membership function between these two extremities is assigned so as to ensure a 
smooth transition between limits to have overlapping of functions. Hence: -
2) If Xij max = 2, and I.Xij = 5 then 0.8 Negligible, 0.6 MarginaL ........ (2.0) 
I.Xij = 6 then MarginaL 0.2 Critical .................. (2.1) 
I.Xij = 7 then 0.5 Marginal, 0.8 Critical ............. (2.2) 
I.Xij = 8 then Critical, 0.2 Catastrophic ............. (2.3) 
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Figure 5.16 Hazard class 2 
The minimum score possible in the HC~ category is 6, i.e. [3,1,1,1] or any variation of 
this score. The maximum possible score is 12, i.e. [3,3,3,3]. When assigning the 
linguistic membership function for HC3, it is important to compare the values with that 
of the HC2 to ensure that it does not contradict the nIles generated for that hazard class. 
For the same total score in HC2 and HC3, the linguistic membership function for HC~ 
(for that particular score) should logically reflect a more severe consequence. For 
example, for a total score of 7 for HC2 and HC3, which would have a combination of 
[2,2,2,1] and [3,2,1,1] respectively, using expert judgement, one would say that 
although both classes have the same total score, a total score of 7 for HC~ would entail a 
more severe consequence. Hence the membership function for HC3 and a total score of 
7 would be 0.8 Critical, 0.2 Catastrophic which is higher than the membership function 
for HC2 with the same total score of 7, which is 0.5 Marginal, 0.8 Critical. Using this 
method, the rules for HC~ are generated for the other values of its total scores and are 
reflected below: 
3) If X ij max = 3, and I,Xij = 6 then 0.5 Marginal, CriticaL .......................... (3.0) 
I,Xij = 7 then 0.8 Critical, 0.2 Catastrophic .................. (3.1) 
I,Xii = 8 then 0.5 Critical, 0.5 Catastrophic .................. (3.2) 
I,Xij = 9 then 0.2 Critical, 0.8 Catastrophic .................. (3.3) 
I,Xii = 10 then Catastrophic .................................... (3....1-) 
I,Xij = II then Catastrophic .................................... (3.)) 
I,Xii = 12 then Catastrophic .................................... (3.6) 
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The above rules can be represented graphically as seen in figure 5.17. 
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Figure 5.17 Hazard class 3 
Hazard Class 4 (He;) 
4) IfXij max = 4, and LXij ~ 7 then Catastrophic ..................................... (4.0) 
It is necessary to assign a hazard class for each event as the consequences of the event 
are considered for different groups. Grouping each event into a hazard class allows 
direct comparison with other events and enables the effects of a failure to be compared 
based on its linguistic terms assigned to it. For example, if an event A has a score of 
[3,3,1,1] and a total of 8 and event B has a score of [2,2,2,2] which also gives a total of 
8, from experience and expert judgements, it can be said that event A is more serious in 
nature. Hence, it should be assigned a linguistic term which must be 'more severe' 
compared to event B. To enable this distinction between events, which have the same 
total score, hazard classification is introduced, i.e. HC I, HC 2, etc. Therefore, the 
membership function for event A and B will be obtained from Rules No.(3.2) and (2.3) 
respectively. At this stage of the proposed approach, each event would be assigned 
likelihood and consequences of occurrence. The next step would be to analyse these two 
parameters and provide a risk ranking number for each event. 
5.4.3 Risk assessment 
The risk associated with a failure increases as either the se\'crity of the consequences of 
the failure or the failure probability increases. The se\'crit\' of an e\'cnt is ranked 
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according to the seriousne s of the effect of the failure. Judgement of the e erit f a 
failure consequence is , by its very nature, highly ubjective. U ing a pliority matri . th 
"riskiness" of a failure can be obtained. The ri k po ed by the failure i expre ed in 
linguistjc terms such as 'Very Important ', 'Important', 'Moderate' and 'Low '. Thi 
matrix is based on the probability of occurrence and the everity of the con equence. 
Table 5.2 displays the various combinations of these two parameters. 
The interpretation of hazard risk ranking is given as below: 
• Very Important => Needs immediate corrective action. 
• Important => Review and correcti ve action to be carried out. 
• Moderate Review to be carried out and corrective action 
implemented if found to be cost effective. 
• Low Review subject to availability of revenue and time. 
Severity of Occurrence 
NEG MARG CRIT CAT 
REMOTE RN RM RC RCAT 
~ ~ LOW LN LM LC LCAT 
'-> Q ~ ~ ~ MODERATE MN MC ..... t:: ...t::> 
c::s ~ 
...t::> '-> HIGH HN ~ '-> ~ 0 
VERY HIGH 
Very important Important 
Moderate Low 
Table 5.2 Probability and consequence matrix 
From thi table, a ri k ranking in lingui tic term can be obtained for the fa ilur f a 
y tem/ ub- y tern or component. For example, if the probability of failure i 'High' 
and the severity i 'Marginal' , then the ri k would be cla , ified a 'Important'. In rd r 
to utili e thi info11l1ation for the deci ion making proc ., a cri p nllmb r ha t be 
obtained from the linguistic terms to rank the risk according to its priority. One common 
procedure for ranking risk is to use the RPN or 'Risk Priority Number'. This method 
provides a numerical ranking for each term and multiplies them to assess the riskiness 
[Loughran C.G. et. aI., 1999]. 
Fuzzy set approach provides a more flexible and meaningful way of assessing risk. The 
analysis uses linguistic variables to describe severity and probability of occurrence of 
the failure. These parameters are 'fuzzified' to determine their degree of membership in 
each input class using the membership functions developed. The resulting fuzzy inputs 
are evaluated using the linguistic rule base to yield a classification of the 'riskiness' of 
the failure and an associated degree of membership in each class. This fuzzy conclusion 
is then defuzzified to give a single crisp priority for the failure. 
Figure 5.18 shows the membership function of the riskiness of an event on an arbitrary 
scale, which would later be used to defuzzify the fuzzy conclusion and rank the risk 
according to a priority number. The membership function used is a triangular function 
which can be developed using the horizontal or vertical approach based on expert 
judgement [Pedrycz W. and Gomide F., 1998]. Unlike the trapezoidal function, the 
membership value of 1 in the triangular function is limited to only one value of the 
variable on the x-axis. 
Membership 
Low Moderate Important Very important 
Risk 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Low. Moderate Important v cry Important 
Figure 5.18 Membership function of riskiness 
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5.4.4 Rule Evaluation 
Rules are evaluated using min-max inferencing to calculate a numerical conclusion to 
the linguistic rule based on their input value [Zadeh L.A., 1992]. The result of this 
process is called the fuzzy risk conclusion. 
The 'truth value' of a rule is determined from the conjunction (i.e. minimum degree of 
membership of the rule antecedents) [Zadeh L.A., 1973]. Thus the truth-value of the 
rule is taken to be the smallest degree of truth of the rule antecedents. This truth-value is 
then applied to all consequences of the rule. If any fuzzy output is a consequent of more 
than one rule, that output is set to the highest (maximum) truth-value of all the rules that 
include it as a consequent. The result of the rule evaluation is a set of fuzzy conclusions 
that reflect the effects of all the rules whose truth-values are greater than zero. 
Consider the risk priority table (table 5.2) where the probability of occurrence is 'High' 
and the severity is 'Marginal' and having a membership function of 0.6 and 1.0 
respectively. Thus the conclusion Riskness = 'Important' has a membership value of min 
(0.6,1.0) = 0.6. To establish how risky the hazard is, this fuzzy conclusion has to be 
defuzzified to obtain a single 'crisp' result. 
5.4.5 Defuzzification 
The defuzzification process creates a single assessment from the fuzzy conclusion set 
expressing the risk associated with the hazard, so that corrective actions can be 
prioritised. Several defuzzification techniques have been developed [Runkler T.A. and 
Glesner M., 1993]. One common technique is the weighted mean of maximum method, 
which is illustrated here. This technique averages the points of maximum possibility of 
each fuzzy conclusion, weighted by their degrees of truth. Hence, if the conclusion from 
the risk evaluation phase is, for example, 0.5 Low. 0.1 Low and 0.5 Mod, the maximum 
value for each linguistic term is taken. This reduces the conclusion to 0.5 Low and 0.5 
Mod to he defuzzified. 
~C=ha~p~te~/~'5~-~R~i=sk~A~s=s=eS='S=111~e/~lt~U~5~'iI~lg~F~u~Z~z\~!S~e~t~A~pp~r~o~ac~h~ _____________________________ 124 
The following is given to demonstrate how riskiness is obtained. Suppose Event A has 
the following probability of occurrence and severity of consequences: 
Probability of Occurrence - Moderate (0.6 High, 1.0 Moderate. 0.5 Low). 
Severity - Marginal (1.0 Marginal). 
Then from the risk priority table (Table 5.2), event A will be denoted by the prefix l\(]\( 
and therefore is associated with a riskiness of 'Important'. However, considering all the 
membership functions of the two parameters, i.e. probability of occurrence and severity. 
the following terms of riskiness are generated: 
0.6 High, 1.0 Marginal = HM = 0.6 Important 
1.0 Moderate, 1.0 Marginal = MM = Important 
0.5 Low, 1.0 Marginal = LM = 0.5 Moderate 
From figure 5.18, the support value for each linguistic term is obtained, where: 
The support val ue for Moderate = 4 
The support value for Important = 6 
The support value represents an average value for a particular linguistic term. 
Taking the maximum value for each term of the riskiness, that is, Important and 0.5 
Moderate, the weighted mean is calculated as seen here: 
The weighted mean (Z) = [(1.0)(6) + (0.5)(4)]/(1.0+0.5) 
= 5.33 
From this result the riskiness of event A can be prioritised as being "Important" with a 
support of 5.33. 
5.5 Application to a Hydraulic Winch System 
To demonstrate the proposed approach, the data from a fishing vessel is used as a test 
case. The data collected for the test case is in the format of repair data. It includes: 
• Voyage no (shows the date when the repair was carried out). 
• Equipment repaired. 
• Parts that were changed. 
• Modi fications that were made. 
• Cause of failure (in some instances). 
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Specialists/contract workers carry out the repairs for this particular \essel. in the 
floating dock. Should a failure occur during operation at sea, temporary repair is carried 
out by the crew and the equipment is kept operating in the 'abnormal' condition. No 
records are kept of any temporary repairs done on board, however, a repair list is 
compiled by the Chief Engineer for the equipment to undergo permanent repair work at 
the next 'docking'. 
In order to use this data for the modelling process, the following assumptions were 
made: 
• Repairs and modifications are only carried out when the equipment/component has 
failed. 
• Upon completion of repair, the equipment is assumed to be "same-as-new". 
For this test case the trapezoidal function was selected and estimated. The boundaries of 
the trapezoidal function were determined for each set. These values being the values of 
x for the respective a-cuts are subjective and were predominantly based on the policies 
and attitude of the company and on what the company thought to be tolerable limits 
within which they wish to operate. To describe the probability of occurrence, linguistic 
terms such as "Very High", "High", "Moderate", "Low", and "Remote" are used. A 
range of limits quantifying the probability of occurrence is then assigned to each term. 
These limits are in the form of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). MTBF is given 
by: 
~t·+~s· MTBF = L...J I L...J I (20) 
n 
where: tj = time to failure, Sj = survival time and n = number of failures. These limits are 
then converted into failure rates by the following formula: 
JL = I 
MTBF 
(2\ ) 
A failure rate is calculated under the assumption that the mean down time and repair 
time is very small compared to the operating time. The MTBF is then con\,erted to 
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failure rate using equation (21) and is reflected along an ordinal scale as shown in table 
5.3. 
The membership function used is a trapezoidal function which, is developed using the 
vertical approach as explained in section 5.4.1 [Pedrycz W. and Gomide F., 1998]. This 
function allows a membership value of 1 for a range of probabilities unlike the 
triangular function. This function is thought to model the probability of occurrence 
close to what it is in reality. Figure 5.19 shows the membership function along with its 
ordinal scale. The limits and the centre point values of the ordinal scale are given by the 
dotted line and will be used to perform the fuzzy arithmetic. 
Probability MTBF range Failure rate 
(Linguistic term) (days) (ordinal scale) 
Very High 1 to 5 1 to 2 x 10'1 
High 5 to 50 2 X 10- 1 to 2 x 10--
Moderate 50 to 500 2 x 1 0-2 to 2 x 10:J 
Low 500 to 2000 2 x 10-J to 5 x 10-4 
Remote 2000 to 10000 5 x 10-4 to 1 x 10-) 
Table 5.3 Probability range for linguistic terms. 
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Figure 5.19 Membership function and ordinal scale 
The system used to demonstrate this methodology is an operating system of a Gilson 
winch on board an ocean trawler. This trawler is a 1266 GRT (Gross Tonnage \. deep-
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sea trawler with an L.O.A (length overall) of 60 meters. The Gilson winch is 
hydraulically operated and is situated forward of the main winches. Unlike the main 
winches, it does not bear the load of the catch. It serves as an auxiliary winch to the 
main winches. 
Table 5.4 shows the failure data of the primarylbasic events for a Gilson winch failure. 
The data collected is over a period of 66 months (14 voyages), and from this data, the 
linguistic term for failure probability of each basic event is determined by identifying 
the number of occurrences per operating day(s) on the ordinal scale. The membership 
function is then determined by reading off the intersecting points on the y-axis, 
Basic Events MTBF (days) Linguistic Membership function term 
Pipe flange leak 900 Low 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 
Pipe 450 Moderate 0.6 High, Mod, 0.5 Low 
Control valve fail 900 Low 0.5 Mod, Low. 0.1 Rem 
Filter choke 40 High 0.72 V.High, High, 0.18 Mod 
Brake cylinder fail 750 Low 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 
Brake seal fail 300 Moderate 0.6 High, Mod, 0.5 Low 
Clutch cylinder fail 900 Low 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 
Clutch seal leak 900 Low 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 
Air cylinder fail 900 Low 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 
Table 5.4 Probabilities of basic events for a Gilson winch failure 
The fault tree shown in Figure 5.20 'is generated from the data collected for the failure 
of the Gilson winch. Each secondar:y or intermediate event (e.g. brake failure, clutch 
failure, hydraulic leakage, etc) is modelled by gathering the available failure data and 
then grouping them according to the ,component or system they affect. For example. the 
failure of the brake cylinder (GBCyl) and brake seal leakage (GBSeal) will cause the 
brake to fail. Hence, the brake failure (G.Brake) is the secondary event with the GBCyl 
and GBSeal being its basic events. To demonstrate the application of this methodology 
with an example, the fault tree used only traces the path of failures that have been 
known to occur in the past, rendering the system inoperable. 
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Take two basic events from the fault tree in figure 5.20, GBCyl and GBSeal a.'i an 
example. The occurrence rates for GBCyl and GBSeal are 1 failure in 750 days and I 
failure in 300 days respectively. Therefore event GBCyl would have a fuzzy probability 
of Low and GBSeal, Moderate. Performing the arithmetic operation using Equations 
(13), (15) and (16) on both these events will yield the result of 0.62 High, Moderate and 
0.46 Low for the secondary event, brake failure (G.Brake). Figure 5.21 shows a 
graphical representation of this. This can be interpreted as the secondary event 
belonging to the linguistic term High with a membership of 62%. complete membership 
(100%) to Moderate and Low with a membership of 46%. Similarly, all the basic events 
in the fault tree are analysed in this manner producing an end result for the top event. 
The Gilson winch failure has a fuzzy failure probability of HIGH with a membership 
function of 0.9 Very High, 0.84 High and O. I Moderate. Although the membership to 
the Very High linguistic term is the highest, when the result is defuzzified to reflect the 
range of probability which it belongs to, it falls into the High category on the ordinal 
scale. It can therefore be stated that the failure rate of the gilson winch lies between 2 x 
10- 1 and 2 x 10-2• 
Hydraulic leakage 
Prob:Moderate 
(Mod,0.46 Low) 
Pipe flange leak 
Prob:Low 
Hydraulic failure 
Prob:High 
(0.8 V.High, High) 
Control valve fail Filter chocked 
Prob:Low Prob:High 
Gi Ison wi nch 
failure Probe High 
(0.9V.High,0.84 
Hgh, 0.1 Mod) 
Brake Failure 
Probe Moderate 
(0.62 High, Mod, 
0.46 Low) 
lutch failure Prob 
Low (0.84 
Moderate,O.96 
Low) 
Figure 5.20 Fault tree of Gilson winch failure 
AIr cylinder fail 
Probe Low 
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5.5.1 Severity of consequences modelling 
The amount of data that was available on the consequences of a failure was scarce and 
difficult to come by. However, much of the data was in terms of cost and reports of 
accidents and incidents that led to injuries. Since there is no standard format for 
reporting an accident, the data was obtained from telexes, faxes, superintendent reports, 
Chief Engineers' logbook and various other sources. To complement the data, expert 
knowledge and judgement was used to assign ratings to each group (PersonneL 
Environment, Equipment and Catch). Table 5.5 shows the analyses of various failures in 
a Gilson winch system. 
Personn. Environ. Equip. Catch Total HC Membership function 
Pipe Flange I 2 I 1 5 2 0.8 Neg, 0.6 Marg. leak 
Pipe leak I 2 I I 5 2 0.8 Neg, 0.6 Man!. 
Control v/v I I 2 3 7 3 0.8 Crit., 0.2 Cat. fail 
Filter choke I I I 3 6 3 0.5 Man!.,Crit. 
Brake cyl fail I I 3 3 8 3 0.5 Crit.. O.sCat. 
Brake seal I I 2 2 6 2 Margo. 0.2 Crit. leak 
Clutch cyl fail I I 3 3 8 3 0.5 Crit.. O.sCat. 
Clutch seal I I ") ") 6 2 Margo. 0.2 Crit. 
leak - -
Air cyl fail I I I I .t 1 Nl'g. 
Table 5.5 Gilson winch severity of consequence 
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5.5.2 Risk ranking of the hydraulic }vinc/z system 
The probability of occurrence is determined for each basic event (table SA) and the 
severity of the same basic events is as shown in table 5.5. The risk estimation and 
ranking of these basic events can be carried out. For the pipe flange leak event, the 
probability of occurrence was determined to be 0.5 Mod, LoH' and 0.1 Rem. and the 
severity as 0.8 Neg and 0.6 Marg. Using the rule evaluation method described in section 
5.5.4 and 5.5.5, which is summarised here in table 5.6, the linguistic term for risk is 
determined. 
From table 5.6, the risk evaluation for the pipe flange failure can be summarised as 
being (0.5 Low, 0.5 Imp, 0.8 Low, 0.6 Mod, 0.1 Low and 0.1 Low). Using the 
minimum-maximum inferencing, this can be reduced to 0.8 Low, 0.6 Mod and 0.5 Imp. 
The number 0.8, 0.6 and 0.5 represents the degree of belief and not the membership 
function of the particular linguistic term. Similarly, the risk evaluation for all other basic 
events is carried out. The results of the evaluation are shown in table 5.7. 
Probability of occurrence Severity Risk 
0.5 Moderate 0.8 Negligible 0.5 Low 
0.5 Moderate 0.6 Marginal 0.5 Important 
Low 0.8 Negligible 0.8 Low 
Low 0.6 Marginal 0.6 Moderate 
0.1 Remote 0.8 Negligible 0.1 Low 
0.1 Remote 0.6 Marginal 0.1 Low 
Table 5.6 Risk evaluation for pipe flange failure 
Weighted mean for event pipe flange leak is calculated as follows: 
(0.8 x 2) + (0.6 x 4) + (0.5 x 6) 
Z= (0.8 + 0.6 + 0.5 ) 
= 3.68. 
Therefore from figure 5.18, the pIpe flange leak event will be prioritised by 
"Moderate" with a support value of 3.68. Similarly. the weighted mean can be 
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calculated for all the other events within the system. Table 5.8 shows the results of these 
calculations. 
Events Occurrence Severity Risk 
!pipe Flange leak 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 0.8 Neg, 0.6 Marg 0.8 Low, 0.6 Mod, 0.5 Imp 
!pipe leak 0.6 High, Mod, 0.5 0.8 Neg, 0.6 Marg 0.8 Low, 0.6 Mod, 0.6 Imp Low 
!Control v/v fail 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 0.8 Crit, 0.2 Cat 0.2 Mod, 0.8 Imp. 0.2 V.lmp 
!Filter choke 0.72 V.High, High, Crit, 0.5 Marg 0.5 Imp, V.lmp 0.18 Mod 
Brake cyl fail 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 0.5 Crit, 0.5 Cat 0.1 Mod, 0.5 Imp, 0.5 V.Imp 
Brake seal leak 0.6 High, Mod., 0.5 Marg, 0.2 Crit 0.5 Mod, Imp, 0.2 V.lmp Low 
Clutch cyl fail 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem 0.5 Crit, 0.5 Cat 0.1 Mod, 0.5 Imp, 0.5 V.Imp 
Clutch seal leak 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem Marg, 0.2 Crit 0.1 Low, Mod, 0.5 Imp 
Air cyl fail 0.5 Mod, Low, 0.1 Rem Neg Low 
Table 5.7 Risk evaluation of gilson winch basic events 
Event Risk (Linguistic term) Support value 
Filter choke Very Important 7.33 
Clutch cyl fail Important 6.72 
Brake cyl fail Important 6.72 
Control v/v fail Important 6.00 
Brake seal leak Important 5.65 
Clutch seal leak Moderate 4.50 
Pipe leak Moderate 3.68 
Pipe flange leak Moderate 3.68 
Air cyl fail Low 2.00 
Table 5.8 Defuzzified ranking of a gilson winch failure events 
5.6 Conclusion 
Lack of reliable safety data and lack of confidence in safety assessment ha\(~ been t\VO 
major problems in safety analysis of various engineering activities. This is particularly 
true in FSA due to the fact that the level of unce11ainty is high. In ship safety assessment 
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it may often be difficult to quantify the probability of undesired events occurring and 
the associated consequences of effect due to this very reason. 
The proposed approach addresses these concerns and offers an alternati\t~ solution. Its 
application can be extended to sub-systems within an operating system to generate a list 
of components, which are ranked according to their priority for attention. This can help 
the owners and operators of fishing vessels to improve operating and maintenance 
strategies. This approach can be adopted within the FSA framework for generic ships 
and the results obtained from the analysis can be further utilised in step 4- of the FSA 
[Marine Safety Agency, 1993]. As the proposed approach employs the fault tree 
method, it can be integrated at the hazard identification stage of a safety assessment as a 
preliminary fault tree. The analysis can then be carried forward to include quantification 
using linguistic terms for the probability of occurrence and severity of consequences. 
Due to the fact that precision is not forced, it would be appealing to use this method for 
fishing vessels as reliable safety data is scarce and hard to come by. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MODIFIED FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
Summary 
The marine industry is recognising the powerful techniques that can be used to perform 
risk analysis of marine systems. One technique that has been applied in both national 
and international marine regulations and operations lS Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA). This risk analysis tool assumes a failure mode occurs in a 
system/component through some failure mechanism, the effect of this failure is then 
evaluated. A risk ranking is produced in order to prioritise the attention for each of the 
failure modes identified. The traditional method utilises the Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) ranking system. This method determines the RPN by finding the multiplication 
of factor scores. The three factors considered are probability of failure, severity and 
detectability. Traditional FMEA has been criticised to have several drawbacks. These 
drawbacks are addressed in this chapter. A new proposed approach, which utilises the 
fuzzy rules base and grey relation theory is presented. 
6.1 Introduction 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is intended to provide information for 
making risk management decisions. Detail procedures on how to carry out an FMEA 
and its various application in the different industries have been documented by Stamatis 
[Stamatis D.H., 1995]. A brief introduction to this method of analysis is presented in 
chapter 3 (section 3.1 1). 
Over the years several variations of the traditional FMEA have been developed. 
Russomano and Price discusses the use of knowledge base system for the automation of 
the FMEA process [Russomano D.1. et. al., 1992: Price C.J. et. a\., 1992: Price C.J. et. 
al.. 1995]. The use of a causal reasoning model for FMEA is documented hy Bell [Bell 
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D. et. aI., 1992]. An improved FMEA methodology, which uses a single matrix to 
model the entire system and a set of indices derived from probabilistic combination to 
reflect the importance of an event relating to the indenture under consideration and to 
the entire system is presented by Kara-Zaitri [Kara-Zaitri C. et. al., 1991; Kara-Zaitri C. 
et. aI., 1992]. A similar approach was made to model the entire system using a fuzzy 
cognitive map [Pelaez C.E. and Bowles J.B., 1996]. 
Many FMEAs have a quantitative objective, that is, to predict the likelihood of certain 
types of system failures. This requires good information on the statistical distribution of 
component failures. It also requires knowledge of dependency relationships among 
components under normal operations and under external perturbations. 
FMEA can also be used as part of a qualitative analysis (or a semi-quantitative 
analysis). It attempts to identify critical components whose failure will lead to accident, 
injury, and/or property loss. The goal is to make systems safer or more reliable by: 
• Evaluating the effects of component failures on system performance. 
• Identifying those components that are critical to safety. 
• Developing system enhancements or administrative changes to Improve safety 
and/or system reliability. 
The major safety-related objectives of FMEA include: 
• Analysis of the system to determine effects of component failures on system 
performance and safety. 
• Identification of components that are critical to safety (identifying where component 
failure would compromise system operation, resulting in injuries, property damage, 
or other losses). 
• Redesigning the system to improve "passive" reliability and safety. 
• Improving maintenance routines to reduce the likelihood of component failures. 
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FMEA is used to assist analysts to perfonn hazard analyses and it is regarded as a 
supplement rather than a replacement for hazard analyses. Safety analysts can use the 
FMEA to verify that all safety critical hardware has been addressed in the hazard 
analyses. The FMEA in hardware systems is an important technique for evaluating the 
design and documenting the review process. All credible failure modes and their 
resultant effects at the component and system levels are identified and documented. 
Items that meet defined criteria are identified as critical items and are placed on the 
Critical Item List (Cli,). Each entry of the CIL is then evaluated to see if design changes 
can be implemented so that the item can be deleted from the CIL. Items that cannot be 
deleted from the Cli, must be accepted by the program/project, based on the rationale 
for acceptance of the identified risk. The analysis follows a well-defined sequence of 
steps that encompass (l) failure mode (2) failure effects (3) causes (4) detectability (5) 
corrective or preventive actions and (6) rationale for acceptance. 
6.1.1 FMEA procedure 
The process for carrying out an FMEA can be divided into several steps as seen in 
figure 6.1. These steps are briefly explained here: 
1. Develop a good understanding of what the system IS supposed to do when it is 
operating properly. 
2. Divide the system into sub-systems and/or assemblies m order to "localise" the 
search for components. 
3. Use blue prints, schematics and flow charts to identify components and relations 
among components. 
4. Develop a complete component list for each assembly. 
5. Identify operational and environmental stresses that can affect the system. Consider 
how these stresses might affect the performance of individual components. 
6. Determine failure modes of each component and the effects of failure modes on 
assemblies, sub-systems, and the entire system. 
7. For each failure mode, establish detectability (dependent upon several elements 
including alarm/monitoring devices in place) 
8. Categorise the hazard level (severity) of each failure mode (several qualitative 
systems have been developed for this purpose). 
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9. Estimate the probability. In the absence of solid quantitative statistical information, 
this can also be done using qualitative estimates. 
10. Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN): the RPN is given as the multiplication of 
the index representing the probability, severity and detectability. 
11. Determine if action needs to be taken depending on the RPN. 
12. Develop recommendations to enhance the system performance. These fall into two 
categories: 
• Preventive actions: avoiding a failure situation. 
• Compensatory actions: minimising losses in the event that a failure 
occurs. 
13. Summarise the analysis: this can be accomplished in a tabular form. 
Generally, an FMEA table will have a major row for each component. As these 
components may have multiple failure modes, the major row is sometimes divided into 
sub-rows where each sub-row summarises a specific failure mode. The table is 
organised into the following columns: 
a. Component - create a major row for each component. 
b. Failure mode(s) - identify failure modes and establish a sub-row for each mode. 
c. Effects (by failure mode) - describe the effects on safety and system performance 
resulting from the failure. List specific adverse outcomes. 
d. Probability - if reliability data does not exist, estimate using qualitative ranks. 
e. Hazard level (severity) - if experience data does not exist, estimate using qualitative 
ranks. 
f. Causes of failure mode (if known) - this includes environmental and/or operational 
stresses that increase the likelihood of the failure mode. 
g. Methods of detecting failure mode (if known) - although this entry does not prevent 
a failure from occurring, it is important to discover that a failure has occurred. This 
column is used to present signs and symptoms that a component has failed. 
h. Suggested interventions - hardware modifications and/or compensatory actions to 
minimise effects 
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Although there have been many variations of the FMEA, the terminology used 
throughout the years has been maintained. Some of the common terms used in an 
FMEA include: 
Failure mode: Failure modes are sometimes described as categorics of failure. A 
potential failure mode describes the way in which a product or process could fail to 
perform its desired function (design intent or performance requirements) as described 
by the needs, wants, and expectations of the internal and external customers /users. 
Examples of failure modes are: fatigue, collapse, cracked, performance deterioration. 
deformed, stripped, worn (prematurely), corroded, binding, seized, buckled, sag. loose. 
misalign, leaking, falls off, vibrating, burnt, etc. 
Potential cause( s) of failure: This is a list conceivable potential cause(s) of failure 
assignable to each failure mode. The causes listed should be concise and as complete as 
possible. Typical causes of failure are: incorrect material used, poor weld, corrosion, 
assembly error, error in dimension, over stressing, too hot, too cold, bad maintenance, 
damage, error in heat treat, material impure, forming of cracks, out of balance, tooling 
marks, eccentric, etc. 
Severity: Severity is an assessment of how serious the effect of the potential failure 
mode is on the customer/user. 
Effect: An effect is an adverse consequence that the customer/user might experience. 
The customer/user could be the next operation, subsequent operations, or the end user. 
6.2 Setbacks of FMEA 
The traditional FMEA has been a well-accepted safety analysis method, hmvC\cr. it 
suffers from several setbacks. One of the critically debated setbacks. is the method that 
the traditional FMEA employs to achieve a risk ranking. The purpose of ranking risk in 
order of importance is to assign the limited resources to the most serious risk items. 
Traditional FMEA uses a RPN to evaluate the risk level of a component or process. The 
RPN is obtained by finding the multiplication of three factors. which are thc probability 
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of failure (S{), the severity of the failure (S) and the probability of not detecting the 
failure (Sd). Representing this mathematically will give: 
RPN = Sf x S X Sd (1) 
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 list the scales used to measure the three factors given in equation 
(1 ). 
Probability of Occurrence Rating Possible failure rate (Operating days) 
Remote 1 < 1 :20000 
Low 2 1:20000 3 1:10000 
4 1 :2000 
Moderate 5 1: 1000 
6 1:200 
High 7 1: 100 8 1:20 
9 1: 10 Very High 10 1:2 
Table 6.1 Traditional FMEA scale for probability of occurrence (S1) 
Severity Rating 
Negligible 1 
2 
Low 3 
4 
Moderate 5 
6 
High 
7 
8 
9 
Very High 
10 
Table 6.2 Traditional FMEA scale for severity (S) 
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Detectability Rating Probability (%) of detection 
Very High 1 86-100 
High 2 76-85 3 66-75 
4 56-65 
Moderate 5 46-55 
6 36-45 
Low 7 26-35 8 16-25 
Remote 9 6-15 10 0-5 
Table 6.3 Traditional FMEA scale for detectability (Sd) 
These tables show that the traditional FMEA uses five scales and scores of one to ten, to 
measure the probability of occurrence, severity and the probability of detection. Though 
this simplifies the computation, converting the probability into another scoring system, 
and then finding the multiplication of factor scores are believed to cause problems. 
From tables 6.1 and 6.3 it can be seen that the relation between Sf and the probability 
scale is non-linear, while it is linear for that between Sd and the probability scale. 
The most critically debated disadvantage of the traditional FMEA is that various sets of 
s'r, Sand Sd may produce an identical value of RPN, however, the risk implication may 
be totally different [Gilchrist W., 1993; Ben-Daya M. and Raouf A., 1993]. For 
example, consider two different events having values of 2,3,2 and 4,1,3 for SI' Sand Sd 
respectively. Both these events will have a total RPN of 12 (RPN j = 2x3x2 = 12 and 
RPN2 = 4x 1 x3 = 12), however, the risk implications of these two events may not 
necessarily be the same. This could entail a waste of resources and time or in some 
cases a high risk event going unnoticed. 
The other prominent disadvantage of the RPN ranking method is that it neglects the 
relative importance among Sr, Sand Sd. The three factors are assumed to ha\l~ the same 
importance. This may not be the case when considering a practical application of the 
FMEA process. 
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An approach using fuzzy rule base and grey relation theory is proposed to address these 
setbacks. A fuzzy rule base is used to rank the potential causes identified within the 
FMEA, which would have identical RPN values but different risk implications. The 
approach then extends the analysis to include weighting factors for Sf. Sand Sd using 
defuzzified linguistic terms and grey relation analysis. The background of fuzzy set 
theory has been explained in chapter 5 (section 5.3) and the principle of grey relation 
theory is briefly described in section 6.3. 
6.3 Background of Grey Theory 
Grey system theory was proposed and developed by Deng in 1982 (Deng J., 1982: Deng 
J., 1989). In grey systems, the information, such as operation, mechanism, structure and 
behaviour, are neither deterministic nor totally unknown, but are partially known. It 
explores system behaviour using relation analysis and model construction. It also deals 
with making decisions characterised by incomplete information (Shih K.C. et. aI., 1996; 
Wu H.H. et. al., 1984). 
Grey system theory has been widely used in many fields, such as optimisation [Zheng 
Y. and Lewis R.W., 1993], engineering [Wu J.R. and Ouhyoung M., 1994], 
geomechanics [Zheng Y., 1988], economy [Jianer H., 1987], history [Junjiang H .. 
1986], geography [Li H., 1991], traffic [Senra L., 1986], management [Deng J., 1986] 
and so on. 
The use of grey theory within the FMEA framework can be accomplished [Chang C.L. 
et. aI., 1999]. The method involves several steps, which are briefly discussed here. First, 
a comparative series, which reflects the various linguistic terms and decision factors of 
the study, is generated The linguistic terms describing the decision factors are for 
example, Low, Moderate, High, etc. The comparative series can be represented in a 
form of a matrix as shown in equation (2). This matrix shows the failure modes, 
{Xl.X::, ...... x ll } and the linguistic terms describing each decision factor of the failure 
mode, (xd I ),xd2) ..... rdk)}, (xA I ),x::(2), ... x::(k)}, etc. 
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Xl X\O) XI (2) XI (k) 
X) x 2 (l) x 2 (2) x 2 (k) 
x= - (2) 
x
ll xn 0) xn(2) xn(k) 
The standard series is an objective series that reflects the ideal or desired level of all the 
decision factors and can be expressed as Xo = [xo(1 ),. xo(2), .... xo(k)]. This could be 
assumed to be the lowest level of the linguistic terms describing the decision factors. 
The difference between the two series, Do, (comparative and standard series) is 
calculated. The grey relation coefficient is obtained using equation (3): 
min min I xo(k) - Xi (k) I +s max max I xo(k) - Xi (/\) I 
r(xO(k),xi(k)) = [ k [ k (3) 
I Xo (k) - Xi (k) I +s m~x m:x I Xo (k) - Xi (k) I 
where xo(k) is the min or max value (as defined in equation (3)) from the standard series 
and xj(k) is the min or max value (as defined in equation (3)) from the comparative 
series and ~ is an identifier, ~ E (0,1), only affecting the relative value of risk without 
changing the priority [Hong G., 1986]. 
To find the degree of relation, the weighting coefficient (fA) of the decision factors must 
first be decided. For the application of the grey theory to FMEA, fA should be set to suit 
the intention of the FMEA and comply with equation (4). 
(4) 
The degree of relation. r(x/.xi)' can then be calculated using equation (5). 
n 
rc\.x;) = IPkY{.\ (k),xj(k)} (5) 
k=l 
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The degree of relation in FMEA denotes the relationship between the potential cause" 
and the optimal value of the decision factors. The higher the value obtained from 
equation (5), the smaller the effect of the identified events. Therefore, the increasing 
order of the degree of relation represents the risk priority of the identified areas that are 
to be improved. 
6.4 Proposed Fuzzy Rule Base Approach 
The aim of this approach is to develop a method that does not require a utility function 
to define the probability of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) and detectability (Sd) considered 
for the analysis and to avoid the use of the traditional RPN. This is achieved by using 
information gathered from experts and integrating them in a formal way to reflect a 
subjective method of ranking risk. 
The flowchart in figure 6.2 illustrates the proposed fuzzy set approach for the modified 
FMEA process. The first step is to set up the membership function of the three 
categories, that is, probability of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) and detectability (Sd). 
Once the membership functions of these three categories have been developed, the 
FMEA is carried out in the traditional manner with the use of brainstorming techniques 
[Brahm C. and Kleiner B.H, 1996; VanGundy A., 1998]. Each of the failure modes is 
then assigned a linguistic term representing the three linguistic variables, (probability of 
occurrence, severity and detectability). Using the fuzzy rule base generated, these three 
variables are integrated to produce linguistic terms representing the "priority for 
attention". This term represents the risk ranking of all the failure modes identified for 
the components. Once a ranking has been established, the process then follows the 
traditional method of determining the corrective actions and generating the FMEA 
report. 
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Figure 6.2 Flowchart of proposed fuzzy rule base approach 
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6.4.1 Fuzzy membership function 
The fuzzy membership function is developed for each of the three variables usmg 
multiple experts. These experts should be appropriately chosen so as to ensure realistic 
and non-biased membership functions [Kuusela H. et. aI., 1998]. The application of the 
modified FMEA to fishing vessels requires experts who are familiar with the operation 
and management circumstances of the industry. Using the selected experts, the fuzzy 
sets and membership functions can be generated as explained here, 
Assume that n experts are asked for some x E X to evaluate the proposition "x belongs 
to A" as either true or false, where A is a fuzzy set on X that represents a linguistic term 
associated with a given linguistic variable. Given a particular element x E X, let a/x) 
denote the answer of expert i (i E Nil)' Assume that a/x) = 1 when the proposition is 
valued by expert i as true, and a/x) = 0 when it is valued as false [Klir GJ. and Yuan 
B., 1995]. Then, 
n 
L a.(x) 
, 1 1 A(X)=~l =~--
n 
(6) 
may be viewed as a probabilistic interpretation of the constructed membership function. 
When the experts have different degrees of competencies, Ci, with regard to the model 
being constructed, equation (6) is modified to give: 
n 
A(x) = I Cia/x) (7) 
i=! 
where 
n ICi =1 (8) 
i=! 
The degree of competency for each of the experts should be determined based on their 
f - h' vess'els' and should be ab<Jreed upon b\ all the experience and knowledge 0 fts mg . 
expel1s involved in the study. 
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In the fuzzy rule base analysis, the linguistic variable is determined to be the probability 
of occurrence (Sf), the severity (S) and the detectability (Sd). Each of the three linguistic 
variables has five linguistic terms describing them. These linguistic terms are Remote, 
Low, Moderate, High and Very High (for simplicity, the term Negligible for the Severity 
category is substituted by Remote). The interpretations of these linguistic terms are 
given in table 6.4. This information can also be represented graphically as seen in figure 
6.3, where it was developed by a collective agreement between the analysts involved in 
the study. Each expert was asked for the values (on the x-axis) that they thought 
belonged to the appropriate linguistic term. The membership functions for the linguistic 
terms proposed were determined using equation (7). 
Linguistic Probability of Severity Detectability term occurrence 
A failure that has no Defect remains It would be very undetected until the 
effect on the system 
Remote unlikel y for these performance, the system performance failures to be observed degrades to the extent 
even once 
operator will probably 
that the task will not be 
not notice 
completed 
A failure that would 
cause slight annoyance Defect remains Likely to occur once, 
to the operator, but that undetected until system Low but unlikely to occur 
would cause no performance is 
more frequently deterioration to the severely reduced 
system 
A failure that would 
cause a high degree of 
operator dissatisfaction Defect remains 
Moderate Likely to occur more or that causes undetected until system 
than once 
noticeable but slight performance is affected 
deterioration in system 
performance 
A failure that causes Defect remains 
Near certain to occur at significant undetected until High 
least once deterioration in system inspection or test is performance and/or 
carried out leads to minor injuries 
A failure that would Failure remains 
undetected, such a 
Near certain to occur seriously affect the defect would almost Very High 
several times ability to complete the certainly be detected task or cause damage, during inspection or 
serious injury or death test 
Table 6.4 InterpretatIons of the ltngUIstIc terms 
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Membership 
1.0 Remote Low Moderate High Very High 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Figure 6.3 Graphical representation of the membership function for the linguistic terms 
6.4.2 Fuzzy rule base development 
Fuzzy logic systems are knowledge-based or rule-based systems constructed from 
human knowledge in the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules [Wang L.X., 1997]. An 
important contribution of fuzzy system theory is that it provides a systematic procedure 
for transforming a knowledge base into non-linear mapping. A fuzzy IF-THEN rule is 
an IF-THEN statement in which some words are characterised by continuos 
membership functions. 
IF- THEN rules have two parts: an antecedent that is compared to the inputs and a 
consequent, which is the result/output. The input of the fuzzy rules base is the 
probability of occurrence, severity and detectability. The output of the FMEA is 
assigned a linguistic variable, priority for attention, and is described linguistically by 
Low, Fairly Low, Moderate, Fairly High and High. 
In order to generate the fuzzy ntle base for the FMEA, the selected experts are asked to 
group the various combinations of linguistic terms describing the three factors 
considered into a category reflecting the priority for attention. Since there are three 
factors and five linguistic terms describing each factor, the total number of rules are 
125. However. some of these rules can be combined to reduce the number of rules of the 
fuzzy rule base. A typical rule from the rule base would read as: 
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"If failure probability is Remote, severity IS Remote and detectability IS LOll'. then 
priority for attention is Low." 
Using equation (7), the membership function for the rules in the fuzzy rule base can be 
determined. The rule base is then used in the FMEA to ascertain the priority for 
attention for each of the potential causes identified. 
6.4.3 Ranking the priority for attention 
The defuzzification process creates a single assessment from the fuzzy conclusion set 
expressing how corrective actions can be prioritised. Several defuzzification techniques 
have been developed [Runkler T.A. and Glesner M., 1993]. One common technique is 
the weighted mean of maximum method (WMoM), which is illustrated here. This 
technique averages the points of maximum possibility of each fuzzy conclusion. 
weighted by their degrees of truth [An M. et. aI., 2000a; An M. et. aI., 2000b]. 
Assume the output of the FMEA is assigned a linguistic variable, priority for attention, 
and is described linguistically by Low, Fairly Low, Moderate, Fair!.v High and High. 
The support value for each of these linguistic terms is determined by taking the 
weighted average of the support values given by each expert. Suppose the support 
values for the five linguistic terms are calculated on an arbitrary scale of 1 to 10 and are 
defined as follows: Fairl.v Low - 0.055, Low - 0.461, Moderate - 0.911, Fair/y High -
2.041 and High - 7.111. 
Suppose the potential cause identified in the FMEA has the following probability of 
occurrence, severity and detectability: Probability of Occurrence - Remote. Severity -
Remote, and Detectability - Moderate. Referring to the rule base, the priority of 
attention is for example, Low, 0.06 Fairly Low with a support value of 0.055 and 0..+61 
respectively. Using the WMoM method, the weighted mean, (Z). can be calculated as: 
Z = [( 1.0)(0.055) + (0.06)(0"+61 )]/( 1.0+0.06) = 0.0780 
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From this result the priority for attention of this particular event can be numerically 
expressed as being 0.0780. This method of defuzzification has been discussed in chapter 
5 (section 5.4.5). Similarly all the potential causes identified in the FMEA can be 
analysed in this manner to produce a ranking such that the highest value of the 
defuzzified conclusion reflects the highest priority for attention. 
6.5 Proposed Grey Theory Approach 
The flowchart in figure 6.4 illustrates the proposed grey theory approach to rank the 
events, which are identified in the FMEA process. The first step is to set up the 
membership function of the three categories (probability of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) 
and detectability (Sd)). This can be carried out as explained in section 6.4. In order to 
preserve consistency in the analysis, the membership functions estimated in section 
6.4.1 is preserved and applied here. Hence, each of the linguistic variables, that is, the 
probability of occurrence, severity and detectability will have five linguistic terms 
describing them. Upon identifying all the failure modes and causes of failure using 
brainstorming techniques (as used in the traditional FMEA process), the probability of 
occurrence, severity and detectability are assigned linguistic terms accordingly. 
Upon assigning the appropriate linguistic term to describe each linguistic variable (for 
each event), the next step requires a crisp number to be produced representing each of 
the linguistic terms assigned. In short, the application of these fuzzy sets with grey 
theory requires the defuzzification of the membership functions obtained in figure 6.3 
[Chang C.L. et. aI., 1999]. The defuzzified values of each of the linguistic terms are 
used to generate the comparative series, which is represented in the form of a matrix. 
At this stage, the standard series for the variables are generated by determining the 
optimal level of all three variables for the events in the FMEA. This standard series is 
also represented in the form of a matrix. The difference between the standard and 
comparative series is obtained and the results are used to determine the grey relation 
coefficient. 
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Using the value of the grey relation coefficient and introducing a weighting factor for all 
three linguistic variables, the degree of grey relation of each event can be calculated. 
This degree represents the ranking order of each event identified in the FMEA. 
FMEA 
(Using fuzzy linguistic terms to express Sf' Sand Sd) 
" 
Defuzzify Sf' Sand Sd 
to obtain a crisp number 
4 Establish standard series Establish comparative series ~ {x(/k)} {xlk)} 
---... 
Obtain difference 
...... 
(Do) ..... 
.. 
Compute grey relation coefficient Introduce weighting factors 
y{ xo(k),x/k) } (/ls' /lSI and /lsd) 
... 
Determine degree of relation ~ 
... {r(xi,x) } ..... 
-,Ir 
Rank according to 
ascending order 
Figure 6.4 Flowchart of proposed grey theory approach. 
Chen and Klien have proposed an easy defuzzification method for obtaining the crisp 
number of a fuzzy set as shown here in equation (9) [Chan C.B. and Klien C.M .. 1997]. 
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n 
L(bi -c) 
K(x) = Il 1=0 n (9) 
L(bi -c)- L(a i -d) 
i=O 1=0 
where K(x) is the defuzzified crisp number. As an example, consider the defuzzification 
of the linguistic term Moderate as seen in figure 6.5. This linguistic term can be 
defuzzified to produce a crisp value as seen below. 
K(x) = [bo -c]+[b1 -c] 
{[bo -c]+[b] -c]}-{[ao -d]+[a l -d]} 
[8-0]+[6-0] = 0.583 
{[8 - 0] + [6 - O]} - {[ 4 - 10] + [6 -) O]} 
embership 
Remote 1.0 .......,. Low 
.....•.••... T ..•...•.•..•. M.9.d·e.r..!l:~·e.···· .. ··T-··· .. ········r·..!:I\Kt .. ·T·-· .. --·-·s~~Y. ... !:lJ.gh ....... . 
iiI 
2 4 6 8 
Rating 
Figure 6.5 Defuzzification of the linguistic term Moderate 
The values of c and d will remain the same for the defuzzification of all linguistic terms. 
The values au and bo are rating values at the extreme limits of each linguistic term where 
the membership function is 0 and 0] and b] are the rating values when the membership 
function is ) (for a triangular membership function). 
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6.5.1 Comparative series 
An informative series with n components or decision factors can be expressed as X'i = 
(x'J 1), x'J2), ... x'Jk)) E X, where xJk) denotes the kth factors of Xi. If all information 
series are comparable, the n information series can be described for the three linguistic 
variables as the following matrix [Deng J., 1989]: 
Xl Xl (1) Xl (2) Xl (3) 
x 2 .\2(1) .\2(2) x 2 (3) 
x= 
For the application of this matrix in an FMEA study, the value of .\Jk) represent the 
defuzzified crisp number describing each linguistic variable considered for the 
identified failure modes. For example, consider three failure events, A, Band C, where 
the linguistic terms have been assigned for the three variables considered as seen in 
table 6.5 and assume that the values in brackets represent the defuzzified value for the 
associated linguistic term. The information in table 6.5 can be represented in a matrix 
form to reflect the comparative series as seen below: 
Failure events 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
Probability of Severity 
occurrence 
Remote (0.196) Remote (0.196) 
Moderate (0.583) Very High (0.952) 
Remote (0.196) Low (0.370) 
Table 6.5 Example of comparative series 
Remote Remote High 0.196 0.196 
Moderate Very High Low = 0.583 0.952 
Remote Low Remote 0.196 0.370 
Detectability 
High (0.370) 
Low (0.804) 
Remote (0.952) 
0.370] 
0.804 
0.952 
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6.5.2 Standard series 
The standard series for the decision factors are generated by determining the optimal 
level of all factors for the events in the FMEA. From a safety point of view. the lowest 
level of all the factors are desired. Hence, the standard series Xo = [xiii ). xo(.? ) ... XI/ k)] = 
[Remote, Remote, ..... Remote]. This information is represented in the same way as the 
comparative series, in a matrix form. The standard matrix for the example shown in 
table 6.5 can be represented as seen below: 
[
;:] = [:::::: :::::: 
Co Remote Remote 
6.5.3 Difference 
Very High] [0.196 0.196 
Very High = 0.196 0.196 
Very High 0.196 0.196 
0.196] 
0.196 
0.196 
The difference between the comparative and standard senes, Do, IS calculated and 
reflected in a form of a matrix as seen below: 
ll.OI(3)] 
L\m (3) 
where L\o.(k) =11 xO(k)-xi(k) II and Xo (kJ is the standard senes and Xi (k) is the 
.I 
comparative series. For the example used in table 6.5, the difference of the comparative 
and standard series can be calculated as seen below: 
110.196 -0. 19611 
Do = \\0.196-0.58311 
110. 196 -0. 19611 
110.196 -0. 19611 
\\0.196 - 0.95211 
\\0.196 - 0.37011 
\\0.196 - 0.37011 [0 
\\0.196 - 0.80411 = 0.3
0
87 
\\0.196 - 0.95211 
o 
0.756 
0.17-+ 
0.174] 
0.608 
0.756 
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6.5.4 Grey relation coefficient 
The grey relation coefficient, y {xo(k),x/k)}, is calculated using equation (.3) for each of 
the failure events identified in the FMEA. In the example used in table 6.5, the grey 
relation coefficient can be calculated as shown here, assuming that S = 0.5: 
Using, 
for event A, the grey relation coefficient for the probability of occurrence, )'1' is given 
as: 
= 0 + [(0.5)(0.756)] = 1.000 
Yj 0 + [(0.5)(0.756)] 
Similarly, the grey relation for the other two linguistic variables (Severity (YI) and 
Detectability (Yd)), can be calculated as follows: 
= 0 + [(0.5)(0.756)] = 1.000 
Ys 0+[(0.5)(0.756)] 
= 0 + [(0.5)(0.756)] = 0.684 
Yd 0.174 + [(0.5)(0.756)] 
The grey relation coefficient for events Band C is calculated in the same way. The 
results of these calculations are summarised as seen in table 6.6. 
Failure event J'f }'s }'d 
A 1 1 0.684 
B 0.494 0.333 0.383 
C 1 0.684 0.333 
Table 6.6 Example of grey relation coefficient 
6.5.5 Grev relation 
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6.5.5 Grey relation 
The next step is to decide upon the weighting coefficient to obtain the degree of grey 
relation. Depending on the objective of the analysis and the reliability of the data 
available, the weighting coefficient (JJk), for the linguistic variables, SI' Sand Sd is to be 
determined. The weighting coefficient will have a large influence on the final ranking of 
the failure events. As such, it must be carefully selected and agreed upon by all experts 
involved in the study. 
The degree of grey relation is calculated using equation (5) for each failure event 
incorporating the weighted variables. For example, assume that the value of Pt, Ps and fJd 
are 0.4, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively, the degree of grey relation in the example shown in 
table 6.5 can be calculated as seen here: 
Using, 
The grey relation for event A can be calculated as: 
r A = [(0.4)(1)] + [(0.4)(1)] + [(0.2)(0.684)]} = 0.9368 
The degree of grey relation for events Band C is calculated in the same way. The 
results of these calculations are summarised as seen in table 6.7. 
Failure Events Degree of grey relation 
A 0.9368 
B 0.4074 
C 0.7402 
Table 6.7 Example of degree of grey relation 
Chapter I - Introductioll 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Summary 
This chapter briefly reVIews the historical development of safety and reliability 
assessment within the maritime industry and outlines the application of such 
assessments. This is followed by a review of the historical development of safety and 
reliability assessment in the United Kingdom. The different databases that are available 
in the maritime industry are described, highlighting the information that each of these 
databases carry. A description of the proposed research is presented, followed by a 
summary of the work carried out in the research project. 
1.1 Introduction 
Safety was not considered to be a matter of public concern in ancient times, when 
accidents were regarded as inevitable or as the will of the gods. Modern notions of 
safety developed only in the 19th century as an outgrowth of the industrial revolution, 
when a terrible toll of factory accidents aroused humanitarian concern for their 
prevention. Today the concern for safety is worldwide and is the province of numerous 
governmental and private agencies at the local, national, and international levels. 
The frequency and severity rates of accidents vary from country to country and from 
industry to industry. A number of accidents in the chemical, oil and gas, marine and 
nuclear industries over the years have increased the public and political pressure to 
improve the safety which protects people and environment. In the evolution of the 
approach to safety, there has been an increasing move towards risk management in 
conjunction with more technical solutions. Hazardous industries have developed 
approaches for dealing with safety and loss prevention, from design standards to plant 
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The identified failure events in the FMEA are ranked according to the ascending order 
of the degree of relation. This entails that the failure mode with the smallest degree of 
grey relation gets the highest priority for attention. For the example in table 6.7, failure 
event B would be at the top of the list for priority for attention, this will be followed by 
events C and A. The summary of the results for this example is shown in table 6.8. 
Failure Probability of Degree of Ranking 
events 
Severity Detectabili tv grey (priority for 
occurrence 
relation attention) 
A Remote Remote High 0.9368 3 
B Moderate Very High Low 0.407.+ 1 
C Remote Low Remote 0.7402 2 
Table 6.8 Example of ranking for failure events using the degree of grey relation 
6.6 Application of the Proposed Approach to Fishing Vessels 
The application of the fuzzy rule base and grey theory to FMEA is demonstrated for an 
ocean going fishing vessel. The FMEA in this example is limited to a few systems and 
not all failure modes are considered. The FMEA for fishing vessels investigates four 
different systems, that is, the structure, propulsion, electrical and auxiliary systems. 
Each of the systems is considered for different failure modes that could lead to an 
accident with undesired consequences. The effect of the failure mode at system and 
vessel level is studied along with the provisions that are in place/available to mitigate or 
reduce the risk. For each of the failure modes, the system is investigated for any alarms 
or condition monitoring arrangement, which are in place. 
A traditional FMEA using the RPN ranking system is carried out in the first instance. 
This analysis is summarised in table 6.9. In this table, Sf represents the probability of 
occurrence, S represents the severity and Sd represents the detectability. The values for 
Sf; Sand Sd are obtained by using the values detai led in tables 6. L 6.2 and 6.3 
respectively. The same pool of experts that carried out the analysis for the proposed 
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approach is used for the traditional FMEA analysis. This ensures the consistency in the 
opinion of each expert. 
Descrip. COII/JI. Failure Failure effect Failure effect Mode (System) (Vessel) Alarm Prol'isioll Sf S SJ RPN 
Structure Rudder Seizure Rudder jam No steering bearing ctr1. No Stop vessel 1 8 3 2.+ 
Structure Rudder Breakage Rudder loose Reduced Bearing steering ctr1. No Stop vessel 1 8 3 2.+ 
Structure Rudder Structural Function loss Reduced No Use beams } 8 .+ 0'+ structure failure steering 
Propulsion Main Loss of Loss of thrust Loss of speed Yes Engine output None 8 8 :1 320 
Propulsion Main Auto MIE stops Loss of speed Yes Anchor 6 8 6 Engine shutdown 288 
Propulsion Shaft & Shaft Loss of thrust Loss of speed No Anchor } 8 1 16 propeller breakage 
Propulsion Shaft & Shaft Loss of thrust Loss of speed Yes Anchor } 9 } 36 propeller seIzure 
Propulsion Shaft & Gearbox Loss of thrust Loss of speed Yes Anchor I .+ 3 12 propeller seIzure 
Propulsion Shaft & Hydraulic Cannot reduce Cannot reduce No Anchor 3 2 3 18 propeller failure thrust speed 
Propulsion Shaft & Prop. blade Loss of thrust Loss of speed No Slow 1 2 4 8 propeller failure steaming 
Air services Air No start air Cannot start No propulsion Yes Recharge 4 '1 3 24 
receIver press. MIE receIver 
Electrical Power Generator Some system Use st-by No elec.power Yes 9 3 7 189 Sys. genera- fail failures generators 
tion 
Main Loss of main No battery Use Electrical 
switch Complete Yes emergency 8 3 6 144 Sys. board loss supply charging 24v 
Electrical Emer. Complete Loss of No emergency No Use normal 3 7 .+ 84 
Sys. SIB loss emer.supp. supp. supply 
Loss of main Loss of main 
Use 
Electrical Main Loss of Yes emergency 3 3 .+ 36 
Sys. batteries output 24v low volt. 2.+v 
Electrical Emer. Loss of Loss of No emer.supp. No 
Use normal 1 8 3 2.+ 
Sys. batteries output emer.supp. supply 
Auxiliary Fuel Contamina- MIE and Gen Vessels stops Yes Anchor .+ 8 5 160 
Sys. System tion stop 
Auxiliary Fuel No fuel to M/E stops Vessel stops No Anchor } 7 7 98 -
Sys. system MIE 
Auxiliary Water No cooling Engine MIE auto cut- Yes Use st-by 7 } .+ 56 
-
Sys. system water overheat out pump 
Auxiliary Hydraulic System loss No hydraulics No steering Yes Stop vessel 9 8 9 O'+i'\ Sys. 
Auxiliary Luhe oil Loss of Low pressure MIE stops Yes 
Use st-hy 9 3 6 162 
Sys. system Ipressure cut-off pump 
Table 6.9 Traditional FMEA for a fishing vessel 
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6.6. J Fuz.z.\' rule base application 
The fuzzy rule base is developed in such a way so as to enable comparison with the 
traditional FMEA method. Hence, in fuzzy terms, the linguistic variables are determined 
to be the probability of occurrence, severity and detectability. Each of these variables 
can be described in linguistic terms as: Remote, Low, Moderate, High and Very High. 
The interpretations of these linguistic terms are given in table 6.4. 
The membership functions of the five linguistic terms are as shown in figure 6.6. The 
linguistic terms for detectability will be in reverse order but with the same membership 
function. The triangular membership function is chosen so as to ensure a smooth 
transition from one linguistic term to the other. This is in parallel with the ability of the 
experts to represent certain sets of data in this fashion. Apart from that, the triangular 
membership function facilitates easy defuzzification of each linguistic term. The 
membership function for each linguistic term is evaluated for its limits on an arbitrary 
scale from 0 to 1. 
Membership 
1.0 Remote Low Moderate High Very High 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Figure 6.6 Membership function for the linguistic terms (generated by the experts) 
The experts for this study were carefully selected to ensure a well-balanced fuzzy rule 
base. The expertise and knowledge of the five experts selected along with the degree of 
competency, Ci. are tabulated in table 6.10. The degree of competency assigned to the 
experts do not reflect their personal competency in their respective field, but instead it 
represents their knowledge and experience in dealing with safety assessments of fi-.hing 
vessels and the fishing industry. The degree of competency, for each of the expert-. \\ere 
decided and agreed upon by all the experts. 
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Expert Expertise and knowledge C] 
Expert 1 Safety analyst (marine & offshore). 0.3 
Expert 2 Marine surveyor (fishing vessels). 0.3 
Expert 3 Superintendent engineer (fishing vessels). 0.2 
Expert 4 Marine operations engineer (merchant vessels) . 0.1 
Expert 5 Statistician. 0.1 
Table 6.10 Selected experts and assigned degree of competency 
The proposed approach introduces a linguistic variable called the ''priority for attention" 
as the output of the FMEA, which can be linguistically expressed by five terms. These 
five linguistic terms describing the priority for attention are Low, Fairly low, Moderate, 
Fairly high and High. 
The selected experts were asked to assign linguistic terms describing the priority for 
attention for different combinations of the linguistic terms describing the three linguistic 
variables (probability of occurrence, severity and detectability). Upon receiving the 
feedback from each of the experts and applying equation (7) with the values from table 
6.10, the membership function for the linguistic variable priority for attention is 
determined and graphically represented in figure 6.7. Although the membership 
function for the priority for attention is triangular in shape, it can be noted that the 
membership functions for the linguistic terms are not symmetrical. This is due to the 
difference in opinions of individual experts. However, the graph still provides a smooth 
transition between states. 
0.9 
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0.7 
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0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
00 0.1 0.2 
Moderate 
0.3 
Fairly High 
High 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
Figure 6.7 Membership function for the priority for attention 
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~C~ha~p~te~r~6~-~M~od~i~fie~d~F~a~i~lu~re~M~o~dt~>~A~lld~E~ae~(~'~~A~I~la~I\~s~iS ______________________________ 16~ 
The support value for each of these linguistic terms is determined by taking the 
weighted average of the support values given by each expert. Using the information 
presented in figure 6.7, the support value is assumed to be represented on the x-axis 
when the membership function for the particular linguistic term reaches 1. Hence. the 
support values for the linguistic terms describing the priorit,\' for attention can be 
summarised as: 
Fairly Low - 0.055 
Low - 0.461 
Moderate - 0.911 
Fairly High - 2.041 
High - 7.1 11. 
The fuzzy rule base is generated based on the membership function derived from the 
experts (figures 6.6 and 6.7). A total of 125 rules are generated. However, these rules 
are combined (where possible) and the total number of rules in the fuzzy rule base is 
reduced to 35 rules. For example, consider these three rules: 
Rule 1: if probability of occurrence is Moderate, severity is Low and detectability is 
Low then priority for attention is 0.66 Moderate, 0.94 Fair!.\' High. 
Rule 2: if probability of occurrence is Low, severity is Moderate and detectability is 
Low then priority for attention is 0.66 Moderate, 0.94 Fairly High 
Rule 3: if probability of occurrence is Moderate, severity is High and detectability is 
High, then priority for attention is 0.66 Moderate, 0.94 Fairly High 
Rules 1, 2, and 3 can be combined to read: 
"if probability of occurrence is Moderate, severity is Low and detectability is Lmv or 
any combination of the three linguistic terms assigned to these variables, then priority 
for attention is 0.66 Moderate, 0.94 Fair!.\' High". 
The degree of belief 0.66 and 0.94, depends heavily upon the opinion of the experts 
involved in the study. as such, it can be assumed that these figures only represent an 
average value for all the opinions of the experts. 
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This method of rule reduction assumes that the probability of occurrence, se\erity and 
detectability have the same importance. Using this method to reduce the number of rules 
in the fuzzy rule base, a final set of rules is generated as shown in table 6.11. 
Probabilitv 
Rule No of Severitv Detectabilir..' Priority for attention 
occurrence 
1 Rem Rem V.High to High Low 
2 Rem Rem Mod Low, 0.06 F.Low 
3 Rem Rem Low 0.86 Low, 0.14 F.Low 
4 Rem Rem Rem 0.78 Low, 0.2 F.Low 
5 Low Rem High Low, 0.16 F.Low 
6 Low Rem Mod 0.86 Low, 0.48 F.Low 
7 Low Rem Low 0.58 Low, 0.68 F.Low 
8 Mod Rem Mod 0.5 Low, 0.92 F.Low 
9 Mod Rem Low 0.8 F.Low, 0.4 Mod 
10 Mod Rem Rem 0.92 F.Low, 0.8 Mod 
11 High Rem Mod 0.74 F.Low, 0.4 Mod 
12 High Rem Low 0.48 F.Low, 0.92 Mod 
13 High Rem Rem 0.88 Mod, 0.1 F.High 
14 V.High Rem High 0.48 Low, 0.88 F.Low 
15 V.High Rem Rem 0.82 Mod, 0.36 F.High 
16 Low Low High 0.86 Low, 0.78 F.Low 
17 Low Low Mod 0.4 F.Low, 0.58 Mod 
18 Low Low Low 0.8 F. Low, 0.92 Mod 
19 Low Low Rem 0.92 F.Low, 0.7 Mod 
20 Mod Low Mod 0.94 F.Low, 0.46 Mod 
21 Mod Low Low 0.66 Mod,0.94 F.High 
22 Mod Low Rem 0.92 Mod, 0.92 F.High 
23 High Low Low 0.58 Mod,0.88 F.High 
24 High Low Rem 0.72 F.High, 0.22 High 
25 V.High Low Rem 0.98 F.High. 0.38 High 
26 Mod Mod Mod 0.92 Mod,0.84 F.High 
27 Mod Mod Low 0.4 Mod,0.66 F.High 
28 Mod Mod Rem 0.94 F.High,0.56 High 
29 High Mod Low 0.88 F.High,0.62 High 
30 High Mod Rem 0.74 F.High,0.9 High 
31 V.High Mod Rem 0.58 F.High.O.6 High .... . .... 
32 High High Low 0.52 F.High.O.98 High 
33 High High Rem 0.3 F.High.O.-l-2 High 
34 V.High High Rem Hiuh c 
35 V.High V.High Rem High 
Table 6.1 I Reduced rules for the fUllY rule base 
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Using the same data from the traditional FMEA, and expressmg the three variables 
considered linguistically with the aid of the membership function in figure 6.6 and the 
fuzzy rule base in table 6.11, gives the results of the modified FMEA. These results are 
then defuzzified using the WMoM method as explained in section 6.-1-.3 to obtain a 
ranking as shown in table 6. 12. 
Descript. Component Failure Mode 5, 5 5d Priority/or I Jcli I ::::iji cd 
attention ranking 
Structure Rudder bearing Seizure Rem High High 0.58 Low,0.68 0.27'+ F.Low 
Structure Rudder Bearing Breakage Rem High High 0.58 Low,0.68 0.27'+ F.Low 
Structure Rudder structure Structural failure Rem High High 0.58 Low,0.68 0.27'+ F.Low 
Propulsion Main Engine Loss of output High High Mod 0.88 F. High, 4.136 0.62 High 
PropUlsion Main Engine Auto shutdown Mod High Mod 0.4 Mod, 0.66 1.61'+ F.High 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Shaft breakage Rem High V.High 0.86 Low. 0.14 0.112 F.Low 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Shaft seizure Rem High V.High 0.86 Low, 0.14 0.112 F.Low 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Gearbox seizure Rem Low High Low,0.16 F.Low 0.111 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Hydraulic failure Low Rem High Low,0.16 F.Low 0.111 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Prop. Blade Rem Low V.high Low 0.055 failure 
Air services Air receiver No start air Low Rem High Low,0.16 F.Low 0.111 press. 
Electrical Power generation Generator fail High Low Mod 0.66 Mod,0.94 1.575 
sys. F.High 
Electrical Main switch board Complete loss High Low Mod 0.66 Mod,0.94 1.575 
~s. F.High 
Electrical Emergency SIB Complete loss Low Mod High 0.4 F.Low, 0.58 0.727 
sys. Mod 
Electrical 
Loss of output Low Low High 
0.86 Low, 0.78 0.248 Main batteries F.Low sys. 
Electrical Emergency Loss of output Rem High High 
0.58 Low,0.68 0.274 
sys. batteries F.Low 
Auxiliary High Mod 0.66 Mod.O.I1'+ 1.575 Fuel sys. Contamination Low F.High sys. 
Auxiliary Mod Mod 
0.5 Lo\\'.0.92 0.318 Fuel sys. No fuel to MIE Rem 
~s. F.Low 
Auxiliary No cooling Mod Low High 
0..+ F.Low, 0.58 0.727 
sys. Water sys. water Mod 
Auxiliary Hydraulic Sys. loss High High Low 
0.52 F.High.O.118 5.353 
~s. High 
Auxiliary High Lo\\' Mod 
0.66 l\lod. 0.11'+ 1.575 Luhe oil sys. Loss of pressure FHigh sys. 
.. Table 6.12 ModIfIed FMEA usmg fuzzy rule base 
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From table 6.12, consider the first event (component-rudder bearing and failure mode-
seizure), the three variables are linguistically described as: 
Probability of occurrence (Sf) = Remote 
Severity (S) = High 
Detectability (Sd) = High 
Using the fuzzy rule base generated in table 6.11, Rule 7 will apply to the first event. 
This rule is interpreted to read as, "if the probability of occurrence is Remote, severity is 
High and detectability is High, then priority for attention is 0.58 Low, 0.68 Fairly low". 
The conclusion 0.58 Low, 0.68 Fairly low can be defuzzified using the WMoM method 
to produce a crisp number as shown here: 
Z = (0.58xO.055) + (0.68x0.461) 
(0.58 + 0.68) 
= 0.274 
where the support value for Low is 0.055 and Fairly low is 0.461 (as determined 
earlier). The priority for attention for the first event can be represented numerically by 
0.274. Similarly, all other events are analysed and the corresponding priorities for 
attention are obtained such that the higher the value of the defuzzified results, the higher 
the priority in the ranking series. From the analysis and the results presented in table 
6.12, the failure event with the highest priority is failure component - hydraulic, failure 
mode - system loss, with a defuzzified result of 5.353. The lowest in the series is 
identified to be failure component - shaft & propeller, failure mode - propeller blade 
failure, with a defuzzified result of 0.055. 
6.6.2 Gr('v theory application 
There are many similarities in the data required to carry out the FMEA using grey 
theory, as it is to analyse it using a fuzzy rule base. Hence. the linguistic terms and 
membership functions generated for the fuzzy rule base application can be used in the 
grey theory method. The three variables are identical. these are the probability of 
occurrence (Sf), severity (S). and detectability (Sd). These three variables are described 
linguistically as Remote, Low. Moderate, High and Very High. The meaning of each of 
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these terms are tabulated in table 6.4 and graphically represented in figure 6.6. These 
linguistic terms are defuzzified using equation (9) to produce a crisp number. The rc~ult 
of the defuzzification is tabulated as seen in table 6.13. 
Linguistic Term Defuzzified crisp number 
Remote 0.196 
Low 0.370 
Moderate 0.583 
High 0.804 
Very High 0.952 
Table 6.13 Defuzzified crisp number for linguistic terms describing the variables 
The data from the FMEA in tables 6.9 and 6.12 is used here to demonstrate the 
application of the grey theory method. The same data is used for all three methods 
(traditional FMEA, fuzzy rule base and grey theory method), to enable comparisons of 
the results. The comparative series is generated based on the linguistic terms assigned to 
each event for the three variables considered and is represented in a matrix linguistically 
and then converted by defuzzification to express it numerically as seen in the matrix 
below. 
Rem High High 0.196 0.804 0.370 
Rem High High 0.196 0.804 0.370 
Rem High High 0.196 0.804 0.370 
High High Mod 0.804 0.804 0.583 
Mod High Mod 0.583 0.804 0.583 
Rem High V.High 0.196 0.804 0.196 
Rem High V.High 0.196 0.804 0.196 
Rem Low High 0.196 0.370 0.370 
Low Rem High 0.370 0.196 0.370 
Rem Low V.High 0.196 0.370 0.196 
x, = Low Rem High = 0.370 0.196 0.370 
High Low Mod 0.804 0.370 0.5S3 
High Low Mod 0.804 0.370 0.583 
Low Mod High 0.370 0.583 0.370 
Low Low High 0.370 0.370 0.370 
Rem High High 0.196 0.804 0.370 
Low High Mod 0.370 0.804 0.583 
Rem Mod Mod 0.196 o .5R3 0.583 
Mod Lu\\ High 0.583 0.370 0.370 
High High Low O. R()-l- O.RO-l- O.RO-l-
High Luw [\lod O.R()-l- 0.370 o .5R_~ 
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The standard series is taken to be the lowest level of the linguistic term describing all 
three variables, which is Remote for the Probability and severity and Very High for the 
detectability. When the linguistic term Remote is defuzzified, the crisp number obtained 
is 0.196, this represents the average value, as such the value 0 (lowest possible Yalue) is 
used to represent the linguistic term Remote in the standard series. A matrix 
representing the standard series is generated as shown below. 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Xo = Rem Rem V.High = 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
Rem Rem V.High 0 0 0 
The difference between the comparative and standard series, Do, is then calculated and 
expressed as a matrix. Since all entries for the matrix representing the standard series 
was determined to be 0, the difference between the comparative and standard series 
would be equal to the comparative series (considering that ~Oj(k) =11 xlI(k) - xi(k) II). 
Using the values obtained from the difference of the standard and comparatiyc series. 
the grey relation coefficient, y{xllk),x/k)}. is calculated using equation (3) for each 
variable of the events identified in the FMEA. Equation (3) can be simplified and is 
represented by equation (10): 
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inspections and technical safety, through to safety auditing and human factors 
[Trbojevic V.M. and Soares C.G., 2000]. 
As far as the marine industry is concerned, tragic accidents such as the Herald of Free 
Enterprise and Derbyshire, together with environmental disasters such as Exxon Valdez. 
and Amoco Cadiz, have focused world opinion on ship safety and operation. This 
demand for improved safety requires comprehensive safety analyses to be developed in 
order to identify ways to improve human and ship reliability. These improved safety 
prediction models will ensure efficient, economic and safe ship operation. 
1.2 Safety and Reliability Development in the Maritime Industry 
Reliability and safety methods saw a rapid development after the Second World War. 
These methods were mainly concerned with military use for electronics and rocketry 
studies. The first predictive reliability models appeared in Germany on the V 1 missile 
project where a reliability level was successfully defined from reliability requirements 
and experimentally verified on components during their development stages [Bazovsky 
I., 1961]. 
The first formal approach to shipboard reliability was the Buships specification, MIL-R-
22732 of July 31, 1960 prepared by the United States of America's Department of 
Defence and dealt with ground and shipboard electronic equipment [MIL, 1960]. 
Subsequently in 1961 the Bureau of Weapons issued MIL standards concerning 
reliability models for avionics equipment and procedures for the prediction and 
reporting of the reliability of weapon systems. This was due to the fact that the growing 
complexities of electronic systems were responsible for the failure rates leading to a 
significantly reduced availability on demand of the equipment. 
In February 1963 the first symposium on advanced marine engineering concepts for 
increased reliability was held at the office of Naval Research at the Uni ycrsity of 
Michigan. In December 1963 a paper entitled "Reliability engineering applied to the 
marine industry" [Harrington R.L. and Riddick R.P., 1963] was presented at the Society 
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where 
~min = 0.196 
~max = 0.804 
s= 0.5 
(10) 
s is an identifier, S E (0,1), only affecting the relative value of risk without changing the 
priority. Generally, S can be set to 0.5 [Deng J., 1989]. 
One of the objectives of applying an FMEA study to fishing vessels is to identify areas 
where safety features are lacking in the system. These include interlocks, alarms, auto 
cut-off/shut-down, condition monitoring and redundancy features. Due to the 
organisational and operating nature of fishing vessels, incorporating/improving safety 
features may be the easiest and most effective way to improve the operational safety of 
the vessel. As such the weighting coefficient (fJk), for the decision factors, SI; Sand Sd 
should be such that /lsd > /ls > /lSt This would entail giving more preference to the 
detectability factor in the analysis. Hence, The weighting coefficient (/lk) , is set to be 
0.2, 0.3 and 0.5 for the probability of occurrence, severity and detectability respectively. 
Using these values, the degree of grey relation is calculated using equation (5). 
Consider the first event where Sf Sand Sd are assigned Remote, High and High for the 
probability of occurrence, severity and detectability respectively. The grey relation 
coefficient y!, Ys and Yd is calculated as shown here: 
_ 0.196 + [(0.5)(0.804)] _ 1 
rf - 0.196 + [(0.5)(0.804)] -
= 0.196 + [(0.5)(0.804 )] = 0.496 
y, 0.804 + [(0.5)(0.804)] 
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0.196 + [(0.5)(0.804)] 
r. = = 0.775 
d 0.370 + [(0.5)(0.804)] 
Substituting these values and the weighting coefficient into equation (5) will gl\C the 
degree of relation for the first event as seen here: 
r(Xi , x j ) = {[(0.2)(I)] + [(0.3)(0.496)] + [(0.5)(0.775)]} = 0.736 
Similarly, the degree of relation is calculated for all the events identified in the FMEA 
to produce a ranking that determines the priority for attention. The complete analysis of 
the test case using grey theory is tabulated as seen in table 6.14. 
Description Component Failure Mode Sf 1f S 1s Sd 1d 
Grey 
Relation 
Structure Rudder bearing Seizure Rem 1.000 High 0 . ..+% High 0.775 0.n6 
Structure Rudder bearing Breakage Rem 1.000 High 0.496 High 0.77':. 0.7J6 
Structure Rudder structure Structural failure Rem 1.000 High 0.496 High 0.77':. 0.n6 
Propulsion Main Engine Loss of output High 0.496 High 0.496 Mod 0.607 0.552 
Propulsion Main Engine Auto shutdown Mod 0.607 High 0.496 Mod 0.607 0.57..+ 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Shaft breakage Rem 1.000 High 0.496 V.High 1.000 0.8..+lJ 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Shaft seizure Rem 1.000 High 0.496 V.High 1.000 0.849 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Gearbox seizure Rem 1.000 Low 0.775 High 0.775 0.820 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Hydraulic failure Low 0.775 Rem 1.000 High 0.775 O.X"+J 
Propulsion Shaft & propeller Prop. blade failure Rem 1.000 Low 0.775 V.high 1.000 0.lJJ3 
Air services Air receiver No start air press. Low 0.775 Rem 1.000 High 0.77':. 0.X"+3 
Electrical Systems Power generation Generator fail High 0.496 Low 0.775 Mod 0.607 0.63':. 
Electrical Systems Main switch board Complete loss High 0.496 Low 0.775 Mod 0.607 O.6J':. 
Electrical Systems Emergency S/8 Complete loss Low 0.775 Mod 0.607 High 0.775 0.725 
Electrical Systems Main batteries Loss of output Low 0.775 Low 0.77':. High 0.775 0.775 
Electrical Systems Emergency batteries Loss of output 
Rem 1.000 High 0.496 High 0.775 0.736 
Auxiliary Systems Fuel system Contamination Low 0.775 High 0.496 Mod 0.607 0.607 
Auxiliary Systems Fuel System No fuel to MIE Rem 1.000 Mod 0.607 Mod 0.607 0.686 
Auxiliary Systems Water system No cooling water Mod 0.607 Low 0.775 High 0.775 0.7-1-1 
Auxiliary Systems Hydraulic Sys. Loss High 0.-1-96 High 0.-1-lJ6 Low 0.-1-% 0.-1-% 
Auxiliary Systems Lube oil system Loss of pressure High 0.-1-Y6 Lll\\ 0.775 t\lod 0.007 0.635 
Table 6.14 Modified FMEA using grey theory 
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6.7 Analysis of Results 
The results obtained for the FMEA using the proposed approach is collated with the 
results obtained from the traditional FMEA using the RPN method and is given in table 
6.15. From this table, consider event 1 and 11, where the RPN is 24. From table 6.9. the 
values of Sf, Sand Sd are 1, 8 and 3 for event 1 and 4, 2 and 3 for event 1 1. hence a RPN 
of 24 is obtained. Although the RPN for both events are the same, the risk levels are 
different. This difference is obvious when the fuzzy rule base method and grey theory is 
applied. The results of the proposed methods shows that event 1 has a higher priority 
compared to event 1 1. However, the traditional RPN method puts these two events as 
having the same priority. 
Fuzzy Grey Ranking Ranking Ranking ID Component Failure Mode RPN rule Theory (RPN) (Rule hase) (Grey base theory) 
1 Rudder bearing Seizure 24 0.274 0.736 15 I 1 10 
2 Rudder Bearing Breakage 32 0.274 0.736 14 11 10 
3 Rudder structure Structural failure 64 0.274 0.736 10 1 1 10 
4 Main Engine Loss of output 320 4.136 0.552 2 , 2 
5 Main Engine Auto shutdown 288 1.614 0.574 3 3 3 
6 Shaft & propeller Shaft breakage 16 0.112 0.849 19 16 19 
7 Shaft & propeller Shaft seizure 36 0.112 0.849 12 16 19 
8 Shaft & propeller Gearbox seizure 12 0.111 0.820 20 18 16 
9 Shaft & propeller Hydraulic failure 18 0.111 0.843 18 18 17 
10 Shaft & propeller Prop. blade fail 8 0.055 0.933 21 21 21 
1 1 Air receiver No start air press. 24 0.111 0.843 15 18 17 
12 Power generation Generator fail 189 1.575 0.635 4 4 5 
13 Main switch board Complete loss 144 1.575 0.635 7 4 5 
14 Emer. SIB Complete loss 84 0.727 0.725 9 8 9 
15 Main batteries Loss of output 36 0.248 0.775 12 15 15 
16 Emer. batteries Loss of output 24 0.274 0.736 15 11 10 
17 Fuel System Contamination 160 1.575 0.607 6 4 4 
18 Fuel system No fuel to MIE 98 0.318 0.686 8 10 8 
19 Water system No cooling water 56 0.727 0.741 1 1 8 14 
20 Hydraulic System loss 648 5.353 0.496 1 1 1 
21 Lube oil system Loss of pressure 16' 1.575 0.635 5 4 5 
Table 6.15 Ranking comparison 
The ranking produced by the proposed methods do not differentiate events that han:, the 
same linguistic terms describing the factors considered. For cxample. C\Cllh 1.2 and .i. 
'-
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where Sf; Sand Sd are assigned Remote, High and High respectively, the defuzzified 
ranking is 0.274 and the degree of grey relation is 0.736 for all three events. This entails 
that these three events should be given the same priority for attention. The RPN method 
howev~r, produces a result of 24, 32 and 64 for events 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This 
denotes that event 3 has the highest priority followed by event 2 and 3. This ranking 
could be misleading, especially when the safety data used for the analysis is 
accompanied with a high level of uncertainty. 
The effects of the weighting coefficient introduced in the grey theory method can be 
clearly seen in the results obtained for events 17 and 21, where Sf, Sand Sd are assigned 
Low, High and Moderate and High, Lon' and Moderate respectively. Using the fuzzy 
rule base to analyse these two events produces a defuzzified ranking of 1.575, however, 
when using the grey theory method (incorporating the weighted coefficient), the grey 
relation ranking is 0.607 and 0.635 for events 17 and 21 respectively. This entails that 
event 17 should be given a higher priority compared to event 21. This shows that a more 
accurate ranking can be achieved by the application of the fuzzy rule base and grey 
theory to FMEA. 
6.8 Conclusion 
When conducting an FMEA for safety assessment purposes, precision should not be 
forced where data is unreliable and scarce. Hence, to ask an analyst or an expert to 
assign scores ranging from 1 to 10 (as done in the RPN method) for the different factors 
considered would produce a false and unrealistic impression. The use of linguistic terms 
in the proposed approach allows for the experts to assign a more meaningful value for 
the factors considered. This ensures that identified events do not get overlooked (due to 
a low RPN) when considering the priority for attention. 
The advantages of the proposed fuzzy rule base and grey theory approach for 
application to FMEA of fishing vessels can be summarised as follows: 
• It can be used for systems where safety data is unavailable or unreliable, as it docs 
not force precision. 
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• It provides an organised method to combine expert knowledge and experience for 
use in an FMEA study. 
• The use of linguistic terms In the analysis enables the experts to express their 
judgements more realistically and hence improving the applicability of the FMEA. 
• The flexibility of assigning weight to each factor in the FMEA provides a means of 
specifically identifying weak areas in the system/component studied. 
The proposed approach using fuzzy rule base (without the weighting factors of the 
linguistic variables) could be suitable for use in step 1 of the FSA process (at the 
hazard-screening phase) as discussed in chapter 4 (section 4.2.1). During the hazard-
screening phase, only a relative ranking order is needed. This will distinguish the 
hazards with a high-risk level from those with a low-risk level. 
The proposed approach using grey theory (with the weighting factors of the linguistic 
variables) would be suitable for use in step 2 of the FSA (risk estimation phase) as 
discussed in chapter 2 (section 4.2.2). At this stage of the FSA, a more detailed analysis 
of each hazard is required to produce a ranking order that would determine the 
allocation of the limited resources. As the proposed method provides the analyst with 
the flexibility to decided which factor is more important to the analysis, the outcome of 
the analysis will provide valuable information for the decision making process. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MAINTENANCE MODELLING 
Summary 
The data analysis in chapter 2 showed that more than 50% of accidents on fishing 
vessels involved machinery failure. Upon investigation of several fishing vessels in the 
UK, it was found that maintenance activities on board these vessels were almost non-
existent. A review of different maintenance concepts is carried out in the first instance 
followed by a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of these concepts. The 
current maintenance practice of fishing vessels is reviewed and a proposal is presented 
to reduce machinery failure on these vessels by means of implementing an inspection 
regime based on the delay-time concept. The proposed approach provides an alternative 
solution to the current maintenance practice to reduce cost incurred and downtime 
suffered by fishing vessels. 
7.1 Introduction 
Maintenance is defined as the combination of all technical and administrative actions, 
including supervision actions, intended to retain an entity in, or restore it to a state in 
which it can perform a required function. It involves planned and unplanned activities 
being carried out to ensure an acceptable state of operation. Selection of a maintenance 
strategy will depend on one or a combination of the following criteria: maximisation of 
reliability, minimisation of downtime and minimisation of total maintenance cost [Savic 
D.A. et. aI., 1995]. 
The impact of the maintenance policy on total maintenance cost IS hard to predict 
[Rischel T.D. and Christy D.P., 1996]. Any breakdown in machine operation results in 
disruption of production and leads to additional costs due to downtime. loss of 
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of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) and in June the following year 
another paper, entitled "Reliability in shipbuilding" [Dunn T.W .. 1964] was presented. 
Following the presentation of these two papers. SNAME in 1965 established Panel 1\1-
22 to investigate the new discipline as applied to marine machinery and make it of use 
to the commercial marine industry. 
In the last two decades, stimulated by public reaction and health and safety legislation, 
the use of risk and reliability assessment methods has spread to the higher risk 
industries. The usage is now spreading to an even wider range of applications. The 
Reactor Safety Study undertaken by the U.S.A [U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
1975] and the Canvey studies performed by the UK Health and Safety Executive [U.K. 
Health and Safety Executive, 1978, 1981 a, 1981 b] resulted from a desire to demonstrate 
safety to a doubtful public. Both these studies made considerable use of quantitative 
methods, for assessing the probability of failure and for determining consequence 
models. 
1.3 Present Status in the United Kingdom 
There is a long history In Great Britain of research, development and successful 
practical application of safety and reliability technology. There is a continuing 
programme of fundamental research in areas such as software reliability and human 
error in addition to further development of the general methodology available to the 
analyst. Much of the development work was carried out by the nuclear industry. 
Based on the considerable expertise gained in the assessment of nuclear plants, a 
National Centre for System Reliability (NCSR) was established by the UK Atomic 
Energy Authority (UKAEA) to promote the use of reliability technology. This 
organisation plays a leading role in research, training, consultancy and data collection. 
The NCSR is part of the safety and reliability directorate of the UKAEA, which has 
played a major role in formulating legislation on major hazards, and has carried out 
major safety studies on industrial plants. It is noted that some of the major hazard 
studies commissioned at the national level in the UK have included the t'\aluation of the 
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production, decrease in productivity and quality and inefficient use of personnel, 
equipment and facilities [Ashayeri J. et. aI., 1996]. 
In the shipping industry, there are some specific problems with regards to maintenance. 
that need to be considered when developing a maintenance model. These include: 
• The high degree of isolation from repair and spares facilities. 
• The high cost of transport unit (i.e. the ship). 
• The high cost of a ship out of service. 
• Varying costs, availability and quality of labour and spares throughout the world. 
• Shipboard personnel are operators as well as maintainers and with fishing vessels. 
they could be the owners as well. 
• The frequency with which personnel Jom and leave ships, creating a need for 
continuity of ships maintenance plans. 
• Severe safety and insurance conditions, necessitating rigorous survey requirements. 
Several of these problems are undeniably important to the fishing industry as will be 
discussed in section 7.2. 
7.1.1 Modern maintenance concepts 
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) sometimes referred to as Preventive 
Maintenance Optimisation (PMO) has become popular in recent years with several 
industries. The concept has been discussed and elaborated on by several authors 
[Worledge D.H., 1993; Rausand M., 1998; Sherwin D.1., 1999]. RCM is a procedure for 
determining maintenance strategies based on reliability techniques and encompasses 
well-known analysis methods such as Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). RCM procedure takes into account the prime objectives of a maintenance 
programme: 
• Minimise costs. 
• Meet safety and environmental goals. 
• Meet operational goals. 
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The RCM process begins with a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), \\hich 
identifies the critical plant failure modes in a systematic and structured manner. The 
process then requires the examination of each critical failure mode to determine the 
optimum maintenance policy to reduce the severity of each failure. The chosen 
maintenance strategy must take into account cost, safety, environmental and operational 
consequences. The effects of redundancy, spares costs, maintenance crew costs. 
equipment ageing and repair times must be taken into account along with many other 
parameters. 
Classical RCM, as it was first developed, is expensive to implement since rigorous 
FMEA had to be developed. Classic RCM includes calculating probabilities of failure 
for each piece of equipment (reliability calculations for each system) and it takes teams 
of engineer's months/years to complete, and requires a lot of historical data. As such it 
consumes a lot of time. 
The streamlined RCM approach however, recognises the value of the personnel along 
with their experience and takes advantage of their extensive experience running the 
facility. By talking to the personnel on site, the equipment can be categorised and the 
initial phase of a RCM program can be set up. 
Streamlined RCM divides facility equipment into four major categories: 
• Reactive Maintenance 
• Preventive Maintenance 
• Predictive Maintenance 
• Proactive Maintenance 
These four major categories summanse the available maintenance concepts In the 
industry. Each concept can be implemented as a stand-alone regime or it could be 
integrated with each other to produce a sound regime. 
7.1.2 Reactil'e maintenance 
Reactive maintenance is referred to by many different names. such as, breakdown 
maintenance, repair, fix-when-fail and run to failure maintenance. When applying this 
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maintenance strategy, a pIece of equipment receIves maintenance (repair of 
replacement) only when the deterioration of the equipment's condition causes functional 
failure. The strategy of reactive maintenance assumes that failure is equally likely to 
occur in any part, component or system. Thus, this assumption precludes identifying a 
specific group of repair parts as being more necessary or desirable than others. 
The major downside of reactive maintenance is unexpected and unscheduled equipment 
downtime. If the equipment fails and repair parts are not available, delays ensue while 
parts are ordered and delivered. When this is the sole type of maintenance practised, 
both labour and materials are used inefficiently. Labour resources are thrown at 
whatever breakdown is most pressing. A purely reactive maintenance programme 
ignores the many opportunities to influence equipment survivability. However, it can be 
effective if used selectively and performed as a conscious decision based on the results 
of an RCM analysis. Equipment that can be reactively maintained must be non-critical 
and will not pose any safety hazard or effect the operation of the system as a whole. 
7.1.3 Preventive maintenance 
In Preventive Maintenance (PM), maintenance activities are performed before 
equipment failure. PM involves the repair, replacement and maintenance of equipment 
in order to avoid unexpected failure during use. PM with inspection intervals is a 
commonly used maintenance strategy [Ben-Daya M. and Hariga M., 1998; Lofsten H., 
1999; Crocker J., 1999]. The objective of any PM programme is to minimise the total 
cost of inspection, repair and also equipment downtime. Two approaches have evolved 
from performing PM [Mann L. et. aI., 1999]. The traditional approach is based on the 
use of statistical and reliability analysis of equipment failure. The second approach 
involves the use of sensor-based monitoring of equipment condition in order to predict 
when a machine failure will occur. Under this condition-based PM, intervals between 
PM work are not fixed, but are carried out only "when needed". 
Traditional PM is keyed to failure rates and times between failures. It assumes that these 
variables can be determined statistically. and that one can therefore replace a part that is 
"due for failure" shortly before it fails. The availability of statistical failure information 
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tends to lead to fixed schedules for the overhaul of equipment or the replacement of 
parts subject to wear. PM is based on the assumption that the overhaul of equipment by 
disassembly and replacement of parts restores it to a "like-new" condition with no 
harmful side effects. 
Failure rate or its reciprocal, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), is often used as a 
guide to establishing the interval at which the maintenance tasks should be carried out. 
The major weakness in using these measurements to establish task periodicity is that, 
failure rate data determines only the average failure rate. In reality, failures are equally 
likely to occur at random times and with a frequency unrelated to the average failure 
rate. There has been considerable progress in recent years in developing PM models for 
particular equipment addressing this problem [Hariga M., 1994; Srikrishna S. et. al., 
1996; Luce S., 1999]. Other works include an attempt to model PM using Bayesian 
approach [Percy D.F. and Kobbacy K.A.H., 1996] and the reduction of PM cost error 
due to uncertainty [Cavalier M.P. and Knapp G.M., 1996]. 
In summary, PM can be costly and ineffective when it is the sole type of maintenance 
practised. 
7.1.4 Predictive maintenance 
Predictive maintenance or Condition Monitoring (CM), uses primarily non-intrusive 
testing techniques, visual inspections and performance data to assess equipment 
condition. It replaces arbitrarily timed maintenance tasks with maintenance scheduled 
only when warranted by equipment condition. Continuous analysis of equipment 
condition monitoring data allows planning and scheduling of maintenance or repairs in 
advance of catastrophic and functional failure. 
The CM data collected is used in one of the following ways to detennine the condition 
of the equipment and to identify the precursors of failure: 
• Trend analysis - Reviewing data to see if the equipment IS on an obvious and 
immediate "downward slide" toward failure [Newell G.E., \999]. 
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• 
• 
• 
Pattern recognition - Looking at the data and realising the casual relationship 
between certain events and equipment failure [Parrondo J.L. et. aI., 1998]. 
Test against limits and ranges - Setting alarm limits (based on professional 
intuition) and seeing if they are exceeded [Sherwin D.1. and AI-Najjar B., 1999]. 
Statistical process analysis If published failure data on a certain 
equipment/component exists, comparing failure data collected on site with the 
published data to verify/disapprove that the published data can be used for the 
system analysed. 
CM does not lend itself for all types of equipment or possible failure modes and 
therefore should not be the sole type of maintenance practised. 
7.1.5 Proactive maintenance 
Proactive maintenance provides a logical culmination to the other types of maintenance 
described above. It improves maintenance through better design, installation, 
maintenance procedures, workmanship and scheduling. 
Proactive maintenance is characterised by the following attributes: 
• Maintaining a feedback loop from maintenance to design engineers, in an attempt to 
ensure that design mistakes made in the past are not repeated in future designs. 
• Viewing maintenance and supporting functions from a life-cycle perspective. This 
perspective will often show that reducing maintenance activity to save money in the 
short term often costs more in the long term. 
• Constantly re-evaluating established maintenance procedures in an effort to improve 
them and ensure that they are being applied in the proper mix. 
Proactive maintenance uses the following basic techniques to extend machinery life: 
• Proper installation and precision rebuild. 
• Failed-part analysis. 
• Root-cause failure analysis. 
• Rebuild verification. 
• Age exploration. 
• Recurrence control. 
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The major difference in proactive maintenance compared to other maintenance 
programmes is that it doesn't just treat the symptom but determines the root cause of 
repeated failures and addresses them. 
7.1.6 Summary of maintenance techniques 
Each of the maintenance concepts reviewed in section 7.1 is associated with certain 
advantages and disadvantages. Hence, these concepts should be used in a right 
combination so as to ensure a sound and cost-effective maintenance regime. RCM 
attempts to integrate these techniques and its application has proven to be successful in 
the past [Goodfellow l.W., 2000; Fonseca D.l. and Knapp G.M., 2000; Hauge B.S. et. 
aI., 2000]. Table 7.1 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the described 
maintenance concepts. 
Maintenance Advantages Disadvantages 
• Possible costly downtime. 
• Possible damage to associated 
• Cost effective for small, non- equipment. Reactive 
critical equipment. 
• High cost for Medium/High 
priority equipment. 
• Often wasteful. 
• Does not prevent certain 
Preventive • Provides first line of defence. failure. 
• Can introduce problems. 
• Requires large parts inventory. 
• Reduces inventory cost. 
• Reduces downtime. • When implemented alone, 
• Reduces damage to associated does not address root causes Predictive 
equipment. of problems. 
• Reduces unnecessary parts • CM equipment are costly. 
replacement. 
• Addresses root causes of 
problems. 
Proactive • Reduces maintenance costs • Cost. 
beyond predictive levels. 
• Extends equipment life. 
Table 7.1 Advantages and disadvantages of maintenance concepts 
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7.2 Current Maintenance Practice on Fishing Vessels 
The current maintenance practice on fishing vessels varies according to the operatina 
~ b 
policies of the owner/operator. On most occasions, the crew does not carry out regular 
maintenance while at sea. As such, all maintenance work is completed while the vessel 
is at the discharging port. The time between discharge ports can be as long as 3 to 6 
months, which allows for failures on the machinery to propagate and lead to a 
catastrophic breakdown. 
The voyage duration of the vessel depends solely on the success of the catch. Hence, the 
vessel will stay at the fishing grounds as long as it is possible to maximise the catch. 
Should the vessel suffer any breakdown during this period, the vessels' crew will 
attempt to carry out emergency repairs. The amount of repair and replacement of 
damaged equipment is very limited, mainly due to several reasons as seen here: 
• Limited amount of spares carried on board the vessel. 
• Limited number of tools available to carry out the repairs. 
• The competency of the crew to carry out complicated repairs. 
• Rough weather conditions (working on small vessels becomes difficult and 
dangerous). 
• Available manpower on board the vessel may not be sufficient to carry out major 
repaIrs. 
Due to these reasons, only temporary repairs are carried out to enable the vessel to 
steam to the closest port, where more permanent repairs can be carried out. However, if 
temporary repairs are not sufficient to enable the vessel to move to the closest port. 
either a shore team is called out to the ship or the ship is towed back to the closest port 
by tugboats. Both these options are very costly especially when the vessel is stranded in 
the middle of the ocean. 
During the discharging period at port, equipment requiring maintenance will be attended 
to by personnel contracted by the ship owner. The time spent at port by the \'csscl will 
depend on the unloading time required. This could vary from a few days to a few \\ceks. 
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Hence, the time available to carry out repairs is limited. In order to enable the best 
utilisation of the available time, a repair list is prepared by the ships Chief Engineer 
while the vessel is at sea. This list is sent to the shore office (if one exists) to plan the 
maintenance activities at the next discharging. This list will be combined with a list 
created by the superintendent of the vessel - upon an inspection of the ship when it 
arrives at the discharging port. Large fishing vessel companies that have a structured 
organisational hierarchy adopt this method. Skipper owned vessels, will depend on their 
contacts ashore to arrange for the repairs to be expedited. 
There are several routine maintenances that are carried out regularly on board fishing 
vessel. These include: 
• Filter cleaning. 
• Fishing net mending. 
• Oil changing. 
• General cleaning and lubricating of machinery. 
• De-rusting and painting. 
These activities can be summarised as the bare minimum requirement of an engineering 
system. 
It has been observed that many fishing vessels call into a floating dock once a year to 
carry out a complete inspection/repair/overhaul of equipment on board. These repairs 
and overhauls are normally carried out by yard workers or specially contracted 
personnel. These vessels also come in for dry-docking every 3 to 5 years (depending on 
the condition of the vessel) to carry out repairs on seawater valves, replacement of hull 
anodes, inspection of propeller, tail shaft and rudder and any other fitting which lies 
beneath the water line. 
Considering the current status of maintenance practice on fishing vessels and the high 
number of accidents caused by the lack of maintenance activities. it is suggested that a 
maintenance regime be introduced. This regime should be practical (considering the 
limitations associated with fishing vessels) and effective. Taking into account the ability 
and competency of crew on board fishing vessels. it is recommended that an inspection 
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regime be implemented in the first instance. This can be followed by an implementation 
of other maintenance concepts in the future, together with appropriate training for the 
crew. 
This chapter proposes a method to determine inspection intervals to complement regular 
maintenance planning. The purpose of inspection at intervals is to increase the up time 
of systems with comparatively high downtime costs. By regularly carrying out 
inspections on equipment, abnormalities can be identified and corrective action can be 
taken to prevent a catastrophic failure. However, carrying out regular inspection on a 
system that is continuously operating may result in higher operating cost due to 
downtime and the cost of inspection. A model using Delay Time Analysis (DT A) is 
proposed to estimate the expected downtime, cost and safety criticality for various 
inspection intervals. The optimal inspection period can be obtained depending upon the 
criteria chosen such that the downtime or cost be minimised or safety maximised. 
7.3 Background of Delay-Time 
The time to failure of equipment is a function of its maintenance concept, and to capture 
this interaction the conventional time to first failure of reliability theory requires 
enrichment. This may be achieved using the delay-time concept. 
Considerable work has been carried out on the modelling of this concept to production 
plants [Christer A.H. and Walker W.M., 1984a; Christer A.H. et. aI., 1995; Christer 
A.H. et. aI., 1998]. Other works include the application to gearbox failure on busses 
[Leung F. and Kit-Ieung M., 1996], preventive maintenance modelling for a vehicle 
fleet [Christer A.H. and Walker W.M., 1984b] and application to concrete structures 
[Burley E. et. aI., 1989; Redmond D.F. et. aI., 1997]. 
Before a component breaks down (assuming it is not a sudden failure), there will be 
telltale signs of reduced performance or abnormalities. The time between the first 
identification of abnormalities (initial point) and the actual failure time (failure point) 
will vary depending on the deterioration rate of the component. This time period is 
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called the delay time or opportunity window to carry out maintenance or an inspection. 
The delay time is illustrated by means of a diagram as shown in figure 7.1. The 
opportunity window is the period within which the defect could have been identified by 
inspection and corrective action taken before it led to a failure. The delay time h, 
reflects the characteristic of the plant/system. 
Identifying the opportunity window in a system is important to minimise the number of 
failures. As an example, consider figure 7.2 where a system is operated with a 
maintenance period of 6 months. Plotting the failures on the same time scale as the 
inspection activities, it can be seen that if the inspection period was reduced from every 
6 months (A) to every 3 months (B), the failures would not have happened, as it would 
have been detected during the inspection and necessary repairs would have been carried 
out. 
h ~I Time 
h 
e Failure point o Initial point h - Delay time 
Figure 7.1 Delay time 
A B A B 
o 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~lonth 
Figure 7.2 Inspection every 6 months (A) and J months (8) 
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risks involved as a result of marIne transportation of hazardous material \uch a\ 
liquefied gasses and radioactive substances. It is expected that recent legislation In 
relation to the control of major hazards will result in a wider use of quantitati\e \afcty 
assessment methods and this will inevitably involve the marine indu\try. 
Offshore installations can be associated with high-risk petrochemical installation and 
most chemical and petrochemical companies in the UK have made use of reliability 
techniques for safety assessment, plant evaluation and planning. Similar methods are 
regularly employed in relation to offshore production and exploration installations. 
The Royal Navy has introduced reliability and maintainability engineering concepts in 
order to ensure that modern warships are capable of a high combat availability at 
optimum cost [Gosden S.R and Galpin L.K, 1999]. The application of these methods 
has been progressively extended from consideration of the operational phase and 
maintenance planning to the design phase. 
To date, comparatively little use of safety and reliability assessment methods has been 
made in connection with merchant shipping. Lloyd's Register of Shipping has for a long 
period, collected information relating to failures and has carried out development work 
to investigate the application of such methods to the classification of ships. Apart from 
this, some consultancy work has also been carried out on behalf of ship owners. One 
example is the P&O Grand Princess, for which a comprehensive safety and availability 
assurance study was carried out at the concept design stage of this cruise ship. 
Established risk assessment techniques were used including Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), flooding risk analysis and fire risk analysis. The resultant ship was 
believed to be better and safer than it would have been otherwise [Best P.1. and Davies 
W.B .. 1999]. P&O have now developed an in house safety management system which is 
designed to capture any operational feedback, so as to improve the safety and efficiency 
of their cruise fleet operation and to use it for better design in the future. 
The merchant ship-building yards in the UK. having seen the success of the \\~ll'\hip 
yards in applying Availability, Reliability and Maintainability (ARM) studies at the 
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Following the argument of Christer and Walker [Christer A.H. and Walker W.M., 
I 984c], a fault arising within a period (O,T) has a delay time, hand f(h) is the 
probability distribution function of the delay time. A fau1t will be repaired as a 
breakdown repair if the fault arises in the period (0, T-h); otherwise an inspection repair 
as seen in figure 7.3. 
Breakdown repair Inspection repair 
h 
... 
... ... 
° 
T-h T 
Figure 7.3 Breakdown and inspection repair 
Summing up all possible values of h, the probability of a defect arising as a breakdown 
failure beT) can be expressed as: 
b(T)=J(T-h)f(h)dh (I) 
o T 
where T is the inspection period and f(h) is the probability distribution function of the 
delay time. An estimation of the probability distribution function can be achieved in 
several ways as discussed in section 7.3.1. 
7.3 A Proposed Approach 
The flowchart in figure 7.4 illustrates the proposed approach to delay-time analysis of 
fishing vessels. The proposed approach is an integration of three models. that is the 
downtime estimation model, cost estimation model and safety criticality estimation 
model. 
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These models require failure data and a probability distribution function of the delay 
time. The data is then used in a mathematical formula to generate various \'alLlcs for thc 
inspection period, T for corresponding expected downtime D(T). expected co:--t CIT) 
and expected safety criticality SeT). Each model developed will produce an optimal 
inspection period such that downtime, cost or safety criticality is minimised. A best 
compromIse is then achieved by plotting D(T), C(T) and SeT) against the inspection 
time, T. 
Gather information 
(Voyage data, operating data, 
failure data, etc) 
Determine failurelinitial point 1-------, Determine 
Safety criticality 
Operational Criticality 
Determine delay-time 
parameters 
(d, dh, k ) 
Calculate 
expected down 
time, D(T) 
Estimate the probability 
distribution function of 
delay-time - f(h) 
1m =~ I(T -hlf(hldh 
T" 
Plot graph Plot graph Plot graph 
D(T) versus T CIT) versus T SIT) versus T 
Determine optimum 
inspection time, T 
Calculate 
expected cost, 
Cm 
Determine optimum 
inspection time, T 
Determine 
inspection 
cost 
Determine 
corrective 
action cost 
......................................................................... 
Obtain best compromise 
inspection period 
Figure 7.4 Proposed approach flowchart 
7.3.1 Etpected downtime model 
After studying the operating practice, the existing maintenance and failure data. the 
system can be modelled using the following assumptions: 
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• Inspections take place at regular time intervals of T hours and each reqUIres a 
constant time. 
• Downtime owing to inspection = d 
• A verage downtime for breakdown repair = db 
• Arrival rate of defects per unit time = k 
• Inspection period = T 
• Failures are repaired immediately with downtime db « T 
• Inspections are perfect in that any defect present will be identified. 
• Defects identified will be repaired within the inspection period. 
• The time of origin of faults is uniformly distributed over the time between 
inspections. 
• The delay time is independent of its time of origin. 
As a consequence of the above assumptions, the model of beT) given in equation ( 1 ) can 
be simplified as: 
1 T 
beT) = - J(T - h)f(h)dh (2) 
To 
Consequently, the expected downtime per unit time function D(T) is given by equation 
(3) below: 
D(T) = {d + kTb(T)db } (3) 
T+d 
Substituting beT), from equation (2) gives: 
(.+) 
T+d 
Delay time parameter estimation 
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Delay time distribution can be predominantly estimated using subjective or objecti \t~ 
methods. Several models have been developed for these two approaches [Baker R.D. 
and Wang W., 1992; Baker R.D. and Wang W., 1993: Wang W .. 1997]. The objectiye 
models generally require a large amount of data complemented with survey 
questionnaires, which should reflect the operations of the analysed system oyer a 
considerable period of time. These requirements however, are difficult to fulfil when 
considering operating systems on board fishing vessels. The subjective models would 
be more suitable for the intended application, however, these methods are complex. 
resource intensive and time consuming. As such, for demonstration purposes, different 
known distribution functions are experimented to determine the distribution function 
that produces the best results. As it will be demonstrated later, the research indicates 
that a truncated standard normal distribution and a weibull distribution are the most 
appropriate for dealing with failure data of fishing vessel systems. The truncated 
standard normal distribution is then used to determine the optimum inspection period 
for the expected cost and safety criticality model. 
When the probability distribution function of the delay time, f(h), follows the normal 
distribution, i.e. 
f(h)= 1 e-(h-;.Ll"/2(5' (5) 
.J2Jra 
where!.! = mean and (J2 = standard deviation of h. 
Care is necessary when using the normal distribution, since h ~ 0, there is always a 
positive chance with the normal distribution that the observation is negative. Hence. a 
truncated standard normal distribution would be more appropriate. 
Let!.! = 0 and (J2 = I, assuming a truncated standard normal distribution, equation 5 is 
simplified to become: 
, 1 
{(lz) = 5- e-h"/2 (6) 
. , 
_Jr 
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Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) gives: 
D(T) = 
T+d 
(7) 
Equation (7) will gIVe the estimated downtime per unit time of the equipment. A 
practical way of expressing this downtime is by means of its availability within a 
specified time period. The availability of the system, A, is calculated using equation (8): 
where 
TOT = Total operating time 
TDT = Total downtime 
A= TOT-TDT 
TOT 
(8) 
The total downtime can be estimated using equation (9) below: 
where 
T* = Optimum inspection period (when downtime is minimised) 
The optimal inspection period, T, can be obtained graphically by plotting for equation 
(7) the expected downtime, D(T), against the inspection period, T. The optimal period 
will be such that D(T) is minimised or alternatively, such that the availability is 
maximised. The point availability obtained from the proposed method only reflects the 
availability of the component analysed and does not account for any redundancy 
features incorporated within the system. 
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7.3.2 Expected cost model 
This model estimates the expected cost per unit time of maintaining the equipment on 
an inspection regime of period T. The probability of a defect arising as a breakdown 
failure is given in equation (l) as beT). As an inspection repair cost applies to all 
components even if the component is in good condition, the probability of fault arising 
as an inspection repair is 1 - beT). 
There are three cost elements which needs to be considered in this modelling phase. 
These three elements are: 
• Cost of a breakdown. 
• Cost of an inspection repair. 
• Cost of an inspection. 
Using the same assumptions and notations described in section 7.3.1, equation (4) is 
modified to include the various costs involved in an inspection maintenance regime to 
gIve: 
C(T) - [kT{CostBb(T) + CostlR [1-b(T)] }+Costi ] (10) 
(T+d) 
where: 
C(T) = The expected cost per unit time of maintaining the equipment on an inspection 
system of period T. 
CostB = Breakdown repair cost. 
Co stIR = Inspection repair cost. 
Costj = Inspection cost. 
The above terms are described in detail later. When the probability distribution function 
of the delay time, f( Iz), follows a truncated standard normal distribution as shown in 
equation (6) and substituting this into equation (10) to obtain an expression for the 
expected cost, C(T) will give: 
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C(T) = -(T+d) (11 ) 
Breakdown Repair Cost (Costs) 
When considering the cost associated with the breakdown of machinery, all failure 
modes and consequences need to be known. This can be achieved with the use of a 
FMEA. The process of carrying out an FMEA can be found in chapter 3 (section 3.11) 
and a modified FMEA specific for fishing vessels is presented in chapter 6. Using the 
results from this analysis, each consequence is then quantified in monetary terms. The 
breakdown repair cost includes costs associated with the effects of a failure and also 
costs associated with the corrective action taken to restore the equipment back to its 
working condition. This can be represented by equation (12) below: 
CostB = Costkeffect + Cost{ (12) 
Cost{ffect is the cost associated with the effect of an equipment failure and CostkC is the 
cost associated with the corrective action carried out on the failed equipment. The 
various factors considered in predicting the costs associated with the effects of a failure 
are given in equation (13) and where necessary, it is further elaborated. The various 
costs involved in carrying out corrective action are given in equation (19) and is 
explained later. 
Predicting costs associated ~vitlz the effects of afai/ure 
. . h h f~ f . f '1 C t effect, . b' The cost assocIated WIt tee lect 0 an eqUIpment al ure, os k , IS gIven y. 
effect '£II (C q (), ~ PF C t OJ n £". J''"Il ~ PF) Cosh = k m=1 ostm mkEkqkUk + os m UmkLf(LU/(Uk ( 13) 
where 
Costmq = Cost rate for effect m. 
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Costm OJ = Cost per occurrence for effect m. 
Omk = Redundancy factor for failure k and effect m. 
Ek = Operating time factor for failure k. 
qk = Mean probability of failure k. 
&PF = P-F factor for failure k. 
li.Jc = Mean frequency of failure k. 
The cost rate or cost per hour indicates the estimated cost per unit time due to the 
occurrence of the effect. The cost per occurrence indicates the fixed cost incurred every 
time the effect takes place. 
The redundancy factor indicates whether a cause will produce the assigned effect on its 
own or whether other concurrent failures will need to occur for the effect to take place. 
A redundancy factor often needs to be determined if the effect is a hazardous effect as 
there will almost certainly be protective systems in place to mitigate against failures, 
which would lead to a hazard. If the cause will produce the assigned effect without other 
concurrent failures taking place then the default value of 1 should be assigned to the 
redundancy factor. If the cause will only produce the assigned effect when other 
concurrent failures occur (e.g. protective equipment is unavailable) then a factor of 
between a and 1 should be applied. The redundancy factor represents the probability 
that the failure cause will produce the assigned effect. For example, consider the 
analysis of the failure cause, 'valve stuck closed' in a hydraulic winch system. This 
failure might lead to a hazardous event unless the system was shut down until the repair 
could be effected. The protection system provided to protect against the hazardous event 
might consist of sensors and alarms and require the intervention of automatic shut-down 
systems and operator actions. If the protection system were to fail then the hazardous 
effect would occur, the unavailability redundancy factor should be set to the estimated 
probability that the protection system would not work on demand. Therefore, if the 
probability of failure of the protection system is estimated at 0.000 I, the redundancy 
factor should be set to 0.000 I. 
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The operating time factor indicates the fraction of the system lifetime or sampling 
period for which the specified failure effects are applicable. If the failure mode wi II 
always result in the specified effects then this factor should be set to I. If the system 
operates in different phases, and the effects of failure are only applicable during certain 
phases then this value should indicate the ratio of applicable phase time lengths to the 
total lifetime: 
where 
Ek = operating time factor. 
'fA = sum of applicable phase time lengths. 
'fL = system lifetime/sampling period. 
The potential failure (P-F) interval indicates the time period before an actual failure 
during which potential failures are revealed. If the P-F interval is set to zero. failures 
will only be revealed if they have already occurred. Inspections of items with P-F 
intervals of zero are only effective for hidden failures. If potential failures can be 
identified before they occur (P-F interval> 0 ) then it may be worth inspecting items 
with revealed failures at regular intervals. The P-F factor is used to model the effects of 
non-zero P-F intervals for inspection tasks and alarm monitoring. For inspection tasks, 
the P-F factor is given by: 
bPF = l-ipF jCri +llIttr) for iPF jCri +mttr) < 1 (15) 
bPF =0 for iPF jCr; +1Ilttr)~1 (16) 
where 
iPF = P-F interval for the inspection task 
tj = Inspection interval 
I11ftr = Corrective outage duration (including logistic delay) 
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For condition alarms with non-zero P-F intervals the P-F factor is given by: 
t5 PF = 1- iPF / IIIttr for i PF / mUr < 1 ( 17) 
In all other cases the P-F factor is set to 1. 
Predicting costs associated with corrective action (Cost/) 
The cost associated with the corrective action carried out on the failed equipment. 
Cost{ , is given by: 
where 
CostkOpc = operational cost for corrective maintenance for failure k. 
Cost{re,q = cost rate for crew. 
mttTc = corrective task duration. 
Cost{re,OJ,c = corrective call-out cost for crew. 
ill = mean frequency of failure k. 
Costmkspa = corrective spare m unit cost. 
Um/ = no of spares used of type m during one corrective task. 
The operational cost parameter indicates any costs associated with the maintenance task 
other than the maintenance crew cost. This parameter is used to indicate any operational 
costs incurred by taking items off-line during maintenance. 
The cost rate defines the cost when the maintenance crew is performing scheduled or 
non-scheduled maintenance or inspection tasks. The corrective call-out cost represent 
any fixed costs associated with the call-out of the maintenance crew for corrective 
repairs. The scheduled call-out cost represent any fixed costs associated with each 
scheduled maintenance or inspection action. 
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design stage, are actively seeking benefits from adopting a similar approach. Joint 
industry-university research projects are being undertaken to explore this area. 
1.4 Databases 
The early reliability studies, particularly on electronics, made use of failure data 
obtained by testing a large number of components. As the techniques found more 
widespread application, the methods for statistically analysing data from real life 
experience became more advanced and large communal databases of reliability data 
were created. 
In the 1980's, the maritime classification societies, commercial inst itutions and other 
authorities realised the importance of statistical data collection on failure or repair data 
and eventually, data on general accident statistics were provided [Home Office, 1990; 
Health and Safety Executive, 1992a; Health and Safety Executive 1992b]. These data 
give general trends and are not directly useable in quantitative assessments. By far the 
most useful sets of statistics on marine accidents are presented in the publications of the 
UK Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club of insurers [P&I Club, 1992]. 
Accident investigation is a common method used by many organisations in attempt to 
enhance safety. Discovering the causes of casualties may allow steps to be taken to 
preclude similar accidents in the future. Since 1981 the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) has maintained a computer database summarising the causes of investigated 
marine casualties. In 1992 the USCG implemented a new computer casualty database, 
the Marine Investigation Module (MINMOD), which changed the way marine casualty 
investigations were reported [Hill S.G. et. aI., 1994]. The new system implemented 
several improvements that were expected to enhance the validity and completeness of 
the casualty data reported. One of the most important changes made was the adoption of 
a chain-of -events analysis of accident causes, enabling a more complete description of 
all accident-related events and their associated causes. 
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Inspection Repair Cost (Cost/R) 
The inspection repair cost will include all the expenses incurred to carry out the 
inspection and corrective action taken (if necessary). This will include the cost of 
maintenance engineers, spares consumed and loss of operational time. The expected 
cost for corrective action under inspection repair is less compared to breakdown repair 
(from experience of maintenance engineers and ship owners/operators). This is due to 
the number of components that have to be overhauled/changed when a breakdown 
occurs, probably attributed to the 'knock-on effect' of a component/machinery failure. 
Hence, the inspection repair cost is given by equation (20) and the value of Cost/ In 
this equation will be less than the value of Cost/ in equation ( 19). 
CostIR = Costki + Cost{ (20) 
where Costki is the cost associated with inspection tasks and Cost/ is the cost associated 
with corrective action. 
Predicting Costs Associated with Inspection Tasks (Costki) 
The cost associated with inspections carried out on the equipment, Costki , is given by: 
Cost/ = Costtp,g + Cost{re,qmtti + Cost{re,OJ,s (21) 
where 
Costtp,g = operational cost for task group i (includes inspection task for failure k) 
Cost{re,q = cost rate for crew. 
mtti = inspection duration. 
Cost/Ti>.OJ,s = scheduled call-out cost for crew. 
The inspection duration indicates the mean time taken to inspect the item. This time is 
only llsed to calculate the maintenance crew costs. A task group is used to group 
toaether different maintenance tasks, which are to be performed at the same time. 
b 
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Performing an inspection task on a group of items at the same time can often be more 
cost effective than inspecting the items at different intervals. The values of the co"t rate 
for crew and scheduled call-out cost for crew should be the same as the values used in 
equation (19). 
7.3.3 Expected safety criticality model 
This model estimates the safety criticality per unit time of the equipment when it IS 
inspected with a periodicity of T. If bet) is the probability of a defect arising as a 
breakdown failure k then, Cr/u(et\· is the safety criticality of the said failure and Cr/iper is 
the operational safety criticality when the defect does not arise and/or is not a 
breakdown failure. The estimation of Cr/afety and Crkoper are given by equation (22) and 
(23) respectively. 
n 
C slit~rr = '" S s(/f~rs B c s: PF OJ rk " L....J m II/kCkUk k (22) 
m=l 
where 
Crt/let\' = Safety criticality associated with failure k. 
Sw(ery III = Safety severity for the mth effect for failure k. 
Bmk = Redundancy factor for failure k and effect Ill. 
Ck = Operating time factor for failure k. 
4PF = P-F factor for failure k. 
~ = mean frequency of failure k. 
n 
C oper = '" SoperB c s:PF OJ (23) rk L....J m mkck uk k 
11/=1 
where 
Crtper = Operational safety criticality associated with failure k. 
Soper 11/ = Operational safety severity for the mill effect for failure k. 
Bmk = Redundancy factor for failure k and effect 111. 
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Ek = Operating time factor for failure k. 
4PF = P-F factor for failure k. 
til = mean frequency of failure k. 
The safety and operational severity of a failure can be identified by perfomling an 
FMEA study on the system. The values of these two parameters can be estimated 
subjectively using a scale of 0 to 1 0 (0 being least critical and 10 being most critical). 
The values are assigned based on the probability of occurrence and severity, and are 
considered for four categories (personnel, environment, equipment and catch). All the 
other variables in equation (22) and (23) will have the same values as defined in 
equation (13) of section 7.3.2. 
Maintaining the assumptions and notations presented 10 section 7.3. 1, the expected 
safety criticality is given by equation (24). 
kTCrsafef)'b(T) + Croper [I - beT)] SeT) = k k 
T+d 
(24) 
where SeT) is the expected safety criticality per unit time and Cr/utiln and Crtper is 
given by equations (22) and (23) respectively. 
7.4 An Example 
The application of the delay time concept to determine the optimum inspection interval 
is demonstrated using a main hydraulic winch operating system on a fishing vessel. This 
vessel is a 1266 GRT (Gross Tonnage), deep-sea trawler with an L.O.A (Length overall) 
of 60 meters. The winches are used to deploy the nets and haul the catch on to the ship. 
The supporting winches, that is, the gilson winch and tipping winches are not 
considered in this example. The schematic diagram in figure 7.5 shows the layout of the 
main hydraulic piping system and the associated components within the system. The 
main pumps provide the hydraulic power to the port and starboard winches as \\ell as 
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the net drum motor. The 1010 pumps are used to control the ten ion and balance the 
loads on the main winches. 
NET DRUM 
R Port R Change over v/v Winch Winch /\ Balance Valve 
10 10 Pump 
J?~ 
Fi lter Filter 
Filter Filter 
Main Pumps 
Figure 7.5. Hydraulic winch operating system of a fishing ves el 
The fishing vessel used in this test case has a voyage profile as iIJustrated in the bar 
chart in figure 7.6. The voyage duration of the vessel depends olely on the ucce of 
the catch and the duration at port depends on the discharging time and the amount of 
work to be carried out on the ship as discussed in section 7.2. As an example of an 
analy is at the component level, the actual maintenance period and failure of a brake 
seal for a winch are hown in figure 7.7. This particular ves el operate on a yearly 
inspection/maintenance regime. This entails that once a year, a thorough check of the 
ve el i performed. Any component that are identified to require maintenance or 
replacement (during thi in pection) i either overhauled or replaced accordingl to 
bring the equipment back to "a good a new". 
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It can been seen from figure 7.7 that many of the failures go unnoticed as the initial 
point of failure and actual failure occurs between the inspection/maintenance period. 
For this example, only on two occasions (between voyage 3 and 4 and voyage 10 and 
11), the initial failure was detected for the brake seal and the necessary action was 
taken. 
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Figure 7.7 Initial point and failure point of brake seal. 
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The following information was gathered for this particular system, which included a 
combination of logged records and reports complemented by expert judgements (where 
no data was available). 
Inspection downtime (d) = 15 minutes = 0.01041 days 
Downtime for breakdown repair (db) = 4.5 days 
Total operating hours of winch (for 25 voyages) = 1344 hrs = 56 days 
Arrival rate of defects (k) = 0.535 per day [30 failures for 25 voyages] 
The actual process of carrying out the inspection itself would take about 45 minutes for 
this particular system. Most of the inspection can be carried out when the hydraulic 
system is not operating, this include visual inspection, off-load and function testing. 
Hence, the downtime caused by inspection would be much lower than 45 minutes. From 
experience, only 15 minutes is required to carry out an on load pressure test for such a 
system. Therefore, the inspection downtime, d, is set to be 15 minutes or 0.01041 days. 
The downtime for break down repair takes into account any logistic delays that may 
occur while waiting for spares to be sent from shore suppliers. Most fishing vessels 
carry minimum amount of spares on board. Hence, should a break down occur at sea on 
the hydraulic system, the ship might be operationally crippled for a period of time. From 
experience, this period could be a few of hours or days, depending on the position of the 
vessel at the time of break down. 
Substituting the values obtained for the hydraulic system into equation (7) gives the 
following equation: 
T +0.01041 
(25) D(T) = 
[ ITS 2 ,21' ] 0.01041 + (0.535T) - (T - h)( r:::= e- I -) dh 4.5 T 0 '\/ 2;r 
Using a computing software such as De ri1'tJ , MatLah or Studyworks to sol\'e equation 
(25), a graph of D(T) against T can be plotted as shown in figure 7.8. 
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Figure 7.8 Optimal inspection period based on minimum D(T) for a truncated standard 
normal distribution of the delay time 
From the graph in figure 7.8, the optimal inspection period, T (such that the expected 
downtime is minimised), is determined to be 0.216 days or 5.18 operating hours. This 
inspection frequency will cause an expected minimum downtime of 0.0853 days or 3.04 
hours per unit time. To express this result more clearly for a certain period of operating 
time, the availability of the equipment is calculated using equation (8) and (9) for 
various inspection intervals. The total operating time is taken to be 56 days for a period 
of 25 voyages. The result of this analysis is shown in figure 7.9. From the graph the 
maximum attainable availability is 91.1 % with a corresponding inspection interval of 
0.216 days or 5.18 operating hours . 
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Figure 7.9 Optimal inspection period based on maximum availability for a truncated 
standard normal distribution of the delay time 
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For this particular study, two other different probability distribution functions of delay-
time were experimented with, namely the weibull distribution and the exponential 
distribution. 
Equation (4) was altered according to the type of distribution used. For the weibull 
distribution where: 
and substituting equation (26) into equation (4) gives the following; 
D(T)= 
0.01041 + (0.535T)[~ J (T - h)( ~ ha- 1 e-(hl P)") dh]4.5 
To fJ 
T+0.0l041 
(27 ) 
Different values of a and ~ were substituted to plot the change in the D(T) versus T 
curve. The results are as shown in figure 7.10. From these curves, it was determined that 
the optimum inspection period is between 0.3 to 0.8 days (7.2 to 19.2 operating hours). 
a = 10, P = 5 
a = 3, P = I () 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
D(T) 
0.6 
a=3. P=IO 
O.'i 
0.-1 
a = 2. P = 20 
0.3 
0.2 "1 
a = I. P = 'i0 
0.1 
o .--.. --..... -.-.-.-----.... -.-.... -
o 0.2 0.-1 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.-1 1.6 1.8 2 
T 
Figure 7.10 Optimal inspection period based on minimum OCT) for a wei bull 
distribution of the delay time 
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Using the exponential distribution for the delay time, where: 
f(h)=k- Ah (28) 
and substituting equation (28) into equation (4) to obtain an expression for the 
downtime will give: 
D(T) = 
0.01041 + (0.S3ST)[ ~ I (T - II)(Ac -./h) dll}.S 
T +0.01041 
(29) 
Different values of A (failure rate) were substituted into equation (29) to produce the 
graph in figure 7.11. Although different values of A were experimented with (a range 
from MTBF=40 to MTBF=900) the curve maintained the same. 
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Figure 7.11 Optimal inspection period based on minimum D(T) for an exponential 
distribution of the delay time 
The results obtained using exponential distribution is not \ery useful as it does not 
reflect a curve that increases in D(T) as the inspection period increases. From these 
results, the most suited distribution was found to be the weibull and the truncated 
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standard normal distribution. These two distributions gave clear indications of the 
optimum inspection period. The values of a and ~ in the weibull distribution can be 
estimated by a collection of test data or by using available failure data of the equipment, 
and since the failure data available is associated with a high degree of uncel1ainty. this 
distribution is not used here. As such for the purpose of demonstrating the delay time 
concept for fishing vessels, the truncated standard normal distribution is used for the 
expected cost and safety criticality model. 
The data collected from the hydraulic system for the cost estimation is as follows: 
Cost associated with inspection task (Costkl ) 
From the historical data, it was found that contract workers carry out inspection tasks as 
per PMS (Preventive Maintenance Schedule) every 365 days when machinery is not 
operating/at port. However, should the inspection be carried out on board the vessel by 
the vessel crew, the values for Costtp,g and Cost{re,q are O. The only possible cost could 
be a call out cost for crew to carry out special inspection activities such as, the 
calibration of pressure control valves on the hydraulic system. The inspection cost from 
equation (21) is calculated to be: 
Cost/ = Cost{re.m. s = £100 
Cost associated with corrective action (Cost{ ) 
From the historical data, it is known that contract workers normally carry out corrective 
action at port upon inspection. However, if the corrective maintenance was carried out 
on board the vessel upon inspection, the values for CosttP and Cost{re.4 = O. The data 
used for this test case considers repairs carried out on the clutch seal and break seal of 
the hydraulic winch. The following parameters were quantified as follows: 
C t ere.m.e - £100 os k -
{Q= 2.5 
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In the past, accident statistics were not gathered systematically and the data t) pe \\as 
not consistent. This led to the analyst not knowing if the set of data is applicable to the 
analysis under consideration. Some commercial institutions have focused on de\eloping 
databases of maritime accidents. The accident information is presented systematically 
and in some cases correlation is available. Typical examples include: 
• OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) - A database of offshore accidents which \\as 
first published in 1982 and has been updated annually ever since [OREDA, 1982J. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Marine Incident Database System (MIDS) - A database maintained by the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB). 
World Casualty Statistics - A collection of data published annually by L10yds 
Register of Shipping. 
The Institute of London Underwriters. 
CAS MAIN - A database maintained by the United States Coastguard. 
SEAREM - A British Isle database developed and refined under the stewardship of 
the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI). 
During the last five years, progressive maritime organisations around the world have 
been cooperating to form a worldwide information network, called RAM/SHIPNET, to 
support the optimisation of safety, reliability, and cost effectiveness in vessel 
operations. The mission of RAMISHIPNET is to form an efficient information network 
for vessel operators and other industry participants to collect and share sanitised 
performance information on vessel equipment. It consists of distributed and partially 
shared Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) databases. RAMISHIPNET 
was established to collect equipment performance data and to share this data at different 
levels by linking chief engineers, ship operators/managers, regulatory agencies, 
equipment manufacturers, and shipyards/designers. First generation stand-alone data 
collection and processing tools were developed and the system became ready for 
implementation. The roll-out period is in progress for full validation, demonstration, and 
implementation of RAMISHIPNET [Inozu B. and Radovic 1., 1999] 
The databases that are described in this section, are still lacking specific information of 
equipment and component failures, novel methods have to be developed to handle this 
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,pa COstbseaJ = £30 
CostcseaJspa = £30 
UbseaJ = 1 
UcseaJ = 1 
Substituting these values into equation (19) gives, 
Cost{ = 100(2.5) + 30(2.5)( 1) +30(2.5)(1) = £400 
The predicted cost associated with inspection repair from equation (20) is calculated to 
gIve, 
CostlR = 100 + 400 = £500 
Cost associated with the effect of equipment failure (CostkefjeCf) 
The failure of the winch has an effect on the personnel, environment, equipment and 
catch [Pillay A. et. aI., 2001]. The cost rate (Costmq ) and cost per occurrence (Costm ~ 
on each of these categories are given in table 7.2. Since much of the information was 
lacking, expert judgement and subjective reasoning were used to obtain reasonable 
estimates of the effects of the hydraulic winch failure. 
Effect of failure on Costm q Costm ()) 
Personnel £100/hr £4000 
Environment £lOO/hr £2000 
Equipment £lOO/hr £1000 
Catch £100/hr £3000 
Table 7.2 Cost rate and cost per occurrence estimation for a failure 
The other parameters were quantified as follows: 
tk = I 
OX = 2.5 
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Using these values, the sum of Cost{ffect is calculated from equation ( 13) to be £25,000. 
These values are substituted into equation (11) to give the profile of the expected cost, 
C(T) against the inspection period, T. The results of the analysis are presented in figure 
7.12. From the graph, the optimal inspection period for this system is determined to be 
0.302 days or 7.24 operating hours and the expected cost at this interval is estimated to 
be £881. 
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Figure 7.12 Optimal inspection period based on C(T) 
To analyse the effect of the change in the cost elements that were difficult to quantify_ a 
sensitivity analysis is performed on the optimal inspection period by altering the 
inspection repair cost, (CostlR) and the inspection cost, (Costki). The following fi \'c cascs 
were considered: 
Case I: Cost/l? and Cost/ increased by 10CJc 
Case 2: Cost/l? and Cost/ increased by 57c 
Case .3: lostlR and Cost/ unchanged 
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Case 4: CostlR and Cost/ decreased by SC7c, 
Case 5: CostlR and Costki decreased by 10% 
The result of this analysis is shown graphically in figure 7.13 and the expected co~t and 
optimal inspection period for each case is given in table 7.3. From the sensitivity 
analysis, it can be seen that the optimal inspection period is around 7 to 8 operating 
hours. The variation in T, is observed to be small when inspection repair cost and 
inspection cost are varied. 
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Figure 7.13 Sensitivity analysis for optimal inspection period based on C(T) 
Expected cost, CrT) Optimal insp. period, T Case (operating hours) 
Case 1 (+ 10%) £938 7.92 
Case 2 (+5%) £909 7.27 
Case 3 (Unchanged) £881 7.24 
Case 4 ( 5%) £852 7.32 
Case 5 (-10%) £822 6.9../ 
Table 7 . .1 Optimal inspection period based on the sensitivity analysis for various cases 
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The data collected for the safety criticality estimation is based on expert judgement and 
is shown in table 7.4. The failure was evaluated for its safety and operational criticality 
for the four different categories mentioned in section 7.3.3 on a scale of 0 to 10. The 
estimation of the safety severity parameter (S sajetym) , is assumed for the worst case 
scenario. It is also assumed that, if the failure does not lead to a catastrophic breakdown, 
the operational safety severity (S oper m) will be minimal. 
Effect of failure on S safety m Soper m Crmsajety Crmoper 
Personnel 10 1 25 2.5 
Environment 10 1 25 2.5 
Equipment 10 1 25 2.5 
Catch 10 1 25 2.5 
Table 7.4 Values of Ssajety m and Soper m 
The values of Crksajety and Crkoper in equation (22) and (23) were evaluated assuming 
that Omk, Ck, and 4PF = 1 and m.: = 2.5, to give: 
Crksajety = 25 + 25 + 25 + 25 = 100 
Crkoper = 2.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 = 10 
These values are then substituted into equation (24) to give the profile of the expected 
safety criticality, S(T) against the inspection period, T. The results of the analysis are 
presented in figure 7.14. This graph indicates than the optimal inspection period when 
the safety criticality is at its minimum is 0.72 days or 17.28 operating hours. This 
inspection interval is much higher compared to when the cost or downtime is 
minimised. This is probably due to the fact that the worst case is assumed for the safety 
criticality calculation (a score of 10 for all Ssajety m ). 
The next step in the analysis is to determine the best compromise between the three 
inspection intervals obtained. There are several methods that can be used to determine 
the best compromise, these include multiple criteria decision making:. minimax principle 
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optimisation and the bayesian approach optimisation [Almeida AT d B h . G A 
.. an 0 Orts . ., 
1995]. As these methods require tedious mathematical computation, which is not 
required here, a simple graphical method is used to determine the best compromise 
inspection interval. 
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Figure 7.14 Optimal inspection period based on SeT) 
7.5 Optimisation Results 
The example used to demonstrate the proposed approach generated three different 
optimal inspection periods. The inspection period is estimated to be 5.18 operating 
hours when the downtime is minimised, 7.24 operating hours when the cost is 
minimised and 17.28 operating hours when the safety criticality is minimised. As the 
change in the safety criticality is small for a large change in the inspection interval, this 
criterion is not as critical as the cost and downtime criteria. A such. in the first instance 
the expected cost, C(T) is plotted against the expected downtime D(T) as shown in 
figure 7.15. The curve generated can be used to determine the best compromise bet\veen 
the cost and downtime criteria. 
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Points 1 and 2 on the graph show the best downtime and cost achievable respecti ely 
for the system with an inspection interval of T*. Should point 1 be selected, when 
downtime is minimised the operating cost per unit time is £911. This is almost 3.4% 
higher than the minimum possible operating cost. However, if point 2 is selected, when 
the cost is minimised, the downtime suffered will be 0.18 hours per unit time. This 
translates to a reduction in availability of 0.34% from the maximum availability 
attainable by the equipment. 
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Figure 7.15 Expected cost C(T) against expected downtime D(T) 
The ideal inspection time is located at point 3 where both the cost and downtime are 
simultaneously minimised. However, such an operating condition does not exist for the 
system that was modelled. Therefore, the best compromise is identified at point 4, 
which is nearest to the ideal point. If the cost and downtime are of equal importance the 
best compromise point can be obtained using minimax approach [Sen P. and Yang J.B. 
1993]. From the analysis, the best compromise (point 4) is when the inspection period is 
6.24 operating hours, cost is £886, the expected downtime is 2.06 hrs per unit time and 
the availability of the equipment is 91 %. Considering the inspection time interval 
=C=ha=p~te~r~7_-~M=a=i=nt=e~na=n=c~e~M~o=d=el=li~ng~------___________________________________ 216 
obtained (6.24 operating hours), it would entail that an inspection is to be carried out 
after every two fishing operations (assuming that the main winches run on an average of 
3 hours per operation). 
The graph in figure 7.16 gives a clearer indication of the three criteria modelled for the 
winch system. This graph plots the expected cost, C(T), expected downtime D(T) and 
expected safety criticality SeT) against the inspection period T. The shaded area shown 
on the graph represents the approximate operating hours of the winch system (per 
fishing operation), which ranges from 3 to 6 hours. For convenience, the inspection can 
be carried out during this period as the penalty is within acceptable limits. 
----- -------------------------
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Figure 7.16 D(T), C(T) and SeT) against T 
7.6 Conclusion 
The use of a delay-time model within a preventive maintenance system would be useful 
to minimise downtime caused by undetected failures. Inspections carried out during the 
operation phase of machinery will reveal any failures that have already been initiated at 
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an earlier time. Upon identifying the 'abnormal' condition, necessary action can be taken 
to arrest the problem before it propagates to become a failure. This chapter demonstrate" 
the delay-time concept with the use of data gathered from a fishing vessel. Assumptions 
and expert judgements were made where the data was incomplete. Since there \vas no 
record of the delay-time for failures, the probability distribution function of the dela\'-
time could not be ascertained mathematically. As such, known distribution functions 
such as the standard normal, exponential and wei bull were used to demonstrate the 
concept. 
The example of the brake seal failure with the current maintenance policy of every 365 
days (when the vessel is at port), showed that almost 660/c of the failures went 
unnoticed. This would ent~il high repair costs coupled with high operational costs due 
to the downtime suffered. With the integration of the delay-time concept within the 
current maintenance policy, the percentage of failures going unnoticed is expected to be 
as low as 5 to 10%. 
Although the procedure to determine the optimal inspection time is complex, it can be 
easily incorporated into a user friendly computer interface, which would require 
owners/operators to input information about the failure of the equipment. Hence, it 
could be easily adapted to any vessel within the maritime community. The proposed 
approach would appeal to owners and operators who are running their vessels at high 
maintenance costs. Fishing vessels are constantly subjected to rough operating 
conditions as these vessels operate under various constrains such as size of the vessel, 
equipment on board, competency of crew and weather conditions. Owners of such 
vessels would be enthusiastic to incorporate an inspection regime on their fleet, as this 
would entail a more cost efficient ship, which further translates into income for the 
company. The proposed approach does not require any condition monitoring equipment 
to be installed, hence it would not be expensive for the owners/operators to implement 
such a method. 
The inspection regIme can be integrated into the existing maintenance procedure" in 
order to minimise the operating cost and downtime suffered. The effectiveness l)r the 
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proposed approach can be improved if sufficient data is available in order to generate a 
true probability distribution function for the delay time. Currently there is no procedure 
in place for testing the hydraulic equipment for operation before the staI1 of a fishing 
operation. As such, having an inspection regime before every other operation could be 
very useful to minimise unforeseen accidents/incidents caused by equipment failure. 
Any inspection regime implemented on board a fishing vessel would enable gathering 
of useful information about the system, such as the time of actual failure and the time of 
initial failure (the time when the equipment starts to show signs of abnormalities). This 
information will enable for better prediction of the delay time interval and distribution, 
hence, enhancing the accuracy of the model. 
The final decision of the optimal inspection period will depend heavily on the needs and 
operating culture of the owner/operator of the vessel. The implementation of such a 
regime on fishing vessels will be influenced by the operating circumstances of the 
equipment and other factors such as availability of expertise, position of vessel and sea 
conditions. However, should the conditions for implementation be favourable, DTA can 
be used to optimise the systems' inspection maintenance scheme. 
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shortcoming. These novel techniques should integrate expert judgement with available 
data in a formal manner to ensure the accuracy and the applicability of the "afct\ 
assessment carried out. 
1.5 Description of the Proposed Research 
The primary aim of this project is to develop novel safety asscssment methods to be 
applied to fishing vessels. Fishing vessels were chosen as a test case as the vcssels are 
generally smaller with a unique operating nature and the accidents concerning thesc 
types of vessels have been overlooked in the past. Most fishing vessels are owner 
operated and lack the organisational structure of other merchant vessel companies. This 
leads to the difficulty in gathering accident/failure information for a safety analysis. 
Since the fishing vessel industry is starved of safety and reliability data, conventional 
safety and risk assessment techniques are not readily applied. The available quantitative 
techniques require a certain amount of failure data in order to make a reasonable safety 
prediction. The novel methods developed in this project will address this set back of the 
traditional methods by integrating within its model the ability to handle vague and 
uncertain data in an effective manner to produce a reasonably accurate safety 
assessment. These novel methods will integrate hazard identification, risk quantification 
and ranking with formal decision making techniques so that safety improvements made 
to new as well as existing vessels are effective and justified. 
The specific objectives of this project can be summarised as follows: 
1. Identify safety assessment techniques currently used in the shipping industry, which 
include methods of hazard identification, risk quantification, cost benefit analysis 
techniques and decision-making techniques. 
2. Study the existing Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) approach In maritime safety 
application. 
3. Develop a general FSA framework for a generic fishing vessel. 
4. Develop novel safety assessment modelling techniques \vithin the FSA framework to 
facilitate safety assessment of fishing vessels. 
~C:.!.!Ch!:!:Jap:::..:.t=er....!7_-....!M!.!.a~i:!.!:.nt~e~na::!.!..I~lc~e .!.:..;M~o..!::!.:de~/!..!C1 iI:.!...!lg'----____________________ ~~() 
Christer A.H. and Walker W.M. (1984c), "Delay-time models of industrial inspection 
maintenance problems", Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol..35. pp. 
401-406. 
Crocker J. (1999), "Effectiveness of maintenance", Journal of Quality in Maintenance 
Engineering, Vo1.5, No.4, pp. 307-313. 
Fonseca D.J. and Knapp G.M. (2000), "An expert system for reliability centred 
maintenance in the chemical industry", Expert -Systems-with-Applications. 
Vol. 19, No.1, pp. 45-57. 
Goodfellow J.W. (2000), "Applying reliability centred maintenance (ReM) to overhead 
electric utility distribution systems", Power Engineering Society Summer 
Meeting, Vol. 1, pp. 566-569. 
Hariga M. (1994), "A deterministic maintenance scheduling problem for a group of 
non-identical machines", International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, Vol. 14, No.7, pp. 27-36. 
Hauge B.S., Stevens A.M., Loomis RJ.Jr. and Ghose A. (2000), "Reliability-centred 
maintenance on the space shuttle program", Proceedings of the Annual Reliability 
and Maintainability. Symposium, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, USA, pp. 311-316. 
Leung F. and Kit-Ieung M. (1996), "Using delay-time analysis to study the maintenance 
problem of gearboxes", International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, Vol. 16, No. 12, pp. 98-105. 
Lofsten H. (1999), "Management of industrial maintenance - Economic eyaluation of 
maintenance policies". International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, Vol.l9. No.7. pp. 716-737. 
=C=ha=p~te~r~7_-~M~(=li~llt=el=la=ll=ce~M==o(=le=l/=iI~1g--------------------------________________ ~~1 
Luce S. (1999), "Choice criteria in conditional preventive maintenance", ~kchanical 
Systems and Signal Processing, Vol.13, No. I. pp. 163-168. 
Mann L., Saxena A. and Knapp G.M. (1995), "Statistical-based or condition based 
preventive maintenance?", Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering, Vol.l. 
No.1, pp. 49-59. 
Newell G.E. (1999), "Oil analysis: Cost-effective machine condition monitoring", 
Industrial Lubrication and Tribology, Vo1.51, No.3, pp. 119-12--1-. 
Parrondo J.L., Velarde S. and Santolaria C. (1998), "Development of a predictive 
maintenance system for a centrifugal pump". Journal of Quality in Maintenance 
Engineering, Vol.4, No.3, 1998, pp. 198-21l. 
Percy D.F. and Kobbacy K.A.H. (1996), "Preventive maintenance modelling, a 
Bayesian perspective", Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering, Vol.2, 
No.1, pp. 15-24. 
Pillay A., Wang J., Jung G. M., Loughran C.G., rAnson T.. Wall A.D. and Ruxton T. 
(2001), "A modified Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) using fuzzy 
approximate reasoning and grey relation analysis", 11th International Offshore 
and Polar Engineering Conference and Exhibition (ISOPE 2001). June 17-22, 
Stavanger, Norway. 
Rausand M. (1998), "Reliability centred maintenance", Reliability-Engineering and 
System Safety, Vo1.60, No.2, pp. 121-132. 
Redmond D.F., Christer A.H., Ridgen S.R. and Burley E. (1997), "OR modelling of the 
deterioration and maintenance of concrete structures", European Journal of 
Operational Research. Vol.99, pp. 619-6.31. 
=C=ha~p~te=r~7_-~M~a~i=nt~ef~1(=ln~c~e=M~o~de=ll=in~g~ ________________________________________ 'l' 
Rischel T.D. and Christy D.P. (1996), "Incorporating maintenance activities into 
production planning: Integration at the master schedule versus material 
requirements level", International Journal of Production Research, VoI.J-l-. No.2, 
pp. 421-446. 
Savic D.A., Godfrey W.A. and Knezevic J. (1995), "Optimal opportunistic maintenance 
policy using genetic algorithm, 1: Formulation", Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering, Vol. I ,No.2, pp. 34-49. 
Sen P. and Yang J.B. (1993), "A multiple criteria decision support environment for 
engineering design", Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Engineering 
Design, Hague, The Netherlands. 
Sherwin D.J. (1999), "A constructive critique of reliability-centered maintenance", 
Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability. Symposium, IEEE, 
Piscataway, NJ, USA, pp. 238-244. 
Sherwin D.J. and AI-Najjar B. (1999), "Practical models for condition monitoring 
inspection intervals", Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering, Vo1.5, No.3, 
pp. 203-220. 
Srikrishna S., Yadava G.S. and Rao P.N. (1996), "Reliability-centred maintenance 
applied to power plant auxiliaries", Journal of Quality in Maintenance 
Engineering, Vol.2, No.1, pp. 3-14. 
Wang W. (1997), "Subjective estimation of delay-time distribution in maintenance 
modelling", European Journal of Operational Research, Vo1.99, pp. 151-529. 
Worledge D.H. (1993), "Industry advances in reliability centred maintenance". 
Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL '93), 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, pp. 267-277. 
~C=ha~p~te=r~8~-~H~u~m~al~1~E~rr~o~r~A~ss~'e~SS~'11~1e~l1t~a~n~d~D~e±c~is~io~n~M~a~k~in~g~U~s~in~g~A~H~P  _________________ 223 
CHAPTER 8 
HUMAN ERROR ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING USING 
ANAL YTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESSING 
Summary 
A brief review of common human error assessment methods is presented highlighting 
the requirements and steps of each method. This is followed by an introduction to the 
Analytical Hierarchy Processing (AHP) method to aid decision-making. An approach to 
integrate human error assessment and decision-making using the AHP method is 
proposed. The aim of this approach is to reduce the probability of occurrence and 
severity of human error during the operational phase of a fishing vessel. It utilises AHP 
theory to rank the impacts of human error and further integrates the available control 
options (to minimise these errors) within the analysis. The result obtained from the 
analysis reflects the most favoured control option that will address all the possible 
human errors within the system to a satisfactory level. A test case, which considers the 
shooting operation of a beam trawler, is used to demonstrate the proposed approach. 
Each step involved in the shooting operation is assessed for its vulnerability to human 
error with respect to the equipment being operated and this captures the operator-
machine interaction. The AHP method integrates the evaluation of solutions to reduce 
risk levels within the human error assessment and this reduces the complexity of the 
analysis that is present in traditional methods. 
8.1 Introduction 
The cost of shipping casualties is normally expressed in terms of insurance \'alue. The 
report of the Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) for 1995 stated that 95 ships were 
lost during the year [ITSA, 1996; ILU, 1996]. In 1996. the ILU recorded 1.190 li\'cs lost 
at sea and the ship classification society Det Norske Veritas (DNV) has estimated that 
accidents on board ships cost the industry around SUS 10 billion a year lllll. 1996: 
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!MO, 1997]. It has been accepted that 80% of the accidents in the maritime industrv is 
caused by human error. In the fishing vessel industry, Lloyd's Register of World Fleet 
Statistics 1998 notes that the average age of the world fleet of fish catching vessels over 
100 GRT is 20 years [International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 1999]. This 
could be a contributing factor to the high level of human error on these vessels. These 
older vessels lack automation and modern safety devices, hence the safe operation of the 
vessels is highly dependent on the competency of the crew on board. 
Human error has played a critical role in the causes of many major marine accidents. 
The officers and crew of the Herald of Free Enterprise set to sea with their bow doors 
open [Sheen N., 1987]. The crew and skipper of the Pescalanza and Sapphire did not 
close their watertight doors during heavy seas, which led to the sinking of the vessels by 
flooding [MAID, 2000]. 
In these accidents, life, cargo and property had been lost due to the negligence and/or 
mistakes made by the operators of the system. Understanding errors and system failures 
are particularly important with respect to "high-consequence" systems. These are open 
systems whose behaviour has a significant effect not only on the system itself but also 
on the world outside the system. Hence, there is a need for an effective method to model 
the risks posed by human error in order to direct the limited resources to solutions that 
would reduce these risks. 
8.2 Review of Human Error Assessment Methods 
Engineers have developed a range of tools that can be used to represent and reason 
about the causes of major accidents [Leveson N., 1995]. For example, time-lines and 
fault trees have been recommended as analysis tools by a range of government and 
regulatory bodies. Unfortunately, these well-established techniques suffer from a 
number of limitations [Johnson C., 1998]. In particular, they cannot easily be used to 
represent and reason about the ways in which human errors and system failures interact 
during complex accidents [Hollnagel E., 1993]. 
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8.2.1 Methods for quantification of human failures 
Most methods for estimating human reliability were used in nuclear power plants. Such 
methods include confusion matrix [Fullwood R.R. and Hall R.E., 1988: Gertman O.I. 
and Blackman H.S., 1994], expert estimation [Gertman 0.1. and Blackman H.S., 1994]. 
Time Reliability Curve (TRC) [Dougherty E.M. and Fragola J .R., 1988; Moieni P. et. 
aI., 1994], Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation (MAPPS) [Fullwood R.R 
and Hall R.E., 1988; Gertman 0.1. and Blackman H.S., 1994], Success Likelihood 
Index Method-Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) [Fullwood R.R. 
and Hall R.E., 1988; Gertman OJ. and Blackman H.S., 1994], sociotechnical 
assessment of human reliability [Gertman OJ. and Blackman H.S., 1994], Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [Dhillon B. S., 1986], Sandia Recovery 
Model (SRM), INTENT [Gertman OJ. et. aI., 1992] and Operator Reliability 
Calculation and Assessment (ORCA). Of the methodologies given, most deal with 
misdiagnosis or non-response errors and time dependent probability estimates. The most 
commonly used techniques are THERP, utilising generic Human Error Probabilities 
(HEP) from various industries, and SLIM-MAUD, using importance weightings from 
experts. 
8.2.2 THERP 
This method provides a mechanism for modelling as well as quantifying human error. It 
starts off with a task analysis that describes the tasks to be performed by the crew. 
maintainers or operators. Together with the task descriptions, Performance-Shaping 
Factors (PSF) such as stress and time available are collected to modify probabilities. 
The task analysis is then graphically represented in Human Reliability Assessment 
(HRA) event trees. The HEP for the activities of the task or the branches are read and/or 
modified from the THERP tables as shown in [Gertman 0.1. and Blackman H.S, 1994]. 
Details on the construction of HRA event trees and also, the COGnitive EveNt Tree 
(COGENT) to represent cognitive activities and errors associated with human 
performance were also given in the book. Gertman and Blackman also pro\ide a 
summary of the steps to approach THERP. which \vas adapted from the ~uclear 
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Regulation-NUREG/CR-1278 [Swain A. D. and Guttmann H. E., 1983]. THERP ~Llffers 
from the following limitations [Reason J., 1990; White D., 1995]: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
It is difficult to represent the variability of human behaviour adequately. 
The technique assumes each task segment can be handled separately. 
It is difficult to combine human and equipment reliability values. 
It is difficult to identify inter-task dependencies. 
The technique is not appropriate for continuous tasks. 
The method does not determine motivation of the individual. 
Analysts have the tendency to model only errors that appear in databases. 
8.2.3 Accident Sequence Ewdllation Programme (ASEP) 
ASEP is a quicker version of THERP and is more conservative. It is a fine screening 
approach and can be complemented with THERP to warrant more detailed attention in 
the risk assessment. For a more detailed discussion on ASEP refer to [Swain A.D., 
1987]. 
8.2.4 SLIM-MAUD 
The SLIM-MAUD method is centred on the assumption that the failure probability 
associated with task performance is based on a combination of PSFs that include the 
characteristics of the individual, the environment, and the task. It further assumes that 
experts can estimate these failure rates or provide anchor values to estimate them. Refer 
to [Gertman D.l. and Blackman H.S., 1994] for a description on the steps to take to 
perform SLIM-MAUD. Included in this discussion are two enhanced methods for the 
approach. Dougherty and Fragola also provide the mathematics and an example for 
calculating SLIM-MAUD [Dougherty E.M. and Fragola J.R., 1988]. Davoudian 
provides an empirical evaluation of SLIM-MAUD and ranking to estimate HEPs, 
through the use of a simulated manufacturing environment under varying task 
conditions [Davoudian K. et. ai, 1994]. 
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8.2.5 Hllman Reliabili~v Assessment (HRA) 
HRA analyses the relationship between human behavioural tendencies and the work 
context to provide a better understanding in anticipating human errors, violations and 
severe system outcomes. This analysis requires a fundamental understanding of: 
1. The way humans process information, including their capabilities and limitations at 
such processing [Wickens C.D., 1992]. 
2. Human factors and ergonomics design consideration [Sanders M.S. and McCormick 
E.J., 1987]. 
3. Skill, rule and knowledge based framework, which describes distinct levels of 
information processing at which workers perform [Rasmussen J., 1982; Rasmussen 
J., 1986]. 
4. Psychosocial considerations that increase the likelihood of performing violations 
[Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), 1994]. 
The prImary goals of HRA are to assess the risks attributable to human error and 
determine the ways of reducing system vulnerability due to human error impact. These 
goals are achieved by its three principal functions of identifying what errors can occur 
(human error identification), deciding how likely the errors are to occur (human error 
quantification), and, if appropriate, enhancing human reliability by reducing this error 
likelihood (human error reduction). The HRA process can be broken down into several 
steps as seen below. 
Problem definition: This refers to deciding what human involvements are to be assessed 
(operators failing to deal with emergencies, operators' contribution to maintenance 
failures etc.) 
Task analysis: When the human aspect of the problem has been defined, task analysis 
can then define what human actions should occur in such events, as well as \\hat 
equipment and other "interfaces" the operator should use. It may also identify \\hat 
training (skills and knowledge) and procedures the operators will call upon. 
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Human Error Identification (HEI): Once the task analysis has been carried out, HEI 
then considers what can go wrong. The following types of errors are typically 
considered: 
• 
• 
• 
Error of omission - failing to carry out a required act. 
Error of commission - failing to carry out a required act adequately; act performed 
without required precision, or with too much or too little force; act performed at 
wrong time; acts performed in the wrong sequence. 
Extraneous act - not required act performed instead of, or in addition to the required 
act. 
• Error-recovery opportunities - acts which can recover previous errors. 
The HEI phase can identify many errors. Not all of these will be important for the study. 
as can be determined by reviewing their consequences on the system's performance. The 
ones that can contribute to a degraded system state, whether alone or in conjunction 
with other hardware/software failures or environmental events (or both together) must 
next be integrated into the risk analysis. 
Representation: Having defined what the operator should do (via task analysis) and 
what can go wrong, the next step is to represent this information in a form which allows 
the quantitative evaluation of the human-error impact on the system to take place. It is 
usual for the human error impact to be seen in the context of other potential contribution 
to system risk. Human errors and recoveries are usually embedded within logical 
frameworks such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. 
Human error quantifzcation: Once the human error potential has been represented. the 
next step is to quantify the likelihood of the errors involved and then determine the 
overall effect of human error on the system safety and reliability. The Human Error 
Probability (HEP) is simply defined as HEP = (Numbers of errors occurred/Number of 
opportunities for error). 
Impact assessment: Once the errors have been quantified and represented in the risk 
assessment logic trees, the overall system risk level can be calculated. Then it can he 
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determined whether or not the system has an acceptable level of risk. Impact 
assessments involve determining if the risk element is acceptable as well as which 
events (human, hardware, software or environmental - or any combination) contribute 
most to the level of risk. If the human error is a significant contributor to the system risk 
level, and if the system risk level is calculated to be too high, then the appropriate error 
will be targeted for error reduction. 
Error reduction analysis: Error reduction measures may be derived: 
• According to the identified root causes of the error (from the error identification 
stage). 
• From the defined factors that contribute to the errors' HEP. 
If error reduction is necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, then following 
such error reduction measures, several iteration of impact assessments, error reduction 
and re-quantification may occur until satisfactory risk levels are achieved. 
8.3 Human Error Probability 
The analysis of many accidents has led to the appreciation that multiple equipment 
failures and process deviations combined with faulty human decisions and actions are 
often involved. Safety assessments, therefore, are not complete unless the interactions 
between equipment failures and human actions are considered. Since human behaviour 
is complex, and does not lend itself immediately to relatively straightforward reliability 
models, it is suggested that the following classifications of human interactions (that 
typically group all activities) need to be considered [Mahn I.A. et. aL 1995]: 
• Pre-initiator human interactions involving maintenance, testing, calibration, 
planning, etc. 
• Initiators of accidents that involve operator awareness of potential accident initiators 
caused by errors in tests, or reconfiguration conditions involving control systems. 
protective logic, computer controlled functions and manual control. 
• Post initiator interactions that involve procedure specified actions and recover\ 
actions developed from training and experience. 
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5. Identify the best way whereby safety on board fishing vessels can be assured and 
develop a suitable model to assist in its implementation. 
1.5.1 Scope of work 
This thesis presents the work completed by the author for the duration of the research 
commencing in September 1998. It illustrates the findings of rescarch carried out into 
FSA with reference to fishing vessels. The body of the report is divided into nine 
chapters. Each chapter is summarised here, highlighting the salient points deli\'crcd. 
Chapter 2 highlights the international conventions that govern fishing vcssel safety and 
some of the safety programmes that have been implemented by thc International 
Maritime Organisation (lMO) member states. The findings from the literature review 
are discussed and where possible, graphs are generated to determine the trend in 
accidents. The data that was collected and analysed from various sources including the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the Marine 
Accident and Investigation Branch (MAlE), are presented in the form of graphs, pie 
charts and tables to enable easy reading. The findings of the accident data gathered and 
the problems of lack or incomplete data to carry out fishing vessel safety assessment are 
discussed. 
Chapter 3 describes the typical risk and safety assessment techniques that are available 
in the industry. The advantages and disadvantages of each method are reviewed. This is 
followed by a proposed approach to identifying hazards on fishing vessels using one of 
the typical methods described. 
Chapter4 discusses the inception of FSA, starting from the disastrous Piper Alpha 
incident in 1988 and the consequent unfolding events. which led to the proposal by thc 
Marine Coastguard Agency (Me A) to the IMO. The concept of FSA consists of fi ve 
steps. which are the identification of hazards, assessment of the risks assuciated with 
those hazards, identification of \vays of managing the risks. cost benefit as'-,cssillent of 
the identified options determined and making decisions on which options to sclect. 
These five steps are briefly discussed. highlighting the interaction and continuity of 
These classifications of human interactions can be related to a simple error classification 
system consisting of three categories: (1) slips, (2) non-response, and (3) mistakes. This 
classification scheme can then be used to qualitatively incorporate human errors In 
accident scenarios. Table 8.1 provides generic human error probabilities for use In 
accident scenario assessment [Department of Energy, 1996]. 
The development of a generic set of failure probabilities for human error is extremely 
difficult since there is a strong correlation on the actual person performing the task, 
complexity of the task, the time required for task completion, and the training level of 
the person performing the task. Additionally, a worker may perform any specific task 
differently depending on the level of alertness due to fatigue or other factors. 
A relatively simple model has been developed by Rasmussen to quantify human error 
rates based on the level of training [Rasmussen J., 1979; Rasmussen J., 1981] This 
model divides the behaviour into three basic categories, skill-based, rule-based, and 
knowledge-based behaviours. 
8.3. J Skill-based 
Skill-based behaviours depend mostly on the operator's practice in performing the task. 
In short the operator can perform the task without ambiguity. A simplistic view is that 
skill-based errors are slips or lapses. These errors tend to be related to highly routine 
activities in familiar circumstances: omissions, repetitions, reversals, interference errors 
and double-capture slips. For example, incorrect use of controls: fork-lift trucks have a 
number of different types of foot pedal controls. Some operate with three pedals (as a 
car), others have two pedals, reverse and forward. Removing a foot from either 
accelerator brings the vehicle to a halt. A common error is for the driver to press the 
backward accelerator in the belief (wrongly) that it is a brake pedal. Double-capture 
slips result from the influence of a recent highly practised routine on the task at hand. 
Examples of slips and lapses include: 
• Failing to disengage the gears before starting the engine (omission). 
• Turning the ignition key to start the engine, when the engine is already runnll1g 
(repetition ). 
Chapter 8 - Human Error Assessment and Decision Making Using AHP 'p ====~~~==~~~====~~~~~~~~~~~--________________ Jl 
• Pressing the brake instead of the accelerator (reversal). 
8.3.2 Rule-based 
Rule-based behaviour is at work when the operator does not have the same leve I of 
practice at performing the required task, but has a clear knowledge of the procedures, 
There may be some hesitation in recalling any procedure, the procedure may not be 
carried out in the proper sequence, or any step may not be performed precisely. 
Rule-based errors are concerned with the misapplication or inappropriate use of 
problem solving rules. Individuals have a complex array of specific and general rules 
that they use to deal with everyday problems. Rules are of the type if <event> thell 
<action>. Some simplistic examples relating to the operation of vehicles are: 
• if <machine blockage> then <disengage power, switch off engine and investigate> 
• if <pallet insecure> then <re-secure> 
• if <towing a trailer on slopes> then <connect trailer brakes> 
Sometimes the operators' rules are incomplete: 
• (f <emergency> then <apply handbrake, switch off engine, and dismount> 
This is a perfectly good rule under most circumstances. However, with accidents 
involving contact with high voltage overhead lines, remaining in the cab provides 
protection against electrocution (principle of the Faraday Cage). A better additional rule 
would be: 
• (f <emergency involving electricity> then <stay in cab until supply isolated>. 
The role of training in providing individuals with a set of safe rules is crucial. 
8.3.3 Knowledge-based 
Knowledge-based action would include situations where the operator needs to 
contemplate the situation, interpret information or make a difficult decision. Also 
included in this grouping would be cases where a procedure is not \vell spelled out. In 
these cases the person performing the task must consider the actions to be taken and not 
act according to specific training. 
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Knowledge-based errors are concerned with performance in novel or new situations. 
Actions have to be planned "on-line" and the process is intellectually demanding. The 
problem solver will only resort to this type of activity when they have run out of rule-
based solutions. An example of knowledge-based performance is that of first learning to 
operate a piece of machinery. The hydraulic controls of a winch provide a good 
example. Experimentation will help the operator to build a mental model of how the 
controls can be co-ordinated to achieve the desired movements. Eventually, the operator 
will adopt a set of rules derived from that mental model. With practice, the task will 
become skill-based. Training offers the opportunity to miss out the experimentation 
phase by guiding the trainee to correct models of situations, based on the experiences of 
others. 
Rasmussen provides per demand ranges and point estimates for these different 
categories [Rasmussen J., 1982]. These values are presented in table 8.2. Swain and 
Guttmann suggest for screening purposes, the values of 0.05 and 1 are used for the rule-
based and knowledge-based actions respectively [Swain A. D. and Guttmann H. E., 
1983]. However a value of 1 means 100% error rate for the knowledge-based action, a 
value that would appear to be unrealistically high. 
One problem with the Rasmussen data is that it requires subjective analysis of the 
operator's training and capabilities. A set of human error rates were developed by 
Hunns for more specific tasks, not relying as much on the operator's capabilities and 
knowledge [Hunns D. M., 1982]. These data are presented in table 8.3 and were based 
on extrapolation from human error rate databases. These data are similar to the rates of 
Rasmussen, table 8.2, but provide some actual examples and do not require as much 
subjective analysis as the Rasmussen data. 
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Human Description of human interaction Example factors for a facilit.' Error 
Probability and error specific adjustment 
Pre-Initiator actions - Test. No written procedure available. 
maintenance, and calibrations leaving or newly defined action; verbal 
3 x 10 -3 to a component, or system with un- instructions, no checking for 
3 xl 0 -4 revealed fault. Includes typical errors completed action, poor 
in maintenance that cause overall eq uipment/procedure 
system unavailability (10-3) identification label matching. 
Errors include: slips, non-responses, Use established, practised, 
or mistakes leading to skipping a written procedures. discussed 
procedure, selecting an incorrect in training, work progress 
procedure, omitting a step in a verified with signed checklist, 
procedure, improper communication, apply self-checking, use tag-
transposition of labelling, or out system to maintain 
misunderstanding task responsibility. configuration control, etc. 
Signals and instruments 
Initiator actions - Test, maintenance inappropriate for the action and procedure, lack of cues. or 
1 x 10 -2 to and calibration activities that trigger verbal instructions for 
I xlO-4 events. Include contribution of errors interlocks, need for process that cause initiating events - covered 
in initiating event frequencies (10 -3) knowledge, requires interpretation of indirect 
information, etc. 
Indications permit easy transfer 
through procedures, discussed 
in training, practiced before 
Typical error modes include slips, hand, administrative control of tags, training involves 
non-responses and mistakes. 
understanding of the basic 
principles, and feedback of 
lessons learned from event 
precursors. 
Post-Initiator actions - Response Actions typically outside 
actions that are not successful in control room, involves more 
terminating or mitigating the event. than one person, lack of a clear 
I to 1 x I 0-3 Includes recovery actions subsequent cue, knowledge of the process 
to initiating events: (.1) following required, process knowledge 
multiple failures and (.03) directly substituted for emergency 
following an initiating event. procedures, etc. 
Actions in a control room, 
include redundant cues, 
memorised and practised 
Errors include slips, mistakes. and 
responses, clear man-machine 
interface, action priorities 
non-responses for control and stressed in training which 
mitigation actions following an includes simulation of process 
initiating event. dynamics, reco\,erabil it y from 
errors, training on infield 
procedures and long time 
available for action. 
Table 8.1 Generic human failure probabilities 
Per demand error rate Per demand error 
range rate point estimate 
Skill-based SE-S to SE-3 1 E-~ 
Rule-based SE-4 to SE- ') 1 E-2 
Knowledge-based SE-~ to SE-l IE-l 
Table 8.2 Error rates of Rasmussen 
Typical Classification of error type probability 
Processes involving creative thinking, unfamiliar operations where time is short; 0.1-1 high stress situations 
Errors of omission where dependence is placed on situation cues or memory IE-2 
Errors of commission such as operating wrong button, reading wrong dial, etc. 1 E-.~ 
Errors in regularly performed, common-place tasks 1 E--l 
Extraordinary errors - of the type difficult to conceive how they could occur; ~tress-
<IE-5 free, powerful cues militating for success 
Table 8.3 Error rates of Hunns 
The human error rates for some specific tasks have been provided by Dhillon and are 
presented in table 8.4 [Dhillon B. S., 1986]. Dhillon points out that there are six basic 
categories of error sources that can eventually lead to an accident condition: 
1 . Operating errors 
2. Assembly errors 
3. Design errors 
4. Inspection errors 
5. Installation errors 
6. Maintenance errors 
Operating errors can be the result of: 
1 . Lack of proper procedures. 
2. Task complexity and overload (of operator) conditions. 
3. Poor personnel selection and training. 
4. Operator carelessness and lack of interest. 
5. Poor environmental conditions. 
6. Departure from following correct operating procedures. 
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Error Rate per Rate per 
demand plant-month 
Reading a chart recorder 6E 3 
Reading an analog meter 3E-3 
Reading graphs lE-2 
Interpreting incorrectly an indicator lE-3 
Turning a control in the wrong direction under high stress 0.5 
Using a checklist incorrectly 0.5 
Mating a connector lE-2 
Choosing an incorrect panel control out of several similar controls 3E 3 
Reading a gauge incorrectly S.OE-3 
Closing a valve improperly 1.8E 3 
Soldering connectors improperly 6.SE-3 
Actuating switch inappropriately 1.1E-3 
Failure to tighten nut and bolt 4.8E-3 
Failure to install nut and bolt 6E 4 
Improper adjustment of mechanical linkage 1.7E-2 
Procedural error in reading instructions 6.SE-2 
Connecting hose improperly .+.7E-.1 
Failure to pursue proper procedure by an operator 0.0'+0 
Installation error 0.013 
Misinterpretation or misunderstanding of requirements by the operator 0.0076 
Inadvertent or improper equipment manipulation by the operator 0.071 
Improper servicing or re-assembly by the maintenance personnel O.01S 
Table 8.4 Error rates of Dhillon 
8.4 Analytical Hierarchy Processing 
Analytical Hierarchy Processing CAHP) IS a powerful and flexible decision making 
process to help set priorities and make the best decision when both qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of a decision need to be considered. By reducing complex decisions 
to a series of one-on-one comparisons, then synthesising the results, AHP not only helps 
decision-makers arrive at the best decision, but also provides a clear rationale that it is 
the best. Designed to reflect the way people actually think, AHP was developed more 
than 20 years ago by Dr. Thomas Saaty, and continues to be the most highly regarded 
and widely used decision-making theory [Saaty T.L., 1980]. 
AHP is especially suitable for complex decisions, which invohe the companson of 
decision elements that are difficult to quantify. It is based on the assumption that \\ hen 
faced with a compkx decision the natural human reaction is to cluster the decision 
elements according to their common characteristics. It imohes building a hierarch\ 
(ranking) of decision elements and then making comparisons between each pos"ible pair 
in each cluster (as a matrix). This gives a weighting for each element within a clLlster (or 
level of the hierarchy). 
The AHP engages decision-makers In breaking down a decision into smaller parts. 
proceeding from the goal to criteria to sub-criteria down to the alternati\'c courses of 
action. Decision-makers then make simple pair-wise comparison judgements throughout 
the hierarchy to arrive at overall priorities for the alternatives. 
The literature survey on AHP indicates that the method has been effective to a wide 
range of applications. These include agricultural applications [Alho J .M. and Kangas J., 
1997; Braunschweig T., 2000], industrial engineering applications [Alidi A.S .. 1996; 
Bhattarai S. and Fujiwara 0., 1997] and financial applications [Hachadorian G.E .. 1987; 
Gerrits M. et. aI., 1994]. The application of AHP theory to ascertain business and 
financial risk have been relatively popular in the past [Jensen R.E., 1987a; Jensen R.E. 
1987b; Nezhad H.G., 1988; Simkin M.G. et. aI., 1990]. It has also found its place in risk 
and safety assessment of engineering systems [Shields T.1. and Silcock G .. 1986; Saaty 
T.L., 1987; Hamalainen R.P. and Karjalainen R., 1989; Shields T.1. et. aI., 1990; 
Hamalainen R. P. and Karjalainen R., 1992; Frank M. V., 1995] 
8.4.1 Principles and background of AHP 
When considering a group of activities (factors) for evaluation, the main objectives of 
this group are [Saaty T.L., 1990]: 
(1) To provide judgement on the relative importance of these activities. 
(2) To insure that the judgements are quantified to an extent which also permits a 
quantitative interpretation of the judgement among these activities (factors). 
The quantified judgement on pairs of activity Ci and Cj are represented by an n-by-n 
matrix. 
A = (aij) where zj= (L2 . .3 ....... n) (1) 
The entries aij are defined by the following entry rules: 
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Rule J. If aij = a, then aji = I la, a :;t:0. 
Rlile 2. If Ci is judged to be of equal relative importance as Cj • then aij = aji = I. 
Obviously aii = I for all i. Thus the matrix A has the following form: 
1 al2 aln 
1/ al2 1 (l2n A= (:2) 
1/ alII 1/ a, 
_11 1 
where the (Ii) is the relative importance of activity i to activity j. Having recorded the 
quantified judgements of comparisons on pairs (Ci , Cj ) as numerical entries (li/ in the 
matrix A, what is left is to assign to the 11 contingencies C] , C2 , C~ , .... ell a set of 
numerical weights w 1 , W2 , W3 , ... , W Il that should reflect the recorded judgements. The 
eigenvector of the comparison matrix provides the priority ordering (weight), and the 
eigenvalue is a measure of consistency. To find the priority vector or the weight of each 
factor included in the priority ranking analysis, the eigenvector corresponding to the 
maximum eigenvalue is to be determined from matrix analysis. One of the 
approximation methods to get the weight of each factor in the pair-wise comparison 
process is described below. 
8.4.2 Weight vector calclilation 
In mathematical terms, the principal eigenvector is computed, and when normalised 
becomes the vector of priorities (weights). To reduce the excessive computing time 
needed to solve the problem exactly, and due to the results of complex numbers, a good 
estimate of that vector can be obtained by dividing the elements of each column in the 
comparison matrix by the sum of that column (i.e. normalise the column). The elements 
in each resulting row are added and the sum is divided by the number of the elements in 
the row. This is a process of averaging over the normalised columns. Mathematically. 
this process is shown below: 
~C~ha~p~t~er~8~-~H~u~n~la~I/~E~r~r(~)r~A~5~'se~S~S/~1l~e/~lt~a~l/~d~D~e~c~is~io~Il~M~a~k~in~g~U~si~nn~AliP~ ________________ _ 
- 6. 2."iX 
(3) 
or in general 
1 ~ [ a"J W --~ lj 1 - n j ~aij (4) 
where aij is the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. 
8.4.3 Risk and AHP 
Risks are by nature subjective, therefore, to analyse their potential of contributing to a 
failure, the AHP method is used. This technique allows subjective and objective factors 
to be considered in risk analysis and also provides a flexible and easily understood way 
to annualise subjective risk factors. The elements in each level are compared pair-wise 
with respect to their importance in making the decision under consideration. The verbal 
scale used in AHP enables the decision-maker to incorporate subjectivity, experience 
and knowledge in an intuitive and natural way. 
After the comparison matrices have been created, the process moves on to the phase in 
which relative weights are derived for the various elements. The relative weights of the 
elements of each level with respect to an element in the adjacent upper level are 
computed as the components of the normalised eigenvector associated with the largest 
eigenvalue of their comparison matrix. The composite weights of the decision 
alternatives are then determined by aggregating the weights through the hierarchy. This 
is done by following a path from the top of the hierarchy to each alternatin? at the 
lowest level, and multiplying the weights along each segment of the path. The outcome 
of this aggregation is a normalised vector of the overall weights of the options. The 
mathematical basis for determining the weights has been established by Saat::.' [Saaty. 
T.L..1980]. 
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8.4.4 AHP for human error assessment and decision makingfor fishing \'essds 
Several methods to quantify human error probability have been reviewed in section 8.2. 
These methods suffer from the difficulty associated with any attempt to construct 
quantitative, predictive models of human behaviour. The qualitati \'e methods on the 
other hand, require multi-disciplinary teams to carry out an analysis and this is regarded 
as being resource intensive. The more recent HRA methods have included cognitive 
aspects of decision making and the "time" dimension. However. it has not yet captured 
the fundamental nature of the interaction between actions and machine responses 
[Cacciabue P.C. et. aI., 1993] These interactions lie in the mutual dynamic influence of 
the operator, the plant and the interfaces. 
The use of AHP to evaluate human error on fishing vessels does not ignore small events 
or operations that are normally rationalised and eliminated as being not important in 
traditional methods. A chain of these small rationalisations results in a larger problem 
later. The AHP method looks at every event/operation and ranks them against each 
other to determine the importance of each event/operation over the other (without 
eliminating them from the analysis). 
The use of the AHP method enables the solutions for each possible human error 
identified, to be integrated within the analysis. This is unlike the methods reviewed in 
section 8.2, where the solutions to reduce the risk levels (posed by human errors) are 
evaluated in the first instance, and then a re-iteration of the whole analysis is performed 
(assuming the implementation of the solution) to confirm the risk reduction. A proposed 
approach using the AHP method for human error assessment and decision making 
applied to fishing vessels is presented in section 8.5. 
8.5 A Proposed Approach for Fishing Vessels 
The flowchart in figure 8.1 illustrates the steps involved in carrying out the proposed 
approach. This approach can be executed in seven distinct steps: 
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each step (as proposed by the MeA). The result from one step of the process is linked to 
the next to ensure that no information is lost and the analvsis is comprehensi\l~. 
Reiteration within the FSA process is expressed by means of a flowchm1. The 
breakdown of individual tasks within the five steps is explained and the accompanying 
risk assessment tools used are listed and their use within the FSA process is described. 
A general framework for the application of the FSA to generic fishing vessel is 
proposed and is demonstrated using a test case. The findings of this test case and the use 
of novel techniques to improve the FSA framework as applied to fishing vessels are 
discussed. 
Chapter 5 proposes a new approach to modelling the probability of occurrence of a 
hazard and its severity using Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
The literature survey indicates that the common problem in quantifying these 
parameters (of an event failure) is often the small sample size and the statistical 
uncertainties, which are correspondingly high. The new proposed approach utilises FST 
and expert judgements to deal with this high level of uncertainty. It involves the 
generation of a fault tree of known events and its synthesis with fuzzy arithmetic to 
produce a linguistic term for the top event (an undesirable event). Linguistic terms such 
as Very High, High, Moderate, LOH' and Remote are used. Mathematical formulas used 
for calculations in the fault tree are derived from the theory of probability and integrated 
with fuzzy arithmetic on (X-cut sets. A score ranking system is proposed where each 
failure event is evaluated for its effect on four different categories, which are the 
personnel, environment, equipment and catch category. The output of the proposed 
approach is in the form of a crisp number, which reflects the risk ranking of the event 
failure. A trial application of the proposed approach is carried out on a winch operating 
system of a fishing vessel. The results obtained from the analysis will prove useful to 
fishing vessel owners and operator as the time, effort and money spent on systems 
within a ship can be justly proportioned. 
Chapter 6 proposes a new modified approach to Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) which incorporates the use of fuzzy rule base and grey theory. The traditional 
method utilises the Risk Priority Number (RPN) ranking s\'stem. This method 
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1. Describe system - The system or operation under consideration is described In 
detail, highlighting all the equipment within the system that will be operated to 
achieve the desired objective of the defined operation. 
2. Identify tasks to be carried out - Identify all tasks that are to be carried out to 
achieve the objective of the operation and present these tasks in the order that they 
should be carried out. This information can be represented by means of a flow chart. 
The order by which the tasks are carried out should reflect the normal safe working 
procedure of the system. To enable effective use of this information in the AHP 
phase, all tasks are annotated according to the equipment that are operated. 
3. Determine operator behaviour - For each of the task identified in step 2, determine 
the required operators behaviour. Three types of behaviours are considered namely, 
skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based behaviour. These behaviours are 
discussed in sections 8.3.1, 8.3.2 and 8.3.3 respectively. 
4. Determine the probability of occurrence - Using a generic database, determine the 
probability that a human error might occur while carrying out the task specified in 
step 2. Use the information developed in step 3 to assign the probability of 
occurrence of the human error. 
5. Determine the severity of occurrence - The severity of a human error should take 
into account the consequences of the error on the system, operation, environment 
and operator. This can be quantified in monetary terms or downtime. 
6. Determine Risk Control Options (RCO) - Considering the system/operation under 
study; determine several options that could address the risks identified (associated 
with each task defined in step 2). The RCOs proposed should be carefully thought 
through and be feasible for implementation within the system/operation studied. 
7. AHP analysis - Using the data gathered in steps 2, 4, 5 and 6, carry out the AHP 
analysis to determine the most favourable RCO. This RCO will address all the risks 
associated with tasks where human errors could manifest. 
Step 7 (AHP analysis) involves 4 distinct steps, which are described here: 
a) Set-up - Decision making criteria are generated. often by brainstorming or past 
experience. Hierarchical relationships are drawn between the criteria and are then 
represented in a matrix form. 
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b) Weighting - The matrices are filled with the criteria comparisons. The comparisons 
allow calculation of the criteria-weighting vector. 
c) Ranking - The different ReOs are ranked on their ability to satisfy the vanous 
criteria. 
d) Evaluation - The final solution ratings are then calculated usmg the ratings 
determined in step (c) and the weighting vector calculated in step (b). 
The first task is to decide on the problem statement. This statement becomes Level One 
or the goal of the hierarchy and will be broken down into nested levels (Level Two). 
Level Two will comprise of the different elements needed to be considered to achieve 
the goal set in the problem statement. The elements in Level Two is further broken-
down to represents the various constituents that make up or belong to each specific 
element. The hierarchical structure is assumed to exist inherently in the problem 
considered and can be identified. 
The hierarchy records the flow of detail from the problem statement (Goal) to broad 
issues (Level Two) and more specific levels (Level Three). While the concerns on a 
particular level are not equally important, they should be on the same order of 
magnitude. This feature in AHP allows decisions to be made involving different orders 
of magnitude criteria, by placing each criterion in its proper matrix in the objective 
hierarchy. Figure 8.2 shows an example of the hierarchy represented diagrammatically. 
Once the hierarchy has been completed, matrices are constructed with the criteria labels 
on each axis. There will be one Level Two matrix and one matrix containing the sub-
elements of each element. For example, the sample in figure 8.2 will have one Level 
Two matrix and three Level Three matrices. These Level Three matrices may be broken 
down in finer detail where applicable. The two axes of the matrix will contain the names 
of the elements on the level being considered. For example, the Level Two matrix in 
figure 8.2 will have the form shown in figure 8.3. The levels below each of the Lc\cl 
Two elements would also be represented in a matrix form. Figure 8.4 sho\vs an example 
for the Element I (constituent A) matrix. The complete representation of Element 
would comprise of three matrices (as Element I has the constituents A, Band C). 
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Describe 
Operation 
~r Group common equipment 
Identify tasks used for operation 
to carry out l t 
'-----.-------I '-----__ 
Determine operator behavior 
for each task 
' .................................... y ...... ~ .......~ ...... -~ ... ~.~ .... _.= .... ==4.........., 
Knowledge based Rule based Skill based -
.................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................... : 
Determine severity/impact of 
human error on system 
Determine probability of error 
from generic database 
.. 
Identify Risk 
Control Options 
(RCO) 
L.....------...L-~~·l Carryout analysis using AHP method ll-ll~t---JL-------...J 
Decision Making 
(Most favorable RCO) 
Figure 8.1 Flowchart of the proposed approach 
As the proposed method does not use historical data (probability of occurrence in terms 
of hard numbers or severity in terms of number of deaths), the uncertainty in these 
parameters are captured by representing them in terms of preference/importance against 
each other. Hence, the analysis is targeted at improving the current situation by 
identifying the areas that need improving, rather than trying to quantify the occurrence 
of an undesired event. 
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Level 2 
Level 3 
Level Two 
Element I 
Element 2 
Element 3 
Element I 
Al 
A') 
A3 
Goal Problem Statement 
Element I Element :2 Element 3 
Figure 8.2 Example of hierarchy levels 
Element I Element 2 Element 3 
EL13 
ELn 
Figure 8.3 Example of Level Two matrix 
Al A2 A."\ 
All AI2 AI3 
An An A~, 
All A,2 A" , , 
Figure 8.4 Example of Level Three matrix 
=C=ha=p~t~er~8~-~H~Il~n=la=n~E~r~rr~)r~A=s=se=S=S/~1l=e'=lt~a=n=d~D~e~Cl~'s~io~I1~M~(~lk~'il~IR~U~si~l1g~A~HLP ___________________ ~~~ 
Upon generating the matrices for all the elements. it must now be filled \\ ith the 
comparIsons of the relative importance of the elements on the t\\O axes. The 
comparIsons are used to calculate the weighting vector that will give the relati\e 
importance of all the elements. The entire weighting vector is calculated from 
comparisons made between just two elements at a time. Table 8.5 shows the scale (I to 
9) proposed by [Saaty T.L, 1980] for indicating the relative importance between the 
elements. 
1 Both elements of equal importance 
3 Left weakly more important than top 113 Top weakly more important than left 
5 Left moderately more important than 
top 115 
Top moderately more important 
than left 
7 Left strongly more important than 
top 117 
Top strongly more important than 
left 
9 Left absolutely more important than 
top 
1/9 Top absolutely more important than left 
Table 8.5 Comparison scale 
Considering the example of the Level Two matrix in figure 8.3. and assuming that 
Element 1 is weekly more important than Element 2 and strongly more important than 
Element 3. Then, the matrix in figure 8.3 may be represented as seen in the matrix 
below: 
Level TWO=[1:3 
117 
3 
1 
3/7 
In the matrix, Element I is of equal importance with respect to itself. so I is placed in 
the upper left-hand corner. A consistent matrix formulation allows the remainder of the 
matrix to be completed given the information in the top row. Since the relationship is 
known between Element I and Element 2. and Element I and Element 3. the 
relationship between Element 2 and Element 3 can be determined. In this case the 
matrix entry for Element 2 versus Element 3 would contain 7/3. Similarly, the re"t uf 
the matrix can be computed using the formula a
'j = alkl alj' 
The weighting vector is then determined to give the percentage of the total \veight 
applied to each element. The first column in the Level Two matrix, (L I/J, 117) is 
normalised so that the sum of the entries is 1.0. The weighting vector of Element 1 wi II 
be given as 1/(1 + 113+ 117) = 0.667 or 67.8%. Similarly Elements 2 and .3 can be 
calculated to be 22.6% and 9.68%. The sum of all three weighting vectors should be 
equal to 100%. 
The comparison process is repeated for all the matrices to be used in the analysis. The 
weighting vectors of the lower matrices will be normalised by the weight associated to 
the sub-elements' matrix, so that their total weight will equal that of the previous level 
(Level Two). For example, for Element 1 sub-element AI, A2, A 3, B I • 8 2• C I , C2 and C~ 
will be given a total weight of 67.8%. All sub-elements are analysed in the same fashion 
to the lowest level possible and the results are normalised to reflect the weight of each 
sub-element in the hierarchy. 
The next step is to generate the possible solution to achieve the problem statement/goal. 
Each solution is compared against each of the lowest level sub-elements. The possible 
solutions are assumed to reduce the likelihood of human error occurring and/or the 
possible consequences. The evaluation represents the "effectiveness" of the solution in 
controlling the risks. These evaluations (of the solutions) are recorded with a user 
defined numerical scale, as appropriate for the sub-elements. For any given element, a 
normalised score is determined for each solution by taking the assigned score (which 
may have units) and dividing it by the sum of the assigned scores across all of the 
solutions. This fraction is then multiplied by the weighting coefficient for the element. 
This will give a normalised score for each solution based on the element considered. 
These normalised results are then summed down the different elements in the matrix. to 
arrive at a final rating for each solution. The result of this series of operations is a 
weighted rating for each solution. The highest rated solution will best meet thc prohlcm 
statement (goal). 
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8.6 An Example 
The purpose of this analysis is to address the high level of human errors that occur 
during the fishing operation on board fishing vessels. As an example. the initial 
shooting operation of the fishing nets is considered. 
8.6.1 Initial shooting operation 
At the commencement of the voyage the beams are stowed port and starboard alongside 
and inboard of the bulwark rails. The cod ends are held by the Gilson wires up at the 
cod end lifting blocks with the netting hanging down to the chain mat that is beneath the 
beam. As soon as the vessel clears the harbour, the derricks are lowered to an angle of 
approximately 45 degrees. This reduces the top weight on the vessel, improving 
stability but importantly, it is to prevent the derricks from moving past vertical and 
falling inboard as the vessel rolls. 
On reaching the fishing grounds, the vessel stops and, working one side at a time, the 
derrick is raised sufficient to lift the beam and chain mat up and over the rail, the derrick 
being lowered back to 45 degrees on completion of the manoeuvre. While the cod ends 
are held by Gilson wire over the lifting block, the netting is paid overboard. 
Attached between the inboard end of the beam and the cod end lifting becket is a heavy 
rope, referred to as a 'lazy decky'. This rope is pulled to swing the beam around to bring 
it normal to the vessel side. The vessel moves ahead slowly and the Gilson wires are 
lowered slightly, sufficient to allow the cod ends to be swung over the rail: but still with 
the Gilson hooks attached in the lifting becket, the weight being carried by the cod ends 
lifting blocks. The crew, on each side, then takes the 'lazy decky' and makes it fast on a 
bulwark rail pin such that the weight of cod end is carried by the pin. The remainder of 
the 'lazy decky' lies in a bight on the deck up to the point where it goes o\er the rail to 
hang in a bight between the vessel and the beam. Once the weight of the cod cnd has 
been transferred to the rail pins, the Gilson hooks are released. the derricks are lov·;ered 
fully outboard, and the vessel is brought up to speed. When the crew in the wheelhouse. 
either the skipper or the mate, is satisfied that the vessel is running straight and true. he 
signals to the crewman to release the 'lazy decky' ropes from the rail pins. The cod ends 
then stream astern with the netting stretched out. Warp is then paid out, typically 200 
fathom for sea depth of 40 fathom. Due to the double purchase around the block on the 
beam, 200 fathoms of warp is in effect a 100 fathom pay-out giYing a typical 
warp/depth ratio of 2.5: I. The complete initial shooting operation can be represented 
diagrammatically as seen in figure 8.5. 
8.6.2 Hierarchy set-up 
The various tasks identified above are used to set up the hierarchy of elements. The goal 
of the analysis is determined to be the safe initial shooting operation. The elements in 
Level Two is set to be the probability of a human error occurring and the severity of 
human error. The sub-elements (Level Three) are determined by grouping the 
equipment that are operated i.e. derrick, vessel, lazy decky, net and Gilson. Each task 
carried out in relation to these equipment is considered within this level i.e. derrick I, 
derrick 2, derrick 3, etc. The hierarchy can be represented diagrammatically as seen In 
figure 8.6. 
Vessell Derrick I --.. Vessel2 I----
Vessel moves Lower Derrick to Vessel stops at 
out of port ~ 5 degrees fishing grounds 
c: Derrick 2 Derrick 3 Net I I----
Raise derrick to LowerDerrick Pay n e tti n g 
lift beam & chain back to ~5 deg. overboard 
m at over rail 
C L.D I . Vessel3 r Gilson I ~ 
I I I Pull lazy decky to I Start moving Lower Gilson b r in g be a m vessel wire s 
norm al to ship 
C Derrick 4 I---Gilson 2 L.D 2 .. 
W hen weight Lower Derrick M a k e fast lazy 
transferred. fu II y out board. deck y to bulwark 
r a i I pin r~lease G i Is 0 n 
hooks 
C ~ .\" e t 2 l' essel .J L .D 2 
I I Release I a z y Pay out \\ a r p B ri n g \. e sse I 1I P 
to speed deck)' fro m ra i I 
pin 
Figure 8.5 Diagrammatic representation of initial shooting operation 
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Level 3 
Level 2 
Goal { '-
__ s_at_e_in_i_tia.,l_S_ho_o_t_in_g_--.J operation 
Human error 
Probability of Occurrence 
L.D 1 
L.D 2 
L.D 3 
Human error 
Severity 
Figure 8.6 Initial shooting operation hierarchy levels 
8.6.3 Level Two matrix 
Gilson 2 
The probability of occurrence and severity make up the two elements in Level Two as 
seen in figure 8.6. These two elements are compared against each other to determine the 
weighting vector of each element. The comparison scale in table 8.5 is used to 
determine the importance of the two elements. Considering the goal of the analysis, it is 
decided that both these elements are equally important to a safety assessment, hence, the 
Level Two matrix is determined as: 
Leve! Two = [: : l and the Weighting Vector = [~:~] 
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8.6.4 Human error probability evaluation 
First, the importance of each element (derrick, vessel, lazy decky. net and Gilson) is 
determined. Using the comparison scale in table 8.5, the matrix below is obtained for 
the probability importance of each element. 
1.00 7.00 3.00 9.00 5.00 
0.14 1.00 0.43 1.29 0.71 
Probability = 0.33 2.33 1.00 3.00 1.67 
0.11 0.78 0.33 1.00 0.56 
0.20 1.40 0.60 1.81 1.00 
The weighting vector and normalised vector is determined by considering the weighting 
vector obtained in the Level Two matrix and is shown here: 
0.5595 0.2798 
0.0799 0.040 
WeightingVector= 0.1865 and NormalisedVector= 0.0933 
0.0622 0.03 I 1 
0.1 I 19 0.0560 
The probability of human error is considered for each of the task carried out by 
determining the type of human behaviour required to carry out the task successfully. 
Using the generic human error data by Rasmussen (table 8.2), each task is assigned 
operator behaviour and the generic error probability. This data is then used to compare 
each task against the others to determine the Level Three matrix. The various tasks 
identified in this example and the associated generic data is provided in table 8.6. 
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determines the RPN by finding the multiplication of factor scores. The three factors 
considered are the probability of failure, severity and detectability. Traditional F\lEA 
has been criticised to have several drawbacks. These drawbacks are reviewed and are 
addressed in the proposed approach. The purpose of the new approach is to utilise 
expert judgement in a formal method to produce a more accurate and logical ranking of 
the failure events identified during the hazard identification phase. It also allows for the 
analyst to assign weighting factors to the decision criteria in order to identify where 
improvements can be made to the system. A test case is presented using the modified 
FMEA proposed. The potential of integrating the modified FMEA to the FSA process is 
discussed. 
Chapter 7 identifies the areas that require improvement on fishing vessels. The results 
obtained from the data analysis in chapter 2 show that the failures could have been 
avoided if a proper maintenance regime was in place. The current maintenance 
strategies on fishing vessels are critically reviewed. Upon analysing the present situation 
of the industry, it is proposed that an inspection regime be implemented to arrest 
failures before they develop into catastrophic ones. A method employing delay-time 
analysis is proposed to determine the optimal inspection time. Three criteria are 
modelled, namely, downtime, cost and safety criticality. Based on the criterion selected, 
an optimum inspection time is obtained. A best compromise is also proposed where all 
three criteria are simultaneously minimised to acceptable levels. The proposed method 
is demonstrated on a winch operating system of a fishing vessel. The effect of the 
integration of an inspection regime within the current maintenance practice is studied 
and its advantages are highlighted. 
Chapter 8 proposes a framework for the identification and quantification of human error 
in fishing vessel operation. This framework ranks the impact of human error and further 
integrates the available risk control options into the analysis. The method uses 
Analytical Hierarchy Processing (AHP) theory to rank the preference of each control 
option. A brief review of human error assessment techniques is presented discussing the 
requirements and characteristics of each technique. The advantages of employing the 
Task Operator behaviour Error Probability 
Derrick I Skill base 5.00E-03 
Derrick 2 Skill base 5.00E-0.3 
Derrick 3 Skill base 5.00E-03 
Derrick 4 Knowledge base 5.00E-OJ 
Vessell Know ledge base 5.00E-Ol 
Vessel 2 Rule base 5.00E-02 
Vessel 3 Knowledge base 5.00E-OJ 
Vessel 4 Skill base 5.00E-03 
L.Dl Skill base 5.00E-03 
L.D2 Skill base 5.00E-03 
L.D3 Skill base 5.00E-03 
Net I Skill base 5.00E-03 
Net 2 Skill base 5.00E-03 
Gilson 1 Rule base 5.00E-02 
Gilson 2 Knowledge base 5.00E-Ol 
Table 8.6 Identified task and generic human error data 
The matrices for the probability of occurrence for each task are determined as follows: 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 
Derrick = 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 
9.00 9.00 9.00 1.00 
0.0833 0.0233 
0.0833 0.023.3 
Weighting Vector = , NormalisedVector= 0.02.3.3 0.0833 
0.7500 0.2098 
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1.00 5.00 1.00 9.00 
Vessel = 
0.20 1.00 0.20 1.80 
l.00 5.00 1.00 9.00 
0.11 0.56 0.11 1.00 
0.4327 0.0173 
0.0865 0.0035 Weighting Veetor= 
0.4327 ' Normalised Veetor= 0.0173 
0.0481 0.0019 
[
1.00 1.00 1.00] 
Lazy Deeky = 1.00 1.00 1.00 
l.00 1.00 1.00 
[
0.3333] [0.0311] 
Weighting Vector = 0.3333 ,NormalisedVeetor= 0.0311 
0.3333 0.0311 
[
1.00 1.00] Net = 
l.00 l.00 
[
0 50] [0.0155] Weighting Veetor=· ,NormalisedVeetor= 
0.50 0.1155 
[
1.00 0.20] Gilson = 
5.00 1.00 
[
0.1667] . [0.0093] 
Weighting Vector = 0.8333 ' Normaltsed Vector = 0.0466 
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8.6.5 Human error severity evaluation 
The importance of each element (derrick, vessel, lazy decky, net and Gilson) is 
detennined using the comparison scale in table 8.5, the matrix below is obtained for the 
severity importance of each element. 
1.00 7.00 3.00 9.00 5.00 
0.14 1.00 0.43 1.29 0.71 
Severity = 0.33 2.33 1.00 3.00 1.67 
0.11 0.78 0.33 1.00 0.56 
0.20 1.40 0.60 1.81 1.00 
The weighting vector and nonnalised vector is determined by considering the weighting 
vector obtained in the Level Two matrix and is shown here: 
0.5595 0.2798 
0.0799 0.0400 
Weighting Vector = 0.1865 and Normalised Vector = 0.0933 
0.0622 
0.1119 
0.0311 
0.0560 
The matrices for the severity of the consequences of human error for each task IS 
determined as follows: 
1.00 7.00 3.00 5.00 
0.14 1.00 0.43 0.71 
Derrick = 
0.33 2.33 1.00 1.67 
0.20 1.40 0.60 1.00 
0.5966 0.1669 
0.0852 0.0238 
Weighting Vector = , Normalised Vector = 0.0556 0.1989 
0.1193 0.0334 
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1.00 0.20 0.33 0.11 
5.00 
Vessel = 
1.00 1.67 0.56 
3.00 0.60 1.00 0.33 
9.00 1.80 3.00 1.00 
0.0556 0.0022 
Weighting Vector = 
0.2778 0.0111 
0.1667 ' NormalisedVector= 0.0067 
0.5000 0.0200 
[
1.00 0.11 0.33] 
Lazy Decky= 9.00 1.00 3.00 
3.00 0.33 1.00 
[
0.0769] [0.0072] 
Weighting Vector = 0.6923 , NormalisedVector= 0.0646 
0.2308 0.0215 
[
1.00 5.00] Net= 
0.20 1.00 
[
0.8333] . [0.0259] Weighting Vector = , Normalzsed Vector = 
0.1667 0.0052 
[
1.00 0.11] Gilson = 
9.00 1.00 
[
0.1000] . [0.0056] 
Weighting Vector = 0.9000 ' Nor11lalzsed Vector = 0.0504 
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8.6.6 Risk Control Options (RCO) 
Several viable Risk Control Options (RCO) are generated in order to reduce the le\t~1 of 
risks posed by human errors during the initial shooting operation. These risk control 
options are evaluated for their effectiveness against each of the operator tasks identified. 
For this example, an arbitrary scale (1 to 10) is used to compare each RCO. I being not 
effective and 10 being most effective. When assigning a score on the I to 10 scale. 
several factors are considered, such as, cost, ease of implementation, efficiency. time 
before solution becomes effective, etc. Six RCOs' have been identified to reduce the 
probability and severity of human errors of the initial shooting operation. These Reos 
include: 
RCO 1 - Training of crew 
RCO 2 - Redesign system 
RCO 3 - Incorporate additional interlocks 
RCO 4 - Change operating procedures 
RCO 5 - Additional crewing 
RCO 6 - Install warning devices (audio and visual alarms, indications etc.) 
The matrices for the effectiveness of each RCO in reducing the probability of 
occurrence are presented in the form as seen in figure 8.7. Similarly all tasks are 
compared with the different RCOs and their values normalised. 
Derrick RCO I RCO 2 RCO 3 RCO 4 RCO 5 RCO 6 
Derrick I 
Derrick 2 
Derrick 3 
Derrick 4 
Figure 8.7 RCO matrix 
8.6.7 RCO evaluation to reduce probability of occurrence 
6 1 7 3 4 9 
Derrick = 
6 2 8 5 1 7 
6 1 7 3 4 9 
6 6 9 7 1 9 
0.0047 0.0008 0.0054 0.0023 0.0031 0.0070 
Normalised results = 
0.0048 0.0016 0.0064 0.0040 0.0008 0.0056 
0.0047 0.0008 0.0054 0.0023 0.0031 0.0070 
0.0331 0.0331 0.0497 0.0386 0.0055 0.0497 
8 1 3 2 4 7 
7 1 2 2 4 7 
Vessel = 
7 1 3 2 4 7 
9 5 3 2 6 8 
0.0055 0.0007 0.0021 0.0014 0.0028 0.0048 
0.0011 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0011 
Normalised results = 
0.0050 0.0007 0.0022 0.0014 0.0029 0.0050 
0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 
[4 3 7 2 6 
:] Lazy Decky = 5 2 8 3 6 648 3 7 
[0.0040 0.0030 0.0070 0.0020 0.0060 0.0090] 
Normalised results = 0.0049 0.0019 0.0078 0.0029 0.0058 0.0078 
0.0052 0.0035 0.0069 0.0026 0.0060 0.0069 
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[
2 2 8 3 4 10] Net = 
3 3 7 3 4 10 
Normalised results = [0.0011 0.0011 0.0043 0.0016 0.0021 0.0054] 
0.0016 0.0016 0.0036 0.0016 0.0021 0.0052 
. [5 3 6 5 6 
1
7
0] Gllson = 7 3 10 6 6 
[0.00 15 0.0009 0.0017 0.0015 0.0017 0.0020] Normalised results = 0.0078 0.0033 0.0111 0.0067 0.0067 0.0111 
8.6.8 RCO evaluation to reduce severity of occurrence 
6 1 5 5 4 7 
6 2 7 5 4 7 
Derrick = 
6 1 5 6 4 7 
6 4 6 7 5 9 
0.0358 0.0060 0.0298 0.0298 0.0238 0.0417 
0.0046 0.0015 0.0054 0.0038 0.0031 0.0054 
Normalised results = 0.0115 0.0019 0.0096 0.0115 0.0077 0.013..t-
0.0054 0.0036 0.0054 0.0063 0.0045 0.0081 
5 1 7 5 4 7 
5 7 5 4 7 
Vessel = 
5 1 7 5 ..t- 7 
9 5 8 7 6 8 
0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.000..t- 0.0003 
0.0005 
0.0019 0.0004 0.0027 0.0019 0.0015 
0.0027 
Normalised results = 0.00 II 0.0002 0.0016 0.0011 0.000l) 0.0016 
0.0042 0.0023 0.0037 0.0033 0.002R 
0.0037 
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[4 3 7 6 6 
:] Lazy Decky = 5 :2 8 6 6 6 4 8 7 7 
[0.0009 0.0007 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0015] Normalised results = 0.0092 0.0037 0.0148 0.01] ] 0.011 ] 0.0148 
0.0032 0.0022 0.0043 0.0038 0.0038 0.0043 
Net=[2 2 8 6 5 88] 
3 3 7 6 5 
71.T Z' d I [0.0017 0.0017 0.0067 0.0050 0.0042 0.0067] IVorma Ise resu ts = 
0.0005 0.0005 0.0011 0.0010 0.0008 0.0013 
[
5 3 6 
Gilson = 
737 
71.T I' d Z [0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 IVorma Ise resu ts = 
0.0095 0.0041 0.0095 
8.6.9 Summary of results 
5 6 7] 
668 
0.0009 0.0010 0.0012] 
0.0082 0.0082 0.0 I 09 
The results obtained from sections 8.6.7 and 8.6.8 are collated to determine the best 
RCO. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show the summary of these results obtained in percentage. 
Each of these tables represents 50% of the weight (as the RCO evaluation has been 
normalised) of the elements in Level Two of the hierarchy. The final ranking of the 
RCOs is achieved by adding the final ratings of each these tables for the respective 
RCOs. Table 8.9 shows the final results obtained for this analysis. From this table. it can 
be determined that the best control option to reduce the probability of occurrence and 
the severity (of human error) during the initial shooting operation is RCO 6. The r("L1lts 
entail that by installing various warning and indication de\ices onto/for the equipment 
used for the initial shooting operation on a fishing \'l~ssel. the len? I of human error can 
be reduced and safe operation can be achieved. 
Derrick Vessel Lazy Net Gilson Total Decky rating 
RCO 1 4.73% 1.22% ~ 1.40% 0.267r 0.927r 8.539c 
RC02 3.63% 0.19% 0.84% 0.26CJc 0 . .f.27r 5.3.JC!c 
RC03 6.70% 0.47% 2.17(;(. 0.79% 1.287r 11A2C:1c 
RC04 4.73% 0.32% 0.757r, 0.32CJc 0.817r, 6.9.JCJc 
RCOS 1.25% 0.66% 1.79% 0.42CJc 0.847r 4. 97c/c 
RC06 6.93% 1.14% 2.37% 1.05% 1.31 CJo 12. 81 17c 
Table 8.7 Summary of results for probability element 
Derrick Vessel Lazy Decky Net Gilson Total 
rating 
RCO 1 5.73% 0.76% 1.33% 0.22(k 1.0.f.CJc 9.08% 
RC02 1.30% 0.30% 0.65% 0.22% 0 . .f.67r· 2.93% 
RC03 5.02% 0.85% 2.06% 0.78% 1.06% 9.77% 
RC04 5.15% 0.67% 1.61% 0.60% 0.90% 8.93% 
RCOS 3.91% 0.55% 1.61% 0.50% 0.92% 7.50% 
RC06 6.87% 0.85% 2.06% 0.80% 1.21% 11.79% 
Table 8.8 Summary of results for severity element 
Derrick Vessel Lazy Decky Net Gilson Total 
rating 
RCO 1 10.46% 1.98% 2.74% 0.48% 1.96% 17.61% 
RC02 4.93% 0.49% 1.49% 0.48% 0.88% 8.27% 
RC03 11.72% 1.33% 4.23% 1.57% 2.34% 21.19% 
RC04 9.88% 0.99% 2.36% 0.91% 1.72% lS.87C!c 
RCOS 5.16% 1.21% 3.40% 0.92% 1.76% 12.46% 
RC06 13.80% 1.99% 4.43% 1.85% 2.53% 24.60% 
Table 8.9 Final ranking of RCO 
8.7 Conclusion 
Human errors on fishing vessels have contributed to a great number of accidents in the 
past, as seen in chapter 2 (section 2..+). Almost 207r of all accidents on these \C\\c]" are 
caused by ncgligence/carelessness of the cre\\'. As sLlch. the ultimate aim for ClIT) ing 
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out a human error assessment on fishing vessel is to determine the best method bv 
which accidents caused by these errors can be reduced. This would entail decreasing the 
risk level by either reducing the probability of a human error occurring or the sevcrity of 
the consequences. 
This chapter proposes a method using AHP to achieve this aim. The approach intcgrates 
the risk control option within the human error assessment framework to determine the 
best option for the identified hazards. The advantages of using the proposed approach 
for fishing vessels include: 
• The use of a flexible modeling and measurement approach to evaluation. 
• The application of structure to facilitate decision making through the use of a model 
which imposes strict independence, ordinality, or homogeneity of preferences. 
• Allowing the decision-maker to arrive at consistent and objective evaluations. 
• The simplicity of the use of the model. 
• The confidence that all human errors identified are evaluated (without being omitted 
by rationalisation) in the decision making process. 
• The interaction between operator and machine is captured within the analysis. 
In this chapter, only human errors are considered in the analysis. However, this can be 
extended to include failures induced by other causes, such as machinery failure. Hence, 
it can be easily integrated into the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework as 
discussed in chapter 4. Step 4 of the FSA framework requires the evaluation of different 
risk control options. The AHP method presented here can be used for this purpose, and 
the results obtained from the analysis can be applied to step 5 of an FSA. 
References 
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AHP technique are discussed and the integration of such a technique within the FSA 
framework is described. 
Finally conclusions and recommendations are provided in Chapter 9. 
1.6 Contributions and Dissemination 
The novel safety analysis techniques developed in this thesis will facilitate ship safety 
assessment in various situations. Although the methods developed were applied to 
fishing vessels, the results of the project can be tailored for safety analysis of any 
maritime and offshore engineering product with domain-specific knowledge. As these 
methods are subjective in nature, it proves useful for many engineering applications that 
lack reliable data. 
Investigation results and findings are made available by publications in journals, 
presentation at international conferences and workshops. The deliverables arising from 
the research project are listed in Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
Summary 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the results and presenting the findings 
of the research project carried out by the author, outlining the contributions to the safety 
analysis methodologies developed for fishing vessels. Salient points are emphasised and 
the areas where further effort and research is required to refine the developed 
methodologies are discussed. 
9.1 Conclusions 
The chapters in this thesis have thoroughly described the series of work carried out in 
this research project. The research started with the review of the development of safety 
and reliability assessment techniques in the maritime industry. It was found that the 
early application of these methods concerned military vessels, particularly the vessels' 
defence and offence systems. Gradually, the application of such techniques has found its 
way to merchant vessels. In the UK, the application of safety and reliability assessment 
techniques in the maritime industry has been principally related to the transportation of 
hazardous cargo. However, there has been some application in UK shipyards of 
Availability, Reliability and Maintainability (ARM) studies at the design stage. 
Accident investigations over the years have provided valuable information for safety 
assessment of vessels. Lessons learnt from previous accidents have been used as a guide 
to produce rules and regulations to prevent similar accidents from happening. The 
capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 eventually resulted in the adoption of 
the International Safety Management (ISM) code. The Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 
resulted in the international convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness. Response and 
Co-operation (OPRC) being established in 1990. Double hull or mid-deck structural 
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requirements for new and existing oil tankers were subsequently applied [Sekimizu K .. 
1997]. The Scandinavian Star disaster in 1990 and the capsize of the Estonia in 1994 
highlighted the role of human error in marine casualties and resulted in the introduction 
of the new Standards for Training, Certificates and Watchkeeping (STCW'95) for 
seafarers [Wang J. et. aI., 1999; Wang J. and Zhang S., 2000]. The various databases 
available concerning these accidents and many more within the maritime industry are 
discussed in chapter 1. Most of the databases described, lack vital information for a 
comprehensive and accurate safety and reliability study. The missing information in 
these databases includes the relationship between the cause and effect of an accident 
and the chain of events that led to the accident. Specific component/equipment failure 
data is also lacking. However, the data that is available requires certain amount of 
formatting if it is to be used for a safety and reliability study. 
The current rules and regulations governing fishing vessels are studied in chapter 2. The 
rules for fishing vessels were found to only address the vessel from the deck and 
accommodation line downwards. There has been no mention about the fishing gear and 
equipment associated with the fishing operation. However, there are several guidance 
documents that address the design, construction and equipment of fishing vessels [IMO, 
1975a; IMO, 1975b; IMO, 1980; IMO, 1988]. These documents provide guidelines on 
various aspects of fishing vessels and are not compulsory. 
Accident data gathered from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
concerning fishing vessels are analysed from 1992 to 1999. It was found that during this 
period, the percentage of vessels lost have been between 0.25% and 0.45% of the total 
registered vessels. Machinery damage was found to be the most common cause of 
accidents on fishing vessels, contributing 64% of all accidents. This is followed by 
foundering and flooding, grounding, collisions and contacts and finally fires and 
explosions. Each of these accident categories is analysed in more detail to provide a list 
of possible causes. Although it has been accepted that there is a certain amount of under 
reporting, the number of fishermen and fishing vessels lost are alarmingly high [\lC A. 
2000]. It can be deduced from this data analysis, that there is an urgent need to addrcs" 
the safety issues plaguing the fishing vessel industry. 
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In order to analyse the safety issues on fishing vessels, typical safety analysis techniques 
can be employed. These techniques include Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), What-
If Analysis, HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis (FT A l. 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and many more as described in chapter 3. The re\ie\v of 
these typical analysis methods is carried out, highlighting the advantages and limitations 
of each method. Safety analysis methods can be broadly divided into two major 
categories, namely, quantitative and qualitative analysis. The use of quantitative 
methods is often not suitable for fishing vessels, as the data available for SLlch an 
analysis is limited. As such, the qualitative methods are preferred. Due to the subjective 
nature of qualitative methods, the use of such methods in safety studics has been 
critically debated [Wilson N., 1994; Klir G.1., 1994; Hardman D.K. and Ayton P., 
1997]. Most of the subjective analysis methods express the probability of a failure 
occurring and its associated severity linguistically. These linguistic expressions are 
normally reflected along an ordinal scale (sometimes determined by a utility function) 
and are used by the analyst as a guide. The use of the HAZOP method is proposed for 
the identification of hazards on fishing vessels. The proposed method is based on the 
conventional HAZOP method developed for the chemical industry [Bendixen L.M. et. 
aI., 1984]. The method seeks to identify hazards on fishing vessels based on the possible 
causes of the deviation for various process parameters under normal working 
conditions. 
A more structured and systematic approach to assessmg fishing vessel safety is 
described in chapter 4. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a new approach to marine 
safety which involves using the techniques of risk and cost-benefit assessment to assist 
in the decision making process. FSA comprises of five steps, which include: hazard 
identification, the assessments of risk associated with those hazards, identifying the 
ways of managing the risks identified, carrying out a Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) of 
the options and finally making a decisions on which options to select. The de\'c]opment 
of this technique was intended for the rule making process of the shipping industry. 
However, over the years it has been used on several occasions to impro\(~ operations 
and minimise costs of operating ships. The development of the method is traced back 
from the point of inception to the present day. Each step within the FSA framework is 
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described and discussed in detail. A trial application of this method is conducted for a 
generic-fishing vessel. The experience gained from this trial application suggests that 
certain areas within this framework need improvement. This is mainly due to the lack of 
available data to carry out the analysis for a fishing vessel using the conventional 
approach of FSA [Marine Safety Agency, 1993]. In order to enhance the accuracy and 
the appropriateness of the FSA being applied to fishing vessels, novel methods have to 
be developed addressing the shortcomings of the five steps in the original FSA 
framework. These novel methods are presented in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The proposed 
HAZOP method in chapter 2 can be integrated into step 1 of the FSA framework and 
the outcome of the analysis can be used in step 2 of the FSA. 
A novel method capable of performing risk quantification and risk ranking is presented 
in chapter 5. This method utilises Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) to determine the probability of a failure occurring and the severity of the 
consequences. The use of FST is thought to be appropriate as it can handle the various 
forms of uncertainties that can manifest in the available data and the analysis itself. The 
probability of occurrence and the severity are expressed linguistically and the evaluation 
of risk is conducted with the use of a linguistic risk matrix. The outcome of this analysis 
is a risk ranking expressed in the form of a crisp number. The novel method developed 
reaps the advantages of presenting failure data in a structured manner using FTA and 
expressing uncertain data linguistically using FST. The application of this method was 
carried out on a Gilson winch operating system of a fishing vessel. The data obtained 
from the proposed HAZOP for fishing vessels can be used as the top events in the FT A. 
These top events are assigned linguistic terms representing the probability of occurrence 
and severity. From this analysis, it was found that the most critical component is the 
hydraulic oil filter and the least critical component is the control air cylinder. Integrating 
this method into step 2 of an FSA framework would increase its applicability to fishing 
vessels. 
One of the main benefits of employing FSA for fishing vessels is the confidence that all 
hazards within the vessel will be identified and addressed. A typical method used to 
identify and screen these hazards is Failure Mode and Effects Anal vsis (F\ lEA). 
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Typically, an FMEA is carried out to identify all hazards that are present encompassing 
the design, structure and operation concerning the system being studied. A Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) is then assigned to each hazard identified. This RPN is used to screen 
the hazards and eliminate those hazards with a low RPN (considered to be of negligible 
importance to the system). However, there are several setbacks of using the RPN 
method and these shortcomings are discussed in chapter 6 [Gilchrist W., 1993]. It has 
been proven that the RPN method may produce inaccurate results, which could lead to 
certain hazards being overlooked [Pillay A. et. aI., 2001 a]. A novel method using fuzzy 
rule base and grey theory is proposed. The fuzzy rule base method integrates expert 
knowledge in a formal manner and evaluates each hazard for it probability of 
occurrence, severity and detectability. A risk ranking is then generated by defuzzyfying 
the various linguistic terms assigned to the three categories of evaluation mentioned 
above. These defuzzfied results represent the priority for attention of each hazard. 
The grey theory method essentially produces the same results. However, there is an 
added advantage in employing this method as the weight of each category considered 
(the probability of occurrence, severity or detectability) can be incorporated. This 
entails that the analyst can determine in the analysis, which of these three categories are 
of more importance and rank each hazard accordingly. The three methods, that is, the 
traditional RPN, fuzzy rule base and grey theory methods are compared along side each 
other. The outcome from this comparison showed that the proposed novel approaches 
do not have the same disadvantages as the traditional RPN method. It is recommended 
that the fuzzy rule base approach be used for the hazard screening process in step 1 of 
the FSA framework and the grey theory method can be incorporated in step 2. 
Step 3 of the FSA framework requires the analyst to determine the different ways by 
which the risk levels in a system can be reduced. Considering the safety issues on 
fishing vessels and the data presented in chapter 2, it is recommended that the 
maintenance strategies for these vessels be improved. The current maintenance on 
fishing vessels is reviewed in chapter 7 and the findings retlect that there are hardly any 
maintenance activities on the vessel apart from very basic routine maintenance. This 
would explain the high number of accidents caused by machinery failure l\L\IB, 19991. 
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Carrying out inspections on operating machinery would be a good starting point in 
developing a maintenance regime for fishing vessels. As such, a method to determine 
the optimal inspection period for equipment is proposed in chapter 7. In order to 
determine this optimal inspection period, three criteria are modelled usin!! the delay 
'- -
time concept [Pillay A. et. aI., 2001 b]. These criteria include the down time suffered. 
cost incurred and the safety criticality of the system under study. The delay time 
represents the opportunity window within which an inspection and consequent repair (if 
an abnormality is identified) will deter a catastrophic failure from occurring [Christer 
A.H. et. aI., 1995]. The application of the delay time concept requires information 
regarding the probability distribution function of the delay time. The application of this 
concept to fishing vessels will require subjective methods of estimating the probability 
distribution function of the delay time as the available data for this parameter is almost 
non-existent [Wang W., 1997]. However, to demonstrate the application of the delay 
time concept to fishing vessels, different known distributions were experimented with. 
The findings from these analyses reflected that the truncated standard normal and 
wei bull distributions provided readable results [Pillay A. et. al., 2001 c]. As such the 
truncated standard normal distribution was used throughout the analysis to determine 
the optimal inspection period for the different criteria modelled. The findings from the 
complete analysis suggest that an inspection of the fishing gear after every two fishing 
operation will contribute to the lowest cost and down time with an acceptable safety 
criticality level. The implementation of an inspection regime is just the first but very 
vital step in developing a maintenance strategy for fishing vessels. Data that is gathered 
from these routine inspections will provide a basis and critical information to develop a 
sound maintenance regime. 
Implementing an inspection regime is only one of the many ways that the risk Ie\el in 
fishing vessels can be reduced. There are several other options such as redesigning the 
system. incorporating interlocks and alarm warnings and many more. Step 5 of the FSA 
deals with making decisions as to which Risk Control Option (RCO) would be best to 
implement. A method using Analytical Hierarchy Processing (AHP) is proposed in 
chapter 8 to select the most favourable RCO. The proposed method abu integrate" the 
assessment of human error in the AHP analysis. Human error has been determined tu 
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contribute to almost 80% of all maritime accidents. From the fishing vessel accident 
data collected, 20% of accidents have been identified as being caused bv erc\\ 
negligence [Loughran C.G., 1998]. As such, it is recommended that each RCO be 
evaluated for its effectiveness to reduce either the probability of human error occurring 
or the severity of the consequences. Unlike the traditional methods that are described in 
chapter 8, the AHP method does not omit any event that is identified by rationalisation. 
The proposed method also captures the interaction between operator and machine by 
identifying all the errors that could be committed by the operator while operating the 
machinery. The findings of this analysis suggest that the most effective RCO would be 
to install warning devices such as audio and visual alarms and indication either on the 
equipment or in the control rooms. Apart from analysing the human errors present in the 
system (as the cause of an accident), the analysis can be extended to include machinery 
failure due to material defects, environmental conditions, lack of procedures in plaee 
and many more. The AHP method allows for flexible modelling and re-structuring of 
the hierarchy. Apart from considering the effectiveness of the RCO, the proposed AHP 
method can be extended to incorporate several other criteria such as cost and feasibility 
of implementation. The proposed method can be integrated into step 5 of the FSA 
framework to complete the safety assessment process of a fishing vessel. 
The initial aim of the project, which is to develop novel techniques that could be used 
for the safety assessment of fishing vessels, has been achieved. The novel methods 
developed and presented in this thesis can be integrated into various sections of the FSA 
framework. This ensures a structured approach to identifying hazards, quantifying the 
risks and evaluating and deciding the best risk control options. The proposed methods 
have been demonstrated to be technically viable, and further work is needed to 
demonstrate economic viability. 
It is believed that the methodologies developed in this thesis possess enormous potential 
as valuable aids and effective alternatives in the area of formal safety asscssment of 
fishing vessels. It is also believed that practical applications of these methodologies \\ ill 
result from utilisation by organisations that deal \vith safety problems with high 
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uncertainty and insufficient data. In such cases, the implementation of the de\eloped 
methodologies could have a high beneficial effect. 
9.2 Further Work 
There are several areas that may be worthwhile exploring and exploited on the basis of 
the methodologies developed in this thesis. These can be summarised by the points 
presented below: 
• The concept of FSA should be widely used to arrive at suitable safety strategies for 
fishing vessels and such an analysis should be extended to address management 
issues. Due to the lack of a formal organisational structure of fishing vessels. there is 
a need to look at management issues and assess the impact on ship safety. The 
analysis should include ship and shore management and determine ways of 
improving the management structure to ensure safe and reliable operation of the 
fishing vessel. 
• Formal training and education programmes should be developed for fishermen. This 
programme should not only highlight safety matters, but also extend to cover 
competency issues of the fishermen. Such a programme will be a starting point to 
cultivate a safety culture within the fishing industry. The outcome of an FSA 
analysis can be used to identify areas where such training and education are lacking 
and the programme can be developed addressing these areas. 
• Designers of fishing vessels should adopt a "design for safety" approach as an 
integral part in the initial design stage. The "design for safety" methodology has 
been developed for marine offshore structure and may not be suitable for fishing 
vessels [Wang J. and Ruxton T., 1993]. Hence, research into this area may provide 
useful information for fishing vessel designers. 
• Rules and regulation governing fishing vessels in the past seem to only consider the 
structure and stability of the vessels. These rules ha\"e to be extended to cover 
equipment operating procedure. crew training and competency. inspection 
requirements by coast guard agencies. etc. It has been noted that the authorities have 
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addressed some of these aspects. However, there is a need to justify and rationalise 
each rule in order to account for the various costs that would be incurred bv the 
vessel owners/operators as well as any stakeholder of the vessel. This can be 
achieved by using the FSA method. As such, development of rules applied to fishing 
vessel using the FSA method needs to be researched and explored. 
Quantitative risk assessment of fishing vessels is frequently inhibited by the lack of 
representative failure and repair statistics. Hence, there is a need to develop a 
database specifically for this type of vessels. Most databases available are only 
limited to failure data without identifying the chain of events or causes of fai lure. 
These are useful information that is required for a risk assessment. The rep0l1ing 
and recording format of accidents should be consistent and the data presented in the 
database should be formatted in such a way that it can be directly applied to the 
safety analysis techniques available. The current method of manipulating data has 
been noted to cause inaccurate analysis and this translates to a waste of time and 
resources [Vosburg 1. and Kumar A., 2001]. 
• Maintenance activities have been identified in this thesis as one of the areas on 
fishing vessels that requires improvement. As such, further research into the 
development of a reliability and safety centred maintenance regime is required. The 
method proposed in chapter 7 only identifies the optimal inspection period of 
equipment on fishing vessels. This information has to be integrated with other 
maintenance concepts to develop a comprehensive regime that addresses all safety 
and reliability issue. The delay time concept could possibly be integrated with age-
based replacement techniques [Sherwin D.l., 1999], availability-based maintenance 
[Organ M. et. aI, 1997] and situational maintenance models [Riis 1.0. et. al.. 1997]. 
• The analysis of human errors on fishing vessels in chapter 8 concluded that the best 
way to reduce these errors is by introducing safety warning devices such as sensors 
and alarm for the timely detection of the condition. However. this may not be true 
over a long period of time when complacency sets in (especially with the acti\'ation 
of false alarms and the related problems associated with control systems). Hence, 
there is a need to further study areas of human performance prediction and 
reliability allocation to human performance. These aspects along with the 
psychological factors affecting fishing vessel crew should be studied in relation to 
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the man-machine interface and be integrated in the FSA framework to pro\ide a 
comprehensive study of human error contribution to accidents. 
Fishing vessels are slowly gaining "popularity" in the eyes of the governing bodies and 
private organisations, such as the Coast Guard Agencies, classification societies, marine 
insurers, charters and the International Maritime Organisation. Consequently, there is a 
need to develop safety assessment techniques for this industry. The work presented in 
this thesis can provide a basis for further study into fishing vessel safety. 
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ABSTRACT 
The work described in this thesis is concerned with the application of Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA) to fishing vessels. Fishing vessels are generally smaller than most 
merchant vessels and the amount of data available to carry out a comprehensive ~afety 
assessment for this type of vessels is lacking. The traditional method of conducting an 
FSA employs typical safety analysis methods that require a certain amount of data. The 
failure and accident data available for fishing vessels are associated with a high degree 
of uncertainty and are considered unreliable. As such the work carried out in this thesis 
is directed to look at the development of novel safety analysis methods to address this 
problem. 
This thesis proposes vanous subjective safety analysis methods for fishing vessels 
within the framework of the FSA technique. These steps comprise of hazard 
identification, the assessments of risk associated with those hazards, identifying the 
ways of managing the risks identified, carrying out a Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) of 
the options and finally making a decisions on which options to select. Each step within 
the FSA framework is addressed by proposing a novel approach to accomplish the aim 
of the particular step. 
In order to systematically and effectively identify and screen the hazards of fishing 
vessels, the HAZard and Operability (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) approaches are proposed. The HAZOP approach identifies hazards by looking 
at the system operating parameters and determining how it can deviate from the normal 
operating conditions. The FMEA on the other hand looks at each component in the 
system to determine the ways that it can fail. The information gathered at this stage 
would include hazards that have a negligible risk implication. Hence, there is a need to 
carry out a hazard screening in order to reduce the number of hazards. The proposed 
FMEA method using fuzzy rule base and grey relation theory will identify and rank the 
risks associated with each hazard according to its priority for attention. 
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APPENDIX 2 
CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SAFETY OF SMALL FISHING VESSELS 
CHECK LIST OF REQUIREMENTS 
Decked Vessels 
10m and above Registered Length to less than 12m Registered Length 
Lifejackets - 1 per person 
Liferafts 
2 Lifebuoys (1 with 18m buoyant line attached) or 
1 Lifebuoy (fitted with 18m buoyant line) + 1 buoyant rescue quoit 
3 Parachute flares 
2 Hand-held flares 
1 Smoke signal (buoyant or handheld) 
1 Fire bucket + lanyard 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher (fire rating 5A134B) 
1 Fire blanket (light duty) in galley or cooking area (if applicable) 
1 Fire pump + Hose or 
1 Fire bucket + 1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher (fire rating 5A134B) + 1 fixed fire 
extinguishing system for the machinery space 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher for oil fires (fire rating 13A1113B ) 
VHF Radio - fixed or hand held 
Bilge pump 
Bilge alarm 
Navigation lights and sound signals 
Compass 
Waterproof torch 
Medical kit 
Notes: 
I. Equipment need not be MCA approved provided it is fit for its intended purpose. 
II. "Decked vessels" means a vessel with a continuous watertight weather deck that 
extends from stem to stern and has positive freeboard throughout in any 
condition of loading the vessel. 
III. VHF using DSC is highly recommended in view of cessation of the 
Coastguard's Channel 16 dedicated headset watch on 1 sl February 2005. 
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CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SAFETY OF SMALL FISHING VESSELS 
CHECK LIST OF REQUIREMENTS 
All Decked Vessels 
Up to 10m Registered Length 
Lifejackets - 1 per person 
2 Lifebuoys (1 with 18m buoyant line attached) or 
1 Li febuoy (fitted with 18m buoyancy line) + 1 buoyant rescue quoi t 
3 Parachute flares 
2 Hand-held flares 
1 Smoke signal (buoyant or hand held) 
I Fire bucket + lanyard 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher (fire rating 5AJ34B) 
1 Fire blanket (light duty) in galley or cooking area (if applicable) 
1 Fire pump + hose or 1 fire bucket 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher for oil fires (fire rating 13AJl13B) 
VHF radio - fixed or hand held 
Bilge pump 
Bilge alarm 
Navigation lights and sound signals 
Compass 
Waterproof torch 
Medical kit 
Notes: 
I. Equipment need not be MCA approved provided it is fit for its intended purpose. 
II. "Decked vessels" means a vessel with a continuous watertight weather deck that 
extends from stem to stem and has positive freeboard throughout, in any 
condition of loading the vessel. 
III. VHF using Digital Selective Calling (DSC) is highly recommended in view of 
cessation of the Coastguard's Channel 16 dedicated headset watch on 1 sl 
February 2005. 
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CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SAFETY OF SMALL FISHING VESSELS 
CHECK LIST OF REQUIREMENTS 
Open Vessels 
7m and above to less than 12m Registered Length 
Lifejackets - 1 per person 
2 Lifebuoys (l with 18m buoyant line attached) or 1 lifebuoy (with 18m buoyant line) 
+ 1 buoyant rescue quoit 
3 Parachute flares 
2 Hand-held flares 
1 Smoke signal (buoyant or hand held) 
1 Fire bucket + lanyard 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher (fire rating 5AJ34B) 
1 Fire blanket (light duty) in galley or cooking area (if applicable) 
1 Fire pump + hose or 1 fire bucket 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher for oil fires (fire rating 13AJl13B) 
VHF Radio - fixed or hand held 
Bilge pump 
Navigation lights and sound signals 
Compass 
Waterproof torch 
Medical kit 
Notes: 
I. Equipment need not be MCA approved provided it is fit for its intended purpose. 
II. VHF using Digital Selective Calling (DSC) is highly recommended in view of 
cessation of the Coastguard's Channel 16 dedicated headset watch on 1 st 
February 2005. 
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CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SAFETY OF SMALL FISHING VESSELS 
CHECK LIST OF REQUIREMENTS 
OPEN Vessels 
Less than 7m Registered Length 
Lifejackets - 1 per person 
1 Lifebuoy ( with 18m buoyant line attached) 
2 Parachute flares 
2 Hand-held flares 
1 Smoke signal (buoyant or hand held) 
1 Fire bucket + lanyard 
1 Multi-purpose fire extinguisher (fire rating 5A/34B) - if vessel has in- board engine 
1 Fire blanket (light duty) if vessel has galley or cooking area 
VHF Radio - fixed or hand held 
Bailer 
Navigation lights and sound signals 
Compass 
Waterproof torch 
Medical kit 
Notes: 
I. Equipment need not be MCA approved provided it is fit for its intended purpose. 
II. VHF using Digital Selective Calling (DSC) is highly recommended in view of 
cessation of the Coastguard's Channel 16 dedicated headset watch on 1 st 
February 2005. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Fishing Vessel (Safety Provisions) Safety Rules 1975 
Arrangement of rules 
PART I - GENERAL 
Rule 
1. Citation, application, commencement, interpretation and amendment. 
PART II - FISHING VESSEL CONSTRUCTION RULES 
A - HULL (INCLUDING SUPERSTRUCURES) AND EQUIPMENT 
2. Structural strength 
B - WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY 
3. Closing arrangements. 
4. Doors 
5. Hatchway covers. 
6. Machinery space openings. 
7. Other deck openings. 
8. Ventilators. 
9. Air pipes. 
10. Side scuttles and skylights. 
11. Side openings. 
12. Inlets, discharges and scuppers other than deck scuppers. 
13. Heights oh hatchway coamings, doorway sills, ventilators and air pipes. 
14. Freeing ports. 
C - FREEBOARD AND STABILITY 
15. Freeboard. 
16. Stability. 
D - BOILERS AND MACHINERY 
17. General. 
18. Boiler feed systems. 
19. Steam pipe systems. 
20. Machinery. 
21. Means for going astern. 
II Shafts. 
23. Exhaust systems. 
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24. Air pressure systems. 
25. Cooling water systems - vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over. 
26. Cooling water systems - vessels of 12 meters in lengths and over but less than 
24.4 meters in length. 
27. Oil systems for lubricating, cooling and control- vessels of 24.4 meters in length 
and over. 
28. Oil systems for lubricating, cooling and control - vessels of 12 meters in length 
and over but less than 24.4 meters in length. 
29. Oil fuel installations (boilers and machinery) - general. 
30. Oil fuel installations (boilers and machinery) - vessels of 24.4 meters in length 
and over. 
31. Oil fuel installations (boilers and machinery) - vessels of 12 meters in length and 
over but less than 24.4 meters in length. 
32. Oil fuel installations (cooking ranges and heating appliances). 
33. Ventilation. 
34. Liquefied petroleum gas installations (cooking ranges and heating appliances). 
35. Storage of flammable liquids, toxic liquids, toxic gases and compressed gases. 
E - BILGE PUMPING ARRANGEMENTS 
36. Requirements for vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over. 
37. Requirements for vessels of 12 meters in length and over but less than 24.4 meters 
in length. 
F - ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS 
38. General. 
39. Distribution systems. 
40. Electrical precautions. 
41. Requirements for vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over. 
42. Requirements for vessels of 12 meters in length and over but less than 24.4 meters 
in length. 
43. Accumulator (storage) batteries and associated charging equipment. 
G - MISCELLANEOUS PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
44. Watertight doors. 
45. Steering gear - vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over fitted with rudders. 
46. Steering gear - vessels of 12 meters in length and over but less than 24.4 meters 
in length fitted with rudders. 
47. Steering gear - vessels of 12 meters in length and over fitted with steering devices 
other than rudders. 
48. Electrical and electro-hydraulic steering gear. 
49. Communication between wheelhouse and engine room - vessels of 24.4 meters in 
length and over. 
50. Controllable pitch propellers. 
51. Refrigerating plants. 
52. Anchors and chain cables. 
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53. Spare gear. 
54. Winches, tackles and lifting gear. 
H - STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION AND FIRE DETECTION 
55. Structural fire protection - general. 
56. Structural fire protection - vessels with hulls constructed of steel or other 
equivalent material. 
57. Structural fire protection - vessels with hulls constructed of glass reinforced 
plastic. 
58. Structural fire protection - vessels with hulls constructed of wood. 
59. Ventilation systems. 
60. Means of escape. 
6 I. Space heaters and cooking stoves. 
62. Automatic fire detection systems 
I - PROTECTION OF THE CREW 
63. Bulwarks, guard rails and guard wires. 
64. Openings in decks. 
65. Stairways and ladders. 
J - NAUTICAL EQUIPMENT 
66. Compasses - requirements for vessels of 45 meters in length and over. 
67. Compasses - requirements for vessels of 12 meters in length and over but less 
than 45 meters in length. 
68. Compasses - general requirements. 
69. Sounding equipment. 
70. Nautical publications. 
71. Flags and signalling equipment. 
72. Pilot ladders. 
K - DOCUMENTATION TO BE CARRIED ON VESSELS 
73. Record of particulars to be kept on vessel. 
74. Information as to stability to be kept on vessel. 
75. Information on loading and ballasting to be kept on vessel. 
PART III - RULES FOR LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES 
A - LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES AND EQUIPMENT 
76. Requirements for vessels of 75 meters in length and over. 
77. Requirements for vessels of 45 meters in length and over but less than 75 meters 
in length. 
78. Requirements for vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over but less than 45 meters 
in length. 
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79. Requirements for vessels of 17 meters in length and over but less than 2.+.-+ meters 
in length. 
80. Requirements for vessels of 12 meters in length and over but less than 17 meters 
in length. 
81. Requirements for vessels less than 12 meters in length. 
82. General requirements for lifeboats. 
83. General requirements for Class C boats. 
84. General requirements for inflatable boats. 
85. General requirements for life rafts. 
86. Marking of lifeboats, Class C boats, inflatable boats and life rafts. 
87. Requirements for lifebuoys. 
88. Requirements for self-igniting lights attached to lifebuoys. 
89. Requirements for line-throwing appliances. 
90. Equipment for lifeboats and Class C boats. 
91. Equipment for inflatable boats. 
92. Rations for lifeboats. 
93. Security of equipment and rations in lifeboats, Class C boats and inflatable boats. 
94. Equipment and rations for life rafts. 
95. General provisions relating to the stowage and handling of life-saving appliances. 
96. Stowage and handling of lifeboats and Class C boats. 
97. Stowage and handling of inflatable boats. 
98. Stowage and handling of life rafts, lifebuoys and lifejackets. 
99. Embarkation into lifeboats, Class C boats, inflatable boats and life rafts. 
100. Storage of pyrotechnic distress signals. 
B - FIRE APPLIANCES 
101. Requirements for vessels of 60 meters in length or over. 
102. Requirements for vessels of 45 meters in length and over but less than 60 meters 
in length. 
103. Requirements for vessels of 24.4 meters in length and over but less than 45 meters 
in length. 
104. Requirements for vessels of 21 meters in length and over but less than 24.-+ meters 
in length. 
105. Requirements for vessels of 9 meters in length and over but less than 21 meters in 
length. 
106. Requirements for vessels less than 9 meters in length. 
107. Requirements for fire pumps. 
108. Requirements for the fire main, water service pipes and hydrants. 
109. Requirements for fire hoses, nozzles, etc. 
110. Requirements for fire extinguishers. 
Ill. Requirements for fire alarm and fire detection systems. 
112. Requirements for fixed pressure water-spraying systems for machinery spaces. 
113. Requirements for fixed fire smothering gas and steam installations. 
1 14. Requirements for fixed foam fire extinguishing installations. 
I 15. Requirements for fireman's outfits. 
1 16. Means for stopping machinery, shutting off fuel oil suction pipes and closing 
opelllngs. 
Chapter 2 - Fishing Vessel Safety 
CHAPTER 2 
FISHING VESSEL SAFETY 
Summary 
This chapter reviews the current rules and regulations governing fishing vessels and 
presents the safety programmes implemented by the governing bodies. Accident data 
collected from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch are presented and an analysis 
is carried out to determine the most common cause of accidents on fishing vessels. 
2.1 Introduction 
Recognising the need for attention to safety of commercial fishing vessels, the IMO 
organised an international conference, which culminated in the Torremolinos 
International Convention for the safety of fishing vessels in 1977 [IMO, 1977]. It 
established uniform principles and rules regarding design, construction and equipment 
for fishing vessels 24m (79 feet) in length and over. This convention was a major 
milestone. It provided benchmarks for improving safety, and many fishing nations have 
adopted its measures into their marine safety programmes. 
The IMO convention on Standard of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for 
seafarers (STCW) 1978 is another important factor. Although the STCW 1978 
specifically exempts fishing vessels, it has inspired efforts to develop personnel 
qualification standards (STCW 95 also exempts fishing vessels). Notable among these 
efforts is the Document for Guidance on Fishermen's Training and Certification [IMO, 
1988]· and the Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels [IMO, 1975a]. Other 
IMO codes and guidelines include the voluntary guidelines for the design, construction 
and equipment of small fishing vessels [!MO, 1980] and the code of safety for 
fishermen and vessel design and construction [IMO, 1975b]. These standards are jointly 
prepared by IMO and two other United Nations subsidiaries, Food and Agricultural 
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1 17. Fire control plans. 
118. Availability of fire-fighting appliances. 
C - MUSTERS AND DRILLS 
1 19. Muster list. 
120. Training. 
121. Inspections. 
P ART IV - EXCEPTIONAL PROVISIONS 
122. Exceptional provisions. 
PART V - SURVEYS AND CERTIFICATES 
123. Surveys and periodical inspections. 
124. Surveys. 
125. Surveyor's report and declaration of survey. 
126. Issue and form of fishing vessel certificates. 
127. Duration of certificates. 
128. Extension of certificates. 
129. Cancellation of certificates. 
130. Periodical inspections of fishing vessels. 
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Organisation (FAO) and International Labour Organisation (ILO). They provide 
guidance on training and education and detailed curriculum development. 
There are strong safety programmes among lMO member states that include equipment 
standards, inspection requirements and certification or licensing of vessel operators and 
crew. These programmes vary in each country for example; Canada, Norway and the 
UK have extensive requirements, while other countries are less stringent. Generally 
vessels about 15m or larger are addressed; however some countries address vessels as 
small as 9m, such as New Zealand and 12m as in the UK. 
In the UK, comprehensive regulations have come into force since 1975. Surveys and 
certification of fishing vessels with the length of 12m or longer are required; they apply 
to about 2000 vessels. For vessels with the length of over 16.5m, deck officers and 
engineers have comprehensive entry level professional training, certification, manning 
and watch keeping requirements. 
Studies on the effect of compulsory programmes have been conducted in Norway, The 
Netherlands, UK and Spain, but they have tended to focus on training, statistics and 
causes of accidents rather than performance of technical systems in relation to 
compulsory programmes. It appears that fatalities have generally been reduced, while 
the rates of incidence for injuries related to vessel casualties and workplace accidents 
appear unchanged. The lack of apparent change in injury rates may be related to 
working conditions and methods, vessel design, training deficiencies and changes in the 
number of fishing vessels and fishermen [Carbajosa J.M., 1989; Dahle E.A. and 
Weerasekara J.C.D., 1989; Hoefnagal W.A.M. and Bouwman K., 1989; Stoop J .. 1989]. 
The number of vessel casualties over the years has changed. For example. in the UK, 
since safety rules were applied to all vessels over 12m during the mid 1980' s. the 
number of losses of these vessels has significantly reduced. However, losses of vessels 
under 12m have more than doubled, perhaps partly because of a large increase in the 
number of vessels under 12m, to which only life saving and fire safety government 
regulations apply [Hopper A.G. and Dean AJ., 1992]. 
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2.2 The Code of Practice for the Safety of Small Fishing Vessels 
The development of a code of practice for small fishing vessels marked the beginning of 
the first major review of fishing vessel safety regulations since 1975. The principal aim 
in developing the code was to update the safety equipment requirements for small 
fishing vessels. Its secondary aim is to build on the concept of hazard identification and 
risk assessment that already applies to health and safety on board the vesseL and 
introduce an assessment by owners of the fitness of their vessels [House of Commons, 
2000]. 
The Code of Practice for the safety of small fishing vessels has been effective since the 
1 st of April 200 1. The aim of this Code of Practice is to improve safety in the under 12 
meter sector of the fishing industry and to raise the safety awareness of all those 
involved with the construction, operation and maintenance of fishing vessels with a 
registered length of less than 12 meters. 
2.2.1 Development 
In 1992 the National Audit Office, in its report entitled "Department of Transport: Ship 
Safety" noted an increase in the fishing vessel accident rate from 1978 to 1989, due in 
part to an increase in the numbers of smaller vessels [National Audit Office, 1992]. It 
observed the absence, until 1990, of any programme of inspection of fishing vessels 
with a registered length of less than 12 meters. At about the same time, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology recommended that fishing vessels 
down to 7m in length should be brought within the licensing, crew certification and 
structural safety regimes. 
In response, the Surveyor General's Organisation of the Department of Transport (now 
the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA)), in consultation with industry members of 
the Fishing Industry Safety Group (FISG), decided to develop a Code of Practice for 
fishing vessels with a registered length of less than 12 meters. This Code has been 
developed by the MCA. The content of the Code has been the subject of extensi,e 
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discussion with representatives of the under 12 meter sector of the fishing industrv 
~ . 
within a Steering Committee set up by FISG to oversee the Code's development. The 
Code applies from the I st of April 2001 to all United Kingdom registered fishing vessels 
with a registered length of less than 12 meters. 
2.2.2 Code requirements 
To comply with the Code, a vessel owner will be required: 
• To carry safety equipment on the vessel appropriate to its length and construction 
(i.e. decked or open). The equipment checklist is given in Appendix 2. 
• To complete, or arrange completion of an assessment of the health and safety risks 
arising in the normal course of work activities or duties on the vessel in accordance 
with the provisions of the Merchant Shipping and Fishing Vessels (Health and 
Safety at Work) Regulations 1997 and MGN 20 (M+F). 
• To certify annually that the vessel complies with the Code, by declaring that the 
safety equipment has been properly maintained and serviced in accordance with 
manufacturers' recommendations and that an appropriate, up-to-date health and 
safety risk assessment has been completed. 
• To present the vessel for inspection either voluntarily or as requested by the MCA. 
Appendix 2 gives the checklist of requirements for the Code of Practice for the safety of 
small fishing vessels in 4 categories. The vessels addressed in this code of practice 
include: 1) Decked vessels 10m and above registered length to less than 12m registered 
length, 2) All decked vessels up to 10m registered length 3) Open vessels 7m and above 
to less than 12m registered length and 4) Open vessels less than 7m registered length. 
2.3 The Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Safety Rules 1975 
In 1968, three vessels were tragically lost off the coast of Iceland. The iI1\'estigation of 
these three vessels determines the loss as 'capsizing due to ice accumulation'. 
Following the official inquiry into these losses, a rule regime was investigated which 
eventually arrived on the statute as "The Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Safety 
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Rules 1975". Unfortunately the formulation of the rules did not result in an anah "is of 
the organisational or human failing, present in many safety tragedies \vithin the fi"hing 
community. The rules are primarily concerned with vessels of over 12 meters registered 
length. Smaller vessels are addressed, but only life saving appliances and firefighting 
measures are included. Appendix 3 gives a list of all equipment addressed in The 
Fishing Vessel (Safety Provisions) Safety Rules 1975. These rules do not concern 
themselves with the whole vessel, but may be noted to consider the vessel from the deck 
and accommodation line downwards. The winches, wires and fishing equipment are not 
covered by the rules. 
Following the introduction of the 1975 Rule, the European Common Fisheries policy 
brought in a licensing scheme for vessels over 10 meters. This coupled with a de-
commissioning scheme for larger vessels, resulted in a huge increase in the number of 
under 10 meter vessels. These vessels did not need licenses to fish and need not comply 
with the majority of the 1975 Rules. However, in 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture 
Fisheries and Food introduced fishing licenses for vessels of under 10 meters overall 
length. The introduction of this law has reduced the size of the fleet. The greatest 
incidence of risk has now moved to vessels in the 7 to 20 meter range, with particular 
safety concern for those vessels under 12 meters. Following concern emanating from 
the Parliament, inspections on these under 12 meter vessels have been requested. Since 
1993, under 12 meter vessels have been subjected to safety inspection. 
2.4 Accident Data 
Comparisons of the safety record of the fishing industry with other industries indicate 
that the industry continues to be the most dangerous by a significant margin. In 1995/96 
there were 77 fatal injuries per 100,000 fishermen as opposed to 23.2 per 100,000 
employees in the mining and quarrying industry (the next highest category in that year) 
[MAIB, 1995]. In 1992 there were 494 reported fishing vessel accidents from a fleet of 
10,953 vessels. In 1997, figures indicate 485 reported fishing vessel accidents from a 
significantly reduced fleet of 7,779 vessels. These statistics do not include personal 
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accidents to fishennen while at sea; it is believed that these are under-rep0l1ed [\ IAlB, 
1997]. 
The accident data presented in this section are predominantly gathered from the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAID). The MAID is a totally independent unit within 
the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions (DETR) and reports 
directly to the Secretary of State. The MAID received 1 A 18 accident and incident 
reports in 1999. Accidents to ships accounted for 641 of those reports. 
The data presented here is collected from 1992 to 1999 and reflects all the reported 
incidents and accidents relating to fishing vessels. It is thought that the actual accident 
and incident figures are much higher than what is presented here, as many accidents are 
not reported to the coastguard authorities. 
The graph in figure 2.1 shows the total number of vessels lost (primary y-axis) and total 
number of vessels registered (secondary y-axis) from 1992 to 1999. These figures 
include all vessel sizes ranging from under 12 meter to over 24 meter. From this graph, 
it is evident that the percentage of vessels lost have increased from 1992 to 1994 and 
then reduced from 1994 to 1998. From 1998 onwards, it is noted that there has been a 
sharp increase in the percentage of vessels lost. Overall, the percentage of vessels lost 
have been between 0.27% (minimum in 1997/98) and 0.45% (maximum in 1999) of the 
total registered vessels, as seen in figure 2.2 
There were approximately 7,460 UK-registered fishing vessels in 1999 (end December 
1999 figure). During the year 370 accidents and incidents involving these vessels were 
reported to the MAID. 33 fishing vessels were lost which at 0.45% of the total fleet 
represents the highest rate since 1994. Machinery damage is noted as the mam 
contributor to the high number of accidents as seen in the pie chart of figure 2.3. 
An analysis of the data from preVIOUS years shows that machinery damage has 
contributed to over 50% of all accidents. This could be attributed to sc\cral factor\ 
including poorly maintained equipment, incorrect operation, age, lack of automation etc. 
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The graph in figure 2.4 shows the number of accidents caused by machinery damage 
from 1994 to 1999. Although the figures indicate a decreasing trend, the number of 
accidents related to this category is still high and certainly unacceptable from a safety 
perspecti ve. 
The next highest contributor to accidents is found to be flooding and foundering 
followed by grounding and then collision and contact. A comparison of all accident 
types is made as seen in figure 2.5. Flooding and foundering is estimated to cause 
almost 150/0 to 20% of accidents on fishing vessels. 
These data is cumulated and presented as a pIe chart in figure 2.6 to reveal the 
contribution of each accident type for the sampling period. As revealed earlier, 
machinery damage is found to be the most common cause of accidents on fishing 
vessels, contributing 64.4% of all accidents. Foundering and flooding (14.2%), 
grounding (10.2%), collision and contacts (5.7%), and fires and explosions (2.9%) 
follow. 
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Figure 2.5 Accidents to fishing vessels by accident type 
Abstract \\' 
A method using Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) is proposed to 
evaluate the hazards identified by the proposed HAZOP and FMEA method. The 
integration of FST and FTA provides a practical means of assessing the chain of events 
from the basic (primary events) up to the top event (undesirable event) of the fault tree. 
This method utilises linguistic terms to express the probability of failures of the basic 
events and the severity of the consequences. As such, these parameters are expressed in 
a natural manner reflecting the uncertainty in the data used. 
The initial analysis of a fishing vessel revealed that machinery failures due to lack of 
maintenance activities were the cause of many accidents. Hence, the development of a 
maintenance regime is identified to be one of the ways to manage the risks that were 
evaluated by the FTA. A method using the delay time concept is proposed to determine 
the optimal inspection period for fishing vessel equipment. Most fishing vessels do not 
have a maintenance regime in place, therefore it is proposed that an inspection regime 
be implemented to gather enough data to develop a comprehensive maintenance regime. 
The delay time concept provides an effective means of modelling the inspection period 
for fishing vessels as it is based on actual failures rather than generic failure data. 
Human errors have been identified as one of the areas that need further research. A 
method to assess the human errors on fishing vessels using Analytical Hierarchy 
Processing (AHP) is proposed. This proposed approach integrates the decision making 
phase of different risk control option available to fishing vessels. The outcome of this 
analysis will assist in the decision making process of the FSA framework. Finally the 
results of the research project are summarised and the areas where further effort is 
required to improve the developed methodologies are outlined. 
To demonstrate the methodologies developed in this thesis, the operating system of a 
hydraulic winch on a fishing vessel is used. The data was obtained from an industrial 
collaborator that owns and operates fishing vessels in the United Kingdom. A 
diagrammatic representation of the original contribution presented in this thesis IS 
shown in figure I. 
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Figure 2.6 Accidents by nature (1994 - 1999) 
To determine the severity of the accidents on fishing vessels, data reflecting the accident 
to vessel crew together with the number of deaths that resulted are gathered and 
presented in figures 2.7 and 2.8. These bar charts show that almost 30% of accidents to 
crew on vessels that are under 12 meter result in deaths and for vessels that are 12-24 
meters and more than 24 meters in length, these figures are calculated to be 13 % and 
15% respectively. The results indicate that vessels under 12 meters have the highest 
casualty rates and suffer severe consequences when an accident happens. This could be 
attributed to the size and stability of these vessels when sailing in bad weather 
conditions. The number of under 12 meter vessels that were lost is much higher than the 
other vessels as seen in figure 2.9. The trend in the number of vessels lost is difficult to 
determine, as it does not follow any specific mathematical rule. However, by comparing 
the graphs in figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.9, it can be concluded that from 1997, the number of 
vessels lost is generally increasing as the number of registered vessels is decreasing. 
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Table 2.1 gives the detailed breakdown of accidents by vessel length and accident cause 
for 1999 [MAIB 1999a]. From this table, it is noted that a great proportion of fishing 
vessel accidents (20%) is caused by negligence/carelessness of the crew. This could be 
summarised as human error attributed by several factors including competency of the 
crew, fatigue, poor manning of vessel and difficult operating conditions. A method 
assessing human error and means to reduce these errors will be described in chapter 8. 
Accidents caused by the lifting gear (15%) and other fishing gear equipment (12%) are 
also high compared to the other accident causes. 
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Accidents by Vessel Length and Accident Cause 
(more than one cause may be applicable to a particular accident) 
Accident Under 12 12-24 Over 24 
metres metres metres Total 
lNegligence/carelessness of 4 10 9 injured person 23 
Ship movement 1 3 3 7 
/Li fting gear 2 8 7 17 
!Miscellaneous fishing gear 3 5 6 14 and equipment 
failure of deck machinery 
2 5 7 and equipment -
Sea washing inboard 3 1 4 8 
1N0 known cause 2 - '") 4 
rrra w I boards - 1 4 5 
!Door or hatch not secured 1 1 - ! 
failure to comply with 1 1 
warnings/orders 
- -
IUnsecured non-fishing gear 
- - - -
on deck 
Unfenced opening 1 - - 1 
Patigue - - - -
lPailure to use protective 3 1 1 5 ~lothing or equipment 
Slippery surface - - 3 3 
/Lifting/carrying by hand 
- 3 3 incorrectly 
-
failure of engine room and 
- - - -
workshop equipment 
Other 2 5 4 1 1 
Table 2.1 Accidents by Vessel Length and Accident Cause 
2.5 Data Analysis 
In many cases of fishing vessel accidents, information is incomplete or totally lacking. 
This makes it difficult to analyse the events that lead to the accident. Accurate historical 
and current data on vessels, fishermen, professional experience, hours and nature of 
exposure and safety performance of personnel and equipment are fundamental to 
assessing safety problems, monitoring results of safety programmes and measuring the 
effectiveness of safety improvement strategies [Loughran C.G. et. aI.. 2001]. Very fc\\ 
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data are regularly collected or published on these parameters. The limited data makes it 
difficult to quantify safety problems, determine casual relations and assess safety 
improvement strategies. However, the data that are available indicate that significant 
safety problems exist and that human error, vessels and equipment inadequacies and 
environmental conditions all contribute to them. 
Marine accidents that have occurred could have been prevented with greater attention to 
safety. This is particularly true for fishing vessels. Recent inquiries into the losses of 
fishing vessels "Pescado" [MAIB, 1998] and "Magaretha Maria" [MAIB, 1999b] have 
raised concerns as to how similar accidents may be prevented in the future. The data 
analysis in section 2.4 shows that there is a rise of fishing vessel accidents and the trend 
seems to be continuing in an upward fashion. From the literature survey, it was found 
that safety assessment of fishing vessels had been limited to stability consideration and 
very little work has been carried out on the operational and equipment safety 
assess·ment. From the data given in section 2.4, it can be deduced that fishing vessel 
safety needs to be addressed and the number of accidents and incidents related to the 
operation and equipment is to be reduced. In order to direct the attention of the safety 
assessment on fishing vessels, the probable causes of each accident category have been 
investigated and are summarised here [MAIB 1999a]. 
2.5.1 Machinery damage 
The highest number of incidents reported in the official statistics relates to machinery 
damage. Although most machinery failures do not threaten the vessel or lives of the 
crew, given other factors such as bad weather or being in a tideway, the consequences 
could be disastrous. Upon investigation of several fishing vessels in the UK. it was 
found that maintenance activities on board these vessels were almost non-existent. This 
is thought to lead to the high number of machinery failures. The present situation 
concerning maintenance on fishing vessels is discussed in detailed in chapter 7. A 
method for improving the current status is proposed within the mentioned chapter. 
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2.5.2 Founderingljlooding 
Typically these incidents are caused by burst pipes, fittings working loose, leaking 
glands and sprung planks. Flooding is a particular problem with smaller wooden 
vessels. Smaller vessels are often of clinker construction where the strakcs are lapped 
against each other and clenched. They are reliant upon the swelling nature of the wood 
when soaked for making a good seal. This method of construction is particularly 
vulnerable in heavy sea conditions. These types of accidents can also happen on vcssels 
that are of metal construction. Sometimes incompatible metals become rapidly corroded 
in a seawater environment; examples are copper piping adjacent to steel or aluminium 
structures, which resulted in a relatively new vessel suffering a major flooding incident 
[Hopper A.G. and Dean A.J., 1992]. 
2.5.3 Grounding 
These incidents are associated with all classes of fishing vessels and can be due to 
various causes. Engine or gearbox failures and propeller fouled by a rope or fishing net 
are common causes. However, many cases have been associated with navigational error. 
This may be a failure to plot a proper course, failure to keep a check on vessel position 
with wind and tidal drift, reliance on auto-pilots and electronic plotters and a failure to 
keep a proper lookout. There are no requirements to carryon board a certified navigator 
(especially for vessels under 12 meters registered length), hence the navigators on these 
vessels rely heavily upon experience and 'gut feeling', which in tum could increase the 
level of navigator error. 
2.5.4 Collisions and contacts 
Almost all collision and contact incidents involve a fishing vessel and a merchant vessel 
and almost without exception they are due to human error. Large merchant vcssels may 
have a poor line of sight from the wheelhouse and small fishing vessels are not easily 
seen under the bow. Apart from that, skippers on fishing vessels are too involved in the 
fishing operation to plot the position and movement of other vessels approaching them. 
The fishing operation itself requires sudden stopping or course changing \\hich could 
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lead to unavoidable collisions. Collisions and contacts could also occur invol\'ing t\\'o or 
more fishing vessels. This is especially true when pair trawling is in progress. Ho\\'e\'cr, 
the consequences are less severe and the incident normally occurs due to errors of 
judgement by one or both parties involved. 
2.5.5 Fires and explosions 
Investigation of these accidents have shown that in most cases the fire had originated 
from the engine room and are caused by oil or fuel coming into contact with hot 
exhausts. Other causes are heating and cooking stoves and electrical faults. There have 
been several cases where the fire had started in the accommodation area due to the crew 
smoking cigarettes in the sleeping bunk. The number of accidents caused by fire has 
been relatively low compared to other categories. However, due to the limited fire 
fighting resources on board fishing vessels, it has the potential to cause severe damage 
and even loss of life. 
2.5.6 Capsizing 
From the MAIB reports, it is evident that the majority of capsizing incidents occur 
during the fishing and recovery of gear operations. This shows that for the vessels that 
do capsize, there is an insufficient factor of safety in the present stability criteria. This 
insufficient factor is introduced by the act of fishing and the associated moment lever 
introduced by the gear along with the wind lever in the dynamic situation at sea 
[Loughran C.G. et. aI., 200 1]. This is perhaps the most lethal type of incident in terms of 
loss of life. The capsizing of small fishing vessels happens in a matter of minutes and 
this leaves little chance for the crew to escape. Extreme sea conditions are one of the 
many factors that lead to a capsize. As most skippers and crew depend on the catch for 
their daily income, skippers have been known to put their vessel through extreme sea 
conditions to get to a fishing ground and sometimes drift within the fishing grounds 
waiting for the sea to calm in order to resume fishing operations. However, the most 
common cause of capsizing is when the fishing gear becomes snagged. Trmd gear 
fouled on some sea bed obstruction is a commonplace happening for a fishing skipper. 
Attempts to free badly fouled gear by heaving on the winch can result in forces that are 
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large enough to roll the vessel over. Heaving on both warps at the same time \vill 
produce a balanced situation but if one side suddenly becomes free. the force on the 
opposite side may be sufficient to capsize the vessel. 
2.5.7 Heavy weather damage 
The number of vessels suffering weather damage is comparatively low as seen in the 
graph in figure 2.5. Small vessels are particularly vulnerable to these accidents. 
especially when they go out further away from the coastline for their fishing operation 
(due to the reduced fishing opportunities in British waters). These small vessels will be 
working far offshore where they cannot withstand the severe weather and wave 
conditions that can occur unexpectedly. Heavy weather can weaken the hull structure of 
the vessel and at the same time, cause deck fittings to come loose and lead to an 
accident. 
2.6 Conclusion 
A review has been performed on available incident data relevant to fishing vessels. It 
was found that the amount of data relating to this type of vessels is limited. The only 
data source that compiles fishing vessel accident/incident data has been identified to be 
the MAID. Over the years, the database maintained by the MAID has considerably 
improved in terms of its format. However, the database still lacks information about the 
casual relationship between the causes and effects of the accidents/incidents. 
Data interpretation should be carried out with caution, as it is highly likely that there is 
some degree of under reporting of incidents. This would entail that the actual number of 
deaths, accidents and vessel losses, would be much higher than the figures presented 
here. However, the data gathered and analysed in this chapter show that there is a real 
problem in the fishing vessel industry. The frequency of accidents and the associated 
severity is still high for maritime standards, and the number of accidents/incidents has to 
be reduced. 
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The work in this thesis attempts to provide assessment methods that could identify the 
high-risk areas on a fishing vessel and thereby justifying the cost of implementing risk 
management solutions. It can be concluded that due to the lack of proper reporting of 
accidents/incidents on fishing vessels, subjective methods of risk and safety analysis 
would be more favourable. As such, the methods developed and presented in the 
following chapters are able to handle vague and imprecise data. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SAFETY ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
Summary 
This chapter gives an introduction to common safety analysis techniques and provides a 
detailed review of some of the typical methods employed in the industry today. A 
detailed discussion is carried out on HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP) and this 
is followed by a proposed approach using HAZOP to identify hazards on board fishing 
vessels. Advantages and disadvantages of the safety analysis techniques described are 
discussed. 
3.1 Introduction 
Reliability and safety analyses are different concepts that have a certain amount of 
overlapping between them. Reliability analysis of an item involves studying its 
characteristics expressed by the probability that it will perform a required function 
under stated conditions for a stated period of time. If such an analysis is extended to 
involve the study of the consequences of the failures in terms of possible damage to 
property and the environment or injury/death of people, the study is referred to as safety 
analysis. 
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of occurrence, the associated 
consequences and the likelihood of consequences of an accident. Safety is the ability of 
an entity not to cause, under given conditions, critical or catastrophic consequences. It is 
generally measured by the probability that an entity, under given conditions, will not 
cause critical or catastrophic events [Villemuer A., 1992]. 
Safety assessment is a logical and systematic way to seek answers to a number of 
questions about the system under consideration. The assessment of risk associated with 
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an engineering system or product may be summarised to answer the following three 
questions: 
I) What can go wrong? 
2) What are the effects and consequences? 
3) How often will they happen? 
The answer obtained from these questions will provide the information about the safety 
of the system. Such information is interesting but is of no practical significance unless 
there is a method for controlling and managing the risk levels of specific hazards to 
tolerable levels. Hence, a complete safety assessment will require a fourth question to 
be answered: 
4) What measures need to be undertaken to reduce the risks and how can this be 
achieved? 
Safety analysis can be generally divided into two broad categories, namely, quantitative 
and qualitative analysis methods. Depending on the safety data available to the analyst, 
either a quantitative or a qualitative safety analysis can be carried out to study the risk of 
a system in terms of the probability of occurrence of each hazard and possible 
consequences of the accident. 
3.2 Qualitative Safety Analysis 
Qualitative safety analysis is used to locate possible hazards and to identify proper 
precautions that will reduce the frequencies or consequences of such hazards. Generally 
this technique aims to generate a list of potential failures that affect the system under 
consideration. Since this method does not require failure data as an input to the analysis. 
it relies heavily on engineering judgement and past experience. 
A common method employed in qualitative safety analysis is the use of a risk matrix 
method [Halebsky M., 1989; Tummala V.M.R. and Leung Y.H.. 1995]. The two 
parameters that are considered are the likelihood of occurrence of the failure event and 
the severity of the consequences of the failure event. Upon identifying all the hazards 
within the system under consideration, each hazard is evaluated for these two 
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parameters. The severity of all the failure events could be assessed in tenns of four 
categories as shown in table 3.1 [Military Standard, 1993]. 
' __ " __ "NNW,""_HNwm.H"NN ••••• H.N •••• NH.NUM'"m.".H""N"N.HH.NNM'U=H"HH.NHNH"''' •• H ••• N'NM.WU'H.HH •• HH."MHH •• H."MNW.N".U'N ••• H.N""' ••• U."_H.U._ •• _w •• ,HNm"m,u_, ,._ ---___ "" __ "Od._H. ____ ~. 
Hazard Consequences Hazard severity Category 
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Death, system loss or severe environmental damage,-etc-~Catastrophi~-------- ---------
Severe injury or major system or environmental 
damage, etc 
Minor injury or minor system or environmental damage, 
etc 
Less than minor injury or less than minor system or 
~~ vir_on!!l~=~~N~ __ ?='!.~.~.£.e, !!E'W_HN'N~~"_-___ ~_ 
Critical 
Marginal 
Negligible 
Table 3.1 Assessment of hazard severity and categories. 
The likelihood of occurrence is assessed qualitatively as frequent, probable, occasional, 
remote or improbable as depicted in table 3.2 [Military Standard, 1993]. Each of these 
categories can be represented quantitatively by a range of probabilities as seen in 
column three of table 3.2. This is to provide a rough guideline for the experts or analysts 
who are providing the information or carrying out the analysis. 
Hazard Qual i tati ve Quantitative Level Categories 
Frequent Likel y to occur The probability is greater than A frequently 10- 1 
Will occur several The probability is between 10-2 
Probable times in the life time B 
and 10-1 
of an item 
Likely to occur The probability is between 10-3 
Occasional sometime in the life of 
and 10-2 C 
an item 
Unlikely but possible The probability is between 10-6 
Remote to occur in the lifetime 
and 10-3 0 
of an item 
So unlikely, it can be 
Improbable assumed occurrence The probability is less than 10-6 E 
may not be 
experienced 
Table 3.2 Assessment of hazard probabilities and levels 
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It is reasonable to assign a high priority if the hazard has a catastrophic consequence 
and a frequent probability. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to assign a 10\\ 
priority if the hazard has a negligible consequence and improbable probability. Based 
on this logic, certain acceptable criteria can be developed. All identified hazards can be 
prioritised corresponding to safety and reliability objectives by appropriate hazard 
indexes using the hazard severity and the corresponding hazard probabilities as shown 
in table 3.3 [Military Standard, 1980]. The hazard probabilities shown in this table is 
used to carry out qualitative analysis for a military defence system. These probabilities 
can be assigned appropriately when different systems are considered. If an identified 
hazard is assigned with a hazard index of 1 A, IB, I C, 2A, 28 or 3A, it needs an 
immediate corrective action. A hazard with an index 1 D, 2C, 2D, 3B or 3C would 
require a possible corrective action. Similarly, a hazard with index 1 E, 2E. 3D, 4A or 
4B would be tracked for a corrective action with low priority; or it may not warrant any 
corrective action. On the other hand, a hazard with index 4C, 4D or 4E might not even 
require a review for action. 
All the identified hazards within the system under study can be evaluated using this 
method to produce a risk ranking based on the highest priority down to the lowest 
priority. A variation of this qualitative risk matrix approach will be presented in chapter 
4 with its application demonstrated for the safety analysis of a fishing vessel. 
Hazard Severity 
Hazard probability 
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
L- L-
(A) Frequent (x > 10-1) lA 2A 3A 4A 
(B) Probable (10- 1 > X > 10-2) IB 2B 3B 4B 
(C) Occasional (10-2 > X > 10-3) lC 2C 3C 4C 
(D) Remote (1 o-j > x > 10-6) ID 2D 3D 4D 
(E) Improbable (x < 10-6) IE 2E 3E 4E 
Table 3.3 Priority matrix based on hazard severity and hazard probability 
=C~h=UI~)t~er~3~-=S(~lt~e~t\'~A~/~la~/)~'s~is~~~e~Ch~/~I~~l~le~S __________________________________________ 37 
3.3 Quantitative Safety Analysis 
Quantitative safety analysis utilises what is known and assumed about the failure 
characteristics of each individual component to build a mathematical model that is 
associated with some or all of the following information: 
• Failure rates. 
• Repair rates. 
• Mission time. 
• System logic. 
• Maintenance schedules. 
• Human error. 
Similar to the qualitative analysis, the probability of occurrence of each system failure 
event and the magnitude of possible consequences are to be obtained. However, these 
parameters are to be quantified. 
3.3.1 Event probabilities 
There are predominantly three methods that could be used to determine the probability 
of occurrence of an event, namely [Preyssl C., 1995]: 
1. Statistical method. 
2. Extrapolation method. 
3. Expert judgement method. 
The statistical method involves the treatment of directly relevant test of experience data 
and the calculation of the priori probabilities. The extrapolation method involves the use 
of model prediction, similarity considerations and Bayesian concepts. Limited use of 
expert judgement is made to estimate unknown values as input to the extrapolation 
method. The expert judgement method involves direct estimation of probabilities by 
specialists. 
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These methods can be used together in an effective way to produce a reasonable 
estimate of the probability of an event occurring. The flowchart in figure 3.1 shows the 
type of event probability produced depending on the available data. 
Statistical Method 
Mainly Objective 
Event Probability 
No 
Event Description 
Related Information? 
Extrapolation 
Method 
Partially Subjective 
Event Probability 
No 
Figure 3.1 Event probability determination 
3.3.2 Event Consequences 
Expert Judgement 
Method 
Mainly Subjective 
Event Probability 
The possible consequences of a system failure event can be quantified in terms of the 
possible loss of lives and property damage, and the degradation of the environment 
caused by the occurrence of the failure event [Smith D.1., 1985; Smith DJ., 1992]. 
Experts of the particular operating situation normally quantify these elements in 
monetary terms. Quantifying human life in monetary terms could be difficult as it 
involves several moral issues that are constantly debated. Hence, it is nOl1l1ally 
expressed in terms of the number of fatalities [Henley E.1. and Kumamoto H., 1992]. 
The process of risk assessment is initially performed qualitatively and later extended 
quantitatively to include data when it becomes available. The interactions and outcomes 
of both these methods are seen in figure 3.2. Using the quanti fied method, risk 
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evaluation can be carried out to determine the major risk contributors and the anah sis 
can be attenuated to include cost benefit assessment of the risk control options. 
Hazard 
identification 
Qualitative techniques Quantitative techniques 
Frequency :Assessment 
~ Model .. Estimate .. I-
causes likelihood 
I-- ~ 
~ Model .. Estimate ~ I-effects impacts 
Consequence :Assessment 
Qualitative ranking 
of recollllllenc/mions 
Quantified benefits and 
costs of risk reduction 
alternatit'es 
Risk 
evaluation 
Figure 3.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis 
3.4 Cause and Effect Relationship 
~ 
• Absolute and 
rdati \\.~ risks 
• Major risk 
contributors 
• Comparisons 
with other 
risks 
As discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3, safety analysis techniques can be initially 
categorised either as qualitative or quantitative methods. However, the way each 
analysis explores the relationship between causes and effects can be categorised further 
into four different categories, namely, 
1. Deductive techniques. 
2. Inductive techniques. 
3. Exploratory techniques. 
4. Descriptive techniques. 
Deductive techniques start from known effects to seek unknown causes, \vhereas 
inductive techniques start from known causes to forecast unknown effects. Exploratory 
techniques establish a link between unknown causes to unknown effects and descripti \c 
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techniques link known causes to known effects. These four ways to investigate the 
relationship between cause and effects are illustrated by means of a table as seen III 
table 3.4. 
Effects 
Known Unknown 
~ Known Descriptive techniques Inductive techniques 
~ 
::: 
a Unknown Deductive techniques Exploratory techniques 
Table 3.4 Ways to investigate cause-effect relationship 
3.5 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was introduced in 1966 after the Department of 
Defence of the United States of America requested safety studies to be performed at all 
stages of product development. The Department of Defence issued guidelines that came 
into force in 1969 [MIL-STD-882, 1969; MIL-STD-882D, 1999]. 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis is performed to identify areas of the system, which will 
have an effect on safety by evaluating the major hazards associated with the system. It 
provides an initial assessment of the identified hazards. PHA typically involves: 
1) Determining hazards that might exist and possible effects. 
2) Determine a clear set of guidelines and objectives to be used during a design. 
3) Create plans to deal with critical hazards. 
4) Assigning responsibility for hazard control (management and technical). 
5) Allocate time and resources to deal with hazards. 
Brainstorming techniques are used during which the design or operation of the system is 
discussed on the basis of the experience of the people involved in the brainstorming 
activity. Checklists are commonly used to assist in identifying hazards. 
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The results of the PHA are often presented in tabular form, \vhich would typicall) 
include information such as but not limited to [Henley EJ. and Kumamoto H .. 1992; 
Smith DJ., 1992; Villemuer A., 1992]: 
(a) A brief description of the system and its domain. 
(b) A brief description of any sub-systems identified at this phase and the boundaries 
between them. 
(c) A list of identified hazards applicable to the system. including a description and 
unique reference. 
(d) A list of identified accidents applicable to the system including a description. a 
unique reference and a description of the associated hazards and accident sequences. 
(e) The accident risk classification. 
(f) Preliminary probability targets for each accident. 
(g) Preliminary predicted probabilities for each accident sequence. 
(h) Preliminary probability targets for each hazard. 
(i) A description of the system functions and safety features. 
U) A description of human error which could create or contribute to accidents. 
The advantages of using the PHA method include: 
• It identifies the potential for major hazards at a very early stage of project 
development. 
• It provides basis for design and siting decisions. 
• It helps to ensure plant to plant and plant to environment compatibility. 
• It facilitates a full hazard analysis later. 
The disadvantage of PHA is that it is not comprehensive and must be followed by a full 
HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study. 
3.5.1 Subsystem Ha~(/rd Analysis/System Ha~ard Analysis 
Subsystem Hazard Analysis (SSHA) or System Hazard Analysis (SHA) are analyses 
requiring detailed studies of hazards, identified in the PHA, at the subsystem and system 
levels, including the interface between subsystems and the environment, or by the 
system operating as a whole. Results of this analysis include design recommendations. 
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changes or controls when required, and evaluation of design compliance to contracted 
requirements. Often subsystem and system hazards are easily recognised and remedied 
by design and procedural measures or controls. These hazards are often handled by 
updating and expanding the PHA, with timing of the SSHAISHA normally determined 
by the availability of subsystem and system design data (usually begins after the 
preliminary design review and completed before the critical design review). 
3.5.2 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis 
Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA) is an analysis performed to identify 
those operating functions that may be inherently dangerous to test, maintenance, 
handling, transportation or operating personnel or In which human error could be 
hazardous to equipment or people. The information for this analysis is normally 
obtained from the PHA. The OSHA should be performed at the point in system 
development when sufficient data is available, after procedures have been developed. It 
documents and evaluates hazards resulting from the implementation of operations 
performed by personnel. It also considers: 
• The planned system configuration at each phase of activity. 
• The facility interfaces. 
• The planned environments. 
• The support tools or other equipment specified for use. 
• The operation or task sequence. 
• Concurrent task effects and limitations. 
• Regulatory or contractually specified personnel safety and health requirements. 
• The potential for unplanned events including hazards introduced by human error. 
OSHA identifies the safety requirements (or alternatives) needed to eliminate identified 
hazards or to reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level. 
3.6 What-If Analysis 
What-If analysis uses a creative team brainstorming "what if" questioning approach to 
the examination of a process to identify potential hazards and their consequences. 
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Hazards are identified, existing safeguards noted, and qualitative severity and likelihood 
ratings are assigned to aid in risk management decision making. Questions that begin 
with "what-if" are formulated by engineering personnel experienced in the process or 
operation preferably in advance. 
There are several advantages and disadvantages to using the What-If technique. The 
advantages include: 
• Team of relevant experts extends knowledge and creativity pool. 
• Easy to use. 
• Ability to focus on specific element (i.e. human error or environmental issues). 
The disadvantages include: 
• Quality is dependent on knowledge, thoroughness and experience of team. 
• Loose structure that can let hazards slip through. 
• Does not directly address operability problems. 
3.7 Hazard and Operability Studies 
A HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study is an inductive technique, which is an 
extended Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Assessment (FMECA). The HAZOP 
process is based on the principle that a team-approach to hazard analysis will identify 
more problems than when, individuals working separately combine results. 
The HAZOP team is made up of individuals with varying backgrounds and expertise. 
The expertise is brought together during HAZOP sessions and through a collective 
brainstorming effort that stimulates creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of the 
process under consideration is made. In short it can be applied by a multidisciplinary 
team using a checklist to stimulate systematic thinking for identifying potential hazards 
and operability problems, particularly in the process industries [Bendixen L.M. et. aI., 
1984]. 
The HAZOP team focuses on specific portions of the process called "nodes". A process 
parameter (e.g. flow) is identified and an intention is created for the node under 
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consideration. Then a series of guidewords is combined with the parameter "flow" to 
create a deviation. For example, the guideword "no" is combined with the parameter 
"flow" to give the deviation "no flow". The team then focuses on listing all the credible 
causes of a "no flow" deviation beginning with the cause that can result in the worst 
possible consequence the team can think of at the time. Once the causes are recorded, 
the team lists the consequences, safeguards and any recommendations deemed 
appropriate. The process is repeated for the next deviation and so on until completion of 
the node. The team moves on to the next node and repeats the process. 
3.7.1 Guidewords, selection of parameters and deviations 
The HAZOP process creates deviations from the process design intent by combining 
guidewords (no, more, less, etc.) with process parameters resulting In a possible 
deviation from the design intent. It should be pointed out that not all 
guideword/parameter combinations would be meaningful. A sample list of guidewords 
is given below: 
• No 
• More 
• Less 
• As Well As 
• Reverse 
• Other Than 
The application of parameters will depend on the type of process being considered, the 
equipment in the process and the process intent. The most common specific parameters 
that should be considered are flow, temperature, pressure, and where appropriate, level. 
In almost all instances, these parameters should be evaluated for every node. The scribe 
shall document, without exception, the teams' comments concerning these parameters. 
Additionally, the node should be screened for application of the remaining specific 
parameters and for the list of applicable general parameters. These should be recorded 
only if there is a hazard or operability problem associated with the parameter. A sample 
set of parameters includes the following: 
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• Flow 
• Temperature 
• Pressure 
• Composition 
• Phase 
• Level 
• Relief 
• Instrumentation 
3.7.2 HAZOP process 
A HAZOP study can be broken down into the following steps [McKelvey T.C., 1988]: 
1. Define the scope of the study. 
2. Select the correct analysis team. 
3. Gather the information necessary to conduct a thorough and detailed study. 
4. Review the normal functioning of the process. 
5. Subdivide the process into logical, manageable sub-units for efficient study and 
confirm that the scope of the study has been correctly set. 
6. Conduct a systematic review according to the established rules for the procedure 
being used and ensure that the study is within the special scope. 
7. Document the review proceedings. 
8. Follow up to ensure that all recommendations from the study are adequately 
addressed. 
The detailed description of the methodology can be found in [Wells G.L.. 1980: 
Bendixen L.M. et. aI., 1984; McKelvey T.C., 1988; Kletz T.A., 1992]. 
3.7.3 HAZOP application to fishing vessels 
To apply the HAZOP process for the study of a fishing vessel system, the conventional 
method given in section 3.7.2 is modified and can be summarised as follows: 
1. Define the system scope and team selection 
• Firstly define the scope of the study and then accordingly select the appropriate 
team to be involved in the study 
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2. Describe the system 
• Describe the system in some detail. This description should clarify the intention 
of the system as a whole from an operational viewpoint. 
• The information generated here will help the analyst understand the system and 
its criticality to the safe operation of the vessel. The data will later prove to be 
useful when used to determine the consequences of component failure in step 5 
of the approach. 
3. Break it down into smaller operations for consideration and identify each 
component within the considered system. 
• Having attained the overall picture, break it down into its sub-
operations/routines. It is difficult to see all the problems in a complex process 
but when each individual process is analysed on its own, the chances are that 
little will be missed out. Ideally, each operation should be singled out, but it is 
frequently more convenient to consider more than one operation at a time due to 
its inter-relationship and dependency. 
• The identification of each component can be achieved by first looking at 
historical failure data that is available and then complementing it with 
components identified from equipment drawings. Component failure data can be 
obtained from logbooks, docking reports, Chief engineers' reports and 
maintenance reports. 
4. Determine design intention for each component that is identified. 
• At this stage, the purpose or intention of each component is ascertained. This 
helps to determine the functional purpose of the specific operation and shows 
how it relates/interacts to achieve the process intentions. 
5. Apply a series of guidewords to see how that intention may be frustrated. 
• This is the heart of HAZOP. Having decided the intention of a process. this stage 
analyses the ways in which it can go wrong. 
• Examples of guide words are as illustrated in table 3.5. 
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6. For meaningful deviations from the intention, look for possible causes and likely 
consequences. 
• At this stage, the root of the problem is identified and the possible consequences 
are predicted and complemented with any historical data available. The 
consequences are considered for four major categories i.e. personnel. 
environment, equipment and operation. At this point, it is determined how the 
failure of a component will affect the safety and integrity of these four 
categories. 
7. Consider possible action to remove the cause or reduce the consequences. 
• A HAZOP team usually provides ideas to remove a cause or deal with a 
consequence. This could be suggestion of improvements in design, operational 
procedure, maintenance periods and redundancy arrangements. It would be very 
unusual for every single one of these actions to be put into practice, but at least a 
rational choice could be made. 
8. Reiteration 
• Consider how the improvements will affect the operation of the system and re-
evaluate what can go wrong (with the improvements incorporated). 
Guide words 
No 
Less 
More 
Opposite 
Also 
Other 
Early 
Late 
Part of 
Examples 
No flow, no signal 
Less flow, less cooling 
Excess temperature, excess pressure 
Cooling instead of heating 
Water as well as lubricating oil 
Heating instead of pumping 
Opening the drain valve too soon 
Opening the drain valve too late 
Incomplete drainage 
Table 3.5 Example of guidewords 
These steps can be illustrated in the tlowchart in figure 3.3. There are sc\'cral 
advantagcs of using HAZOP to assess the safety of fishing \'essels. These include: 
I 
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• It is the most systematic and comprehensive PHA methodology. 
• It provides greatest safety assurance. 
• It can be used in conjunction with Human Error Analysis (HEA). 
• It is the only PHA to address both safety/operability problems and environmental 
hazards. 
The HAZOP process can be time consuming and costly if it is not well prepared in 
advance and can be tedious if it is not well facilitated. A comprehensive HAZOP study 
will require many experts and a considerable duration. As such the demonstration of its 
application has not been carried out in this project. 
Define scope and team selection I 
IXscribe System function(s) 
Equiptrent/components identified from 
.. 
11r 
histOlical failure data 
Breakdown 
(equipment/component) 
... Other equiptrent/components identified 
--.. 
from drawings 
I 
+ 
IXtermine design intention I·· .. ··· .. · .. ······ .. · .. ··· .. ·· .. ··· .. · .. ······················ ........... i 
• ..J Apply guide words L ...... , f"" 
~ 
.J IXtermine possible cause and likely consequences ... , 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
1 
Personnel I 1 Operation I Equiptrent I r Environtrent 
[l [l [l [l 
Possible action to remove the cause or reduce the consequences 
Figure 3.3 Flowchart of HAZOP process applied to fishing vessels 
c 
o 
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3.8 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a formal deductive procedure for determinin~ 
'-
combinations of component failures and human errors that could result in the 
occurrence of specified undesired events at the system level [Ang A.H.S. and Tang 
W.H., 1984]. It is a diagrammatic method used to evaluate the probability of an accident 
resulting from sequences and combinations of faults and failure events. This method can 
be used to analyse the vast majority of industrial system reliability problems. FT A is 
based on the idea that: 
• A failure in a system can trigger other consequent failures. 
• A problem might be traced backwards to its root causes. 
The identified failures can be arranged in a tree structure In such a way that their 
relationships can be characterised and evaluated. 
3.B.1 Benefits to be gainedfrom FTA 
There are several benefits of employing FTA for use as a safety assessment tool, such 
as: 
• The Fault Tree (FT) construction focuses the attention of the analyst on one 
particular undesired system failure mode, which is usually identified as the most 
critical with respect to the desired function [Andrews J.D. and Moss T.R., 1993]. 
• The FT diagram can be used to help communicate the results of the analysis to 
peers, supervisors and subordinates. It is particularly useful in multi-disciplinary 
teams with the numerical performance measures. 
• Qualitative analysis often reveals the most important system features. 
• Using component failure data, the FT can be quantified. 
• The qualitative and quantitative results together provide the decision-makers with an 
objective means of measuring the adequacy of the system design, 
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A FT describes an accident model, which interprets the relation between malfunction of 
components and observed symptoms. Thus the FT is useful for understanding logically 
the mode of occurrence of an accident. Furthermore, given the failure probabilities of 
system component, the probability of a top event occurring can be calculated. A FT A 
consists of the following: 
• System description. 
• Fault tree construction. 
• Qualitative analysis. 
• Quantitative analysis. 
These steps are illustrated in figure 3.4. 
I System Definition 
,Ir 
~ FT construction ... Qualitative I .... evaluation 
Quantitative 
... evaluation ~ .... 
Figure 3.4 FT A method 
3.8.2 System definition 
FTA begins with the statement of an undesired event, e.g. failed state of a system. To 
perform a meaningful analysis, the following three basic types of system information 
are usually needed: 
I. Component operating and failure modes: A description of how the output states of 
each component are influenced by the input states and internal operational modes of 
the component. 
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2. System chart: A description of how the components are interconnected. A functional 
layout diagram of the system must show all functional interconnections and identifv 
each component. 
3. System boundary conditions: These define the situation for which the fault tree is to 
be drawn. 
3.8.3 Fault Tree construction. 
FT construction, which is the first step for a failure analysis of a technical system. is 
generally a complicated and time-consuming task. A FT is a logical diagram 
constructed by deductively developing a specific system failure, through branching 
intermediate fault events until a primary event is reached. Two categories of graphic 
symbols are used in a FT construction, logic symbols and event symbols. 
The logic symbols or logic gates are necessary to interconnect the events. The most 
frequently used logic gates in the fault tree are the AND and OR gates. The AND gate 
produces an output if all input events occur simultaneously. The OR gate yields output 
events if one or more of the input events are present. 
The event symbols are rectangle, circle, diamond and triangle. The rectangle represents 
a fault output event, which results from combination of basic faults, and/or intermediate 
events acting through the logic gates. The circle is used to designate a primary or basic 
fault event. The diamond describes fault inputs that are not a basic event but considered 
as a basic fault input since the cause of the fault has not been further developed due to 
lack of information. The triangle is not strictly an event symbol but traditionally 
classified as such to indicate a transfer from one part of a FT to another. Figure 3.5 
gives an example of a fault tree identifying the basic, intermediate and top event of a 
failure. 
To complete the construction of a fault tree for a complicated system. it is necessary 
first to understand how the system works. This can be achieved by studying the blue 
prints of the system (which will reflect the interconnections of components within the 
system). In practice, all basic events are taken to be statistically independent unless they 
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are common cause failures. Construction of a FT is very susceptible to the subjecti\'ity 
of the analyst. Some analyst may perceive the logical relationships between the top 
event and the basic events of a system differently. Therefore, once the construction of 
the tree has been completed, it should be reviewed for accuracy, completeness and 
Top Event 
AND 
Intermediate 
Event 
checked for omission and oversight. This validation process is essential to produce a 
more useful FT by which system weakness and strength can be identified. 
Figure 3.5 Fault tree example 
3.8.4 Qualitative fault tree evaluation 
Qualitative FTA consists of determining the minimal cut sets and common cause 
failures. The qualitative analysis reduces the FT to a logically equivalent form. by using 
Boolean algebra, in terms of the specific combination of basic events sufficient for the 
undesired top event to occur [Henley E.J. and Kumamoto H .. 1992]. In this case each 
combination would be a critical set for the undesired event. The relevance of these sets 
must be carefully weighted and major emphasis placed on those of greatest significance. 
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3.8.5 Quantitative fault tree evaluation 
In the event that the FT for a top event, T, contains independent basic events, which 
appear only once in the tree structure, then the top event probability can be obtained by 
working the basic event probabilities up through the tree. In doing so, the intermediate 
gate event probabilities are calculated starting at the base of the tree and working 
upwards until the top event probability is obtained. 
When trees with repeated events are to be analysed, this method is not appropriate since 
intermediate gate events will no longer occur independently. If this method is used, it is 
entirely dependent upon the tree structure whether an overestimate or an underestimate 
of the top event probability is obtained. Hence, it is better to use the minimal cut-set 
method. 
FT A may be carried out in the hazard identification and risk estimation phases of the 
safety assessment of fishing vessels to identify the minimal cut sets associated with 
serious system top events and to assess the probability of occurrence of each top event. 
However, due to the nature of the data available, the conventional FT A method may not 
be well suited for such an application. As such, a new modified method incorporating 
FTA and Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) will be presented and discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
3.9 Event Tree Analysis 
In the case of standby systems and in particular, safety and mission-oriented systems, 
the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is used to identify the various possible outcomes of the 
system following a given initiating event which is generally an unsatisfactory operating 
event or situation. In the case of continuously operated systems, these events can occur 
(i.e. components can fail) in any arbitrary order. In the ETA, the components can be 
considered in any order since they do not operate chronologically with respect to each 
other. ETA provides a systematic and logical approach to identify consequences and to 
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assess the probability of occurrence of each possib~e resulting sequence caused by the 
initiating failure event [Henley E.1. and Kumamoto H., 1992: Villemuer A., 1992J. 
3.9. J Event tree example 
A simple example of an event tree is shown in figure 3.6. This event tree is constructed 
to analyse the possible outcomes of a system fire. The system has two components 
designed to handle this event: a sprinkler system and an automated call to the fire 
department. If the fire department is not notified, the fire will be mostly contained by 
the sprinkler system. If the sprinkler system fails as well, the system will be destroyed. 
ETA has proved to be a useful tool for major accident risk assessments and was used by 
the UK Health and Safety Executive for the assessment of risks to the public from 
serious accidents at installations in the Canvey Island area of Essex [Institution of 
Electrical Engineers (lEE), 1999]. Such an analysis can be effectively integrated into the 
hazard identification and estimation phases of a safety assessment programme. 
However, an event tree grows in width exponentially and as a result it can only be 
applied effectively to small sets of components. 
Sprinkler system Call to fire dept. Outcome Consequence 
Success OK 1 
Failure Partial damage 2 
Fire 
Success Partial damage 2 
Failure System destroyed 3 
Figure 3.6 Example of an event tree 
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3.10 Markov Chains 
Markov methods are useful for evaluating components with multiple states. for example 
normal, degraded and critical states [Norris J.R., 1998]. Consider the system in figure 
3.7 with three possible states, 0,1 and 2 with failure rate, A and repair rate. Il. In the 
Markovian model, each transition between states is characterised by a transition rate, 
which could be expressed as the failure rate, repair rate, etc. If it is defined that: 
Pi (t) = probability that the system is in state i at time t. 
pij (t) = the transition rate from state i to state j. 
and if it is assumed that Pi (t) is differentiable, it can be shown that: 
If a differential equation is written for each state and the resulting set of differential 
equation is solved, the time dependent probability of the system being in each state is 
obtained [Modarres M., 1993]. Markov chains are mainly a quantitative technique, 
however, using the state and transition diagrams, qualitative information about the 
system can be gathered. 
State 2 State 1 State 0 
JlI-2 ~ 0-1 
Figure 3.7 Markovian model for a system with three states 
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3.11 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
The process of conducting a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) can be 
examined in two levels of detail. FMEA is the first level of analysis, which consists of 
the identification of potential failures and the effects on systems performance by 
identifying the potential severity of the effect. The second level of analysis is the Failure 
Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) consisting of additional steps for 
calculating the risk of each failure through measurements of the severity and probability 
of a failure effect. Both of these methods are intended to provide information for 
making risk management decisions. 
FMEA is an inductive process that examines the effect of a single point failure on the 
overall performance of a system through a "bottom-up approach" [Andrews 1. and Moss 
T., 1993]. This analysis should be performed iteratively in all stages of design and 
operation of a system. 
The first step in performing a FMEA is to organise as much information as possible 
about the system concept, design, and operational requirements. By organising the 
system model, a rationale, repeatable, and systematic means to analyse the system can 
be achieved. One method of system modelling is the system breakdown structure model 
- a top down division of a system (e.g. ship, submarine, propulsion control) into 
functions, subsystems, and components. Block diagrams and fault-tree diagrams provide 
additional modelling techniques for describing the component/function relationships. 
The failure mode is the manner that a failure is observed in a function, subsystem, or 
component [Henley E.1. and Kumamoto H., 1992; Villemuer A., 1992]. Failure modes 
of concern depend on the specific system, component, and operating environment. The 
past history of a component/system is used in addition to understanding the functional 
requirements to determine relevant failure modes. For example, several common failure 
modes include complete loss of function, uncontrolled output, and prematurellate 
operation [International Maritime Organisation, 1995]. 
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The cause of a failure mode is the physical or chemical processes, design defech. 
quality defects, part misapplication, or other methods, which are the reasons for failure 
[Military Standards, 1980]. It is important to note that more than one failure calise is 
possible for a failure mode; all potential causes of failure modes should be identified 
, 
including human error. 
The failure effect is the severity of the consequence of the failure mode. The effect 
should consider conditions that influence the system performance goals of management; 
for regulation, the aspect of safety is most important. The effects are generally classified 
into three levels of propagation: local, next higher level, and end effect. The effects 
should be examined at different system levels in order to determine possible corrective 
measures for the failure [Military Standards, 1980]. The consequences of the failure 
mode can be identified by a severity index indicating the relative importance of the 
effect due to a failure mode. Some common severity classifications include 1-
catastrophic, II- critical, ill- major, IV-minor [International Maritime Organisation, 
1995]. 
Part of the risk management portion of the FMEA is the determination of failure 
detection sensing methods and possible corrective actions [Modarres M., 1993]. There 
are many possible sensing device alternatives such as alarms, gauges, and inspections. 
An attempt should be made to correct a failure or provide a backup system (redundancy) 
to reduce the effects propagation to rest of system. If this is not possible, procedures 
should be developed for reducing the effect of the failure mode through operator 
actions, maintenance, and/or inspection. 
FMEAlFMECA is an effective approach for risk analysis addressing risk assessment, 
risk management, and risk communication concerns. This analysis provides information 
that can be used in risk management decisions for system safety. FMEA has been used 
successfully within many different industries and has recently been applied in maritime 
regulations to address safety concerns with relatively new designs. While 
FMEAlFMECA is a useful tool for risk management, it also has qualities that limit its 
application as a complete system safety approach. This technique provides risk analysis 
for comparison of single component failures only; a\'oiding such concerns as common 
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cause failures. Other techniques for providing risk analysis should be considered for 
their application to specific system safety determinations. The specific advantages and 
disadvantages of FMEA will be critically evaluated in chapter 6 and this is followed by 
a proposed modified FMEA with application for fishing vessels using fuzzy rules and 
grey relation theory. 
3.12 Other Analysis Methods 
Apart from the methods described above, several other methods have gained popularity 
in the industry. Many of these methods have been developed to a very advanced stage 
and have been integrated with other analysis tools to enhance its applicability. 
3.12.1 Diagraph-based Analysis (DA) 
Diagraph-based Analysis (DA) is a bottom up, event-based, qualitative technique. It is 
commonly used in the process industry, because relatively little information is needed to 
set up the diagraph [Kramer M.A. and Palowitch B.L., 1987]. In a DA, the nodes 
correspond to the state variables, alarm conditions or failure origins and the edges 
represent the casual influences between the nodes. From the constructed diagraph, the 
causes of a state change and the manner of the associated propagation can be found out 
[Umeda T. et. aI., 1980]. Diagraph representation provides explicit casual relationships 
among variable and events of system with feedback loops. The DA method is effective 
when used together with HAZOP [Vaidhyanathan R. and Venkatasubramanian V., 
1996] 
3.12.2 Decision table method 
Decision table analysis uses a logical approach that reduces the possibility of omission. 
which could easily occur in a fault tree construction. [Dixon P., 1964]. A decision table 
can be regarded as a Boolean representation model, where an engineering system is 
described in terms of components and their interactions. Given sufficient information 
about the system to be analysed, this approach can allow rapid and systematic 
construction of the Boolean representation models. The final system Boolean 
representation table contains all the possible system top events and the associated cut 
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sets. This method is extremely useful for analysing systems with a comparatively high 
degree of innovation since their associated top events are usually difficult to obtain by 
experience, from previous accidents and incident reports of similar products. or bv other 
means. A more detailed discussion on the use of this method for safety assessment can 
be found in [Wang J., 1994]. 
3.12.3 Limit state analvsis 
Limit state analysis is readily applicable to failure conditions, which result when the 
demand imposed on the component, or system exceeds it capability. The probability of 
failure is the probability the limit state functions are violated. These probabilities are 
estimated by the statistical analysis of the uncertainty or variability associated with the 
functions variables. In most cases, the analytical solution of the probability of failure is 
very difficult and sometimes almost practically impossible. However, by incorporating 
the Monte Carlo Simulation method, this setback can be addressed. This method is 
normally used in structural reliability predictions and represents only half of a safety 
assessment (as it does not consider the severity of the failure) [Bangash Y., 1983; 
Damkilde L. and Krenk S., 1997]. 
3.13 Conclusion 
In this chapter, typical safety analysis methods are outlined in terms of their 
requirements, advantages and limitations. Some of these techniques have been 
successfully used in the industry and still continue to be used. However. the application 
of these conventional techniques to fishing vessel safety assessment may not be as 
straightforward as it may seem. Certain modifications are needed to enhance the 
application of such methods to fishing vessels. These modifications include the ability 
of the analysis methods to handle data that is associated with a high degree of 
uncertainty and the integration of expert opinion in a formal manner, where there is no 
bias of opinion. 
The conventional methods can be used together within the framework of a Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) process. The FSA process will be described and discLlssed in 
chapter 4. detailing how the analysis methods identified here can be used effectively 
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together with some of the novel techniques developed in the following chapters of this 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
Summary 
This chapter discusses the inception of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), starting from 
the disaster caused by the Piper Alpha incident in 1988 and the consequent unfolding 
events, which led to the proposal by the Marine Coastguard Agency (MCA) to the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Applications of FSA by the IMO for 
different systems are listed and referred to. An application of the FSA is proposed and 
demonstrated for a generic fishing vessel. 
4.1 Introduction 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a new approach to marine safety which involves 
using the techniques of risk and cost-benefit assessment to assist in the decision making 
process. Upon carrying out the initial research on FSA, the history of its development 
and application was learnt and is explained here. 
4. J. J Cullen report 
An explosion and subsequent fire on the Piper Alpha offshore installation led to the loss 
of 167 lives on the 6th of July 1988 [Department of Energy, 1990]. As a result of this. a 
public inquiry was established to discover the circumstances of the accident and its 
causes. The produced report (Cullen report) suggests that a safety case approach is 
required for the design of offshore installations. 
A safety case covers all aspects of the safety of the plant or process in question. and 
determines how the risks involved are to be minimised. It should include sufficient data 
to demonstrate that: 
• Hazards with the potential to cause major accidents haH' been identified. 
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• Risks have been evaluated and measures have been taken to reduce them to a As 
Low As Reasonably Possible level (ALARP) [HSE, 1992]. 
A safety case should be prepared demonstrating safety by design, describing operational 
requirements, providing for continuing safety assurance by means of regular review, 
and setting out the arrangements for emergency response. It should also include 
identification of a representative sample of major accident scenarios and assessments of 
the consequences of each scenario together with an assessment in general terms of the 
likelihood of it happening. The report suggests that innovative safety analysis methods 
and cost-benefit analysis may be beneficially used for the prediction and control of 
safety. 
The reports recommends Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) to be used in the process of 
hazard identification and risk assessment in preparing a safety case. QRA can help to 
provide a structured objective approach to the assessment of risks, provided that it relies 
on and is supplemented by good engineering judgement and the limitation of the data 
used is roughly understood. The significant pathway leading to serious failure 
conditions can be systematically identified using QRA and hence all reasonably 
practicable steps can be taken to reduce them. 
4.1.2 Development of FSA 
Following the Cullen report and the recommendation of a safety case approach by the 
House of Lords Select Committee [House of Lords, 1992], it implied that the safety case 
approach should be considered in the long term for application to every ship trading 
commercially. The report envisaged that safety cases would require operators to 
demonstrate achievement of primary safety goals, including structural standards, 
operational competence and safety management for every type of ship operation. 
However, the impracticability of this in the international context of the shipping 
industry was recognised. In response to the Select Committees' report, the UK 
govemment published a report in December 1992. which reflected the above concern 
regarding the transferability of the safety case concept from the offshore industry to the 
shipping industry. Taking into account the increase in public concern regarding safety at 
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sea and pollution prevention, the UK realised that the time was right for exploration of 
the safety case principles to be applied for shipping. Recognising the need for a change 
in the shipping regulatory framework, and in response to Lord Carvers' Report I . the UK 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) quickly responded and in 199.3. proposed to 
the International Maritime Organisation (IM:O) FSA be applied to ships. This is to 
ensure a strategic oversight of safety and pollution prevention. The UK MeA also 
proposed that the IMO should explore the concept of FSA, and introduce it in relation to 
ship design and operation. This proposal was submitted to the 62nd session of the 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) held from 24-28 May 1993 [Marine Safety Agency, 
1993]. Since the approval of this proposal, the work for preparation of the FSA 
methodology and the guidelines for the application of FSA to the IM:O rule making 
process have been mainly conducted by the inter-session correspondence group under 
the leadership of the United Kingdom. 
Over the years, several applications of FSA have been attempted by the IMO on various 
vessels and systems. These include the application to the transportation of dangerous 
goods on passenger/ro-ro cargo vessels [IMO, 1998a], the effects of introducing 
Helicopter Landing Areas (HLA) on cruise ships [IMO 1998b], high speed catamaran 
passenger vessels [MSC, 1997a; MSC 1997b], novel emergency propulsion and steering 
devices for oil tankers [IMO, 1998d] and the trial application is on a bulk carrier [IMO 
1998c, MSC, 1998b]. 
4.2 FSA 
FSA is a new approach to the regulation of shipping safety. It has as its objective the 
development of a framework of safety requirements for shipping in which risks are 
addressed in a comprehensive and cost effective manner. The adoption of FSA for 
shipping represents a fundamental cultural change, from a largely reactive approach, to 
one, which is integrated, proactive and soundly based upon the evaluation of risk. 
An FSA framework consists of the following steps: 
I The report for the inn:stigation carried out into the capsilc of the Herald of Free Enterprise. \\hich \\as 
puhlished in 1992. 
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1) The identification of hazards (Step 1 Hazards). 
2) The assessments of risk associated with those hazards (Step 2 Risks). 
3) Ways of managing the risks associated with the hazards identified (Step J Control 
options). 
4) Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA) of the options (Step 4 CBA). 
5) Decisions on which options to select (Step 5 Decisions). 
The interaction between the five steps can be illustrated in a process flowchart as shown 
in figure 4.1. As it can be seen, there are repeated iteration between the steps, which 
makes it effective as it constantly checks itself for changes within the analysis. The 
framework was initially studied at the IMO MSC in May 1993. Since then, several 
MSC meetings have been subsequently held to deal with FSA in more detail. 
Step 1 
Hazards 
... 
-po 
Step 2 
Risks 
r ,~ ~Step 3i 
I·········································~ contro:~Ptions 
.. 
.... 
Step 5 
Decisions 
ls~:~. 
Figure 4.1. Flowchart of FSA process 
Each step within the FSA can be further broken down into individual tasks and is 
represented in figure 4.2. The execution and documentation of each task is vital, as it 
will enable the preceding tasks/steps to be carried out with ease. In order for the 
assessment to be accurate, the analyst must understand and appreciate the objectives of 
each step and execute them without any "short-cuts". 
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Step I I Cause and consequence identification I 
.. 
1 Hazard screening/ranking I 1 
........................................................................ ~ .......................................................................................................................... 
.......... 
I Structure risk contribution tree 
r Quantify 
Quantify Update ~ influencing 
Risk Contribution Tree factors 
Step 2 ~ 
Calculate Update Structure 
influencing 
FN curves factors 
i 
Obtain PLL Update Review risk 
Distribute through risk contribution tree control 
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I Focus on high risk components I 
.. 
Step 3 ~ Identify risk control options I .. J .. 
................................................................ .., ,. ...................................................................... ............... ................. ........ .... ........ . ......... 
I Assess cost and benefits I ..... I'"'" 
Step 4 ~ 
Compare cost and benefits and evaluate sensitivity I 
..................................................................... ~ .............................................................................. ............................... ............ ..... . 
I I 
.. 
Evaluate options I .. 
.. 
I Review stakeholders interests I 
Step 5 .. 
I Produce stakeholders balance I ..... I .... 
.. 
I Address any imbalance 
1 
1 
.. 
I Decide risk control option I·········· .. · .. ···~ Ongoing review I·· .. ·· ...... ···· 
Figure 4.2 Detailed breakdown of FSA process 
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Depending on the requirement of the safety analysts and the safety data available. either 
a qualitative or a quantitative safety analysis can be carried out to study the risks of a 
system in terms of the probability of occurrence of each hazard and possible 
consequences. Qualitative safety analysis is used to locate possible hazards and to 
identify proper precautions (design changes, administrative policies, maintenance 
strategies, operational procedures, etc.) that will reduce the frequencies or consequences 
of such hazards. 
4.2.1 Step I-Hazard identification 
Various safety analysis methods may be used individually or in a combination to carry 
out Step 1 of the FSA approach. Such typical methods include: Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Cause-
Consequence Analysis (CCA), Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP), Boolean Representation 
Method (BRM) and Simulation analysis [Henley E.J. and Kumamoto H., 1996; Smith 
D.l., 1992; Villemeur A., 1992]. The use of these methods as safety analysis techniques 
has been reviewed in chapter 3. 
In the hazard identification phase, the combined experience and insight of engineers is 
required to systematically identify all potential failure events at each required indenture 
level with a view to assessing their influences on system safety and performance. This is 
achieved using "brainstorming" techniques. The hazard identification phase can be 
further broken down into several steps as seen here. 
Problem definition - Define the bounds of study, generic vessel and generic stakeholder 
for the vessel. 
Problem identification - The problem boundaries of a FSA study can be developed in 
the following manner: range of vessel types, geographic boundaries, risks to he 
considered, vessel systems, relevant regulations and measures of risk. In addition. the 
following factors, specifically related to the vessel is defined: the generic vessel, vessel 
accident category. vessel stakeholders and vessel operational stages. 
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Hazard identification - The HAZard IDentification (HAZID) consists of determining 
which hazards affect the vessels' activities under consideration using "brainstorming" 
techniques. At the HAZID session the following information is gathered: operational 
stage, vessel system, hazards, causes and consequences. 
Structuring HAZID output - The approach to structuring the HAZID output is to convert 
the information gathered at the HAZID meeting into hazard worksheets which records 
the causes, accident sub-categories, consequences and the source of information. These 
hazard worksheets provide a means for recording the output from the HAZID meeting 
and other hazards identified during the analysis period, e.g. from incident database or 
interviews with the vessel personnel. 
Risk exposure groups - The next step is to group the causes into risk exposure groups. 
This is achieved by using the guidewords taken from the risk exposure source given in 
MSC 68/14 [IMO MSC, 1993]. The groups are then further sub-divided, during the 
hazard-structuring phase into risk exposure sub-groups. An example of this can be 
found in [MSC, 1997b]. In order to sort the large amount of information collected at the 
HAZID meeting, accident sub-categories are established for each accident category and 
all the identified consequences are grouped according to contributing factors. 
Hazard screening - The purpose of hazard screening during Step 1 is to provide a quick 
and simple way of ranking hazards. It is a process for establishing, in broad terms, the 
risks of all identified accident categories and accident sub-categories, prior to the more 
detailed methods of quantification, which will be used in Step 2. Risk is a combination 
of the frequency of occurrence of an accident type with the severity of its consequences. 
The generic unit of the consequence is loss, which may be loss of lives, environmental 
pollution or damage to ship/cargo or financial loss. Accordingly, risk can also be read as 
the estimated loss in a given period of time. Two approaches can be used for the 
assignment of screening risk level in order to check the robustness of the resulting 
hazard rankings and to assist in the resolution of the rankings in cases where sc\'eral 
hazards have similar ranking levels. These approaches are: 
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• Risk matrix approach [Loughran C.G. et. aI., 1999]. 
• Cumulative loss approach [MSC, 1997a]. 
4.2.2 Step 2-Risk estimation 
Information produced from the hazard identification phase will be processed to estimate 
risk. In the risk estimation phase, the likelihood and possible consequences of each 
System Failure Event (SFE) will be estimated either on a qualitative basis or a 
quantitative basis (if the events are readily quantified). The risk estimation phase can be 
further broken down into several steps as seen here. 
Structuring of Risk Contribution Tree (ReT) - The causes and outcomes that were 
identified in Step 1 are structured in Step 2 for its employment in various parts of the 
Risk Contribution Tree (RCT). The RCT is structured in two distinct ways. Below the 
accident category, the structure is a graphical representation of the accident sub-
categories and of the combinations of contributory factors relevant to each accident sub-
category. Its structure is similar to a Fault Tree in its use of logical symbols, and the 
term "Contribution Fault Tree" has therefore been employed. Above the accident 
category level, the structure is an event tree representation of the development of each 
category of accident into its final outcome. An example of a RCT is provided in 
Appendix 4. 
Structuring and quantification of influence diagrams - The purpose of influence 
diagrams is to identify the influences, which effect the likelihood of an accident, and to 
enable those influences to be quantified. It also provides information for use in Step 3 of 
the FSA process. An example of an influence diagram for a fire accident in given in 
Appendix 5. An influence diagram takes into account three different types of influence, 
which are due to: 
• Human failure 
• Hardware failure 
• External event 
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Additionally, each influence diagram incorporates dimensions of design. operation and 
') 
recovery-. 
Quantification of RCT - The quantification of the RCT is accomplished by usmg 
available historical data from the incident database and where such data is absent. expert 
judgement is used to complement the quantification. The level of potential 
consequences of a SFE may be quantified in economic terms with regard to loss of 
lives/cargo/property and the degradation of the environment caused by the occurrence 
of the SFE. Finally, the calculation of FN curves and Potential Loss of Life (PLL) 
through the RCT is carried out. Both FN curves and PLL measures the risks that have 
been derived. 
4.2.3 Step 3 - Risk Control Option (RCO) 
The next step aims to propose effective and practical Risk Control Options (RCOs), 
Focusing on areas of the risk profile needing control, several RCOs are developed and 
recorded in a Risk Control Measure Log (RCML). Upon identifying all possible RCOs 
for the identified risks, the RCOs in the RCML is used to generate a Risk Control 
Option Log (RCOL). The information in the RCOL will be used in Step 4 of the FSA 
process. 
In general, RCO measures have a range of following attributes: 
• Those relating to the fundamental type of risk reduction (preventative or mitigating). 
• Those relating to the type of action required and therefore to the costs of the action 
(engineering or procedural). 
• Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measure (active or passive. 
single or redundant). 
The main objective of the RCO is to reduce frequency of failures and/or mitigate their 
possible consequences. 
~ RecO\cry refcrs to taking remedial action to reco\cr from an error or failure hcforc the aCl'ident nccur". 
. ~ 
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4.2.4 Step 4 - Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
Upon gathering the various control options, the next step is to carry out a Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) on each option. CBA aims at identifying the benefits from reduced 
risks and cost associated with the implementation of each risk control option for 
comparison. The evaluation of costs and benefits may be conducted using various 
techniques [IMO MSC, 1993]. It should be initially carried out for the overall situation 
and then for those interested entities influenced by the problem consideration. 
4.2.5 Step 5 - Decision-making 
The final step is the decision-making phase, which aims at making decisions and giving 
recommendations for safety improvement. At this point, the various stakeholders' 
interest in the vessel under study is considered. The cost and benefit applicable to each 
stakeholder has to be determined in order to decide the best risk control option - each 
RCO will have a different impact on the identified stakeholders, as such, the most 
effective RCO should strike a balance between the cost and benefit for each stakeholder. 
In reality, this is not always possible, hence, any imbalance has to be addressed and 
justified before the selected RCO is accepted as being the best option. The information 
generated in Step 4 of the FSA process can be used to assist in the choice of a cost-
effective RCO. However, the cost factor may not be the only criterion that should be 
considered. As such, at this stage, certain multi criteria decision-making techniques 
should be employed to select the most favourable RCO [Wang J. et. aI., 1996: Pillay A. 
and Wang J., 2001]. 
4.3 An FSA Framework for a Generic Fishing Vessel 
The proposed FSA framework for a generic fishing vessel by the author, is hased on the 
FSA methodology described in section 4.2 and can be developed into five steps for ease 
of understanding as follows: 
I) Hazard identification. 
2) Risk quantification. 
J) Risk ranking. 
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4) Recommendations. 
5) Decision-making. 
These five steps are represented in a flowchart as seen in figure 4.3. These steps are 
further complemented by the work completed in this project and presented in the 
various chapters of this thesis. The interaction of the proposed framework and the parts 
developed in this thesis can be seen in figure 4.4. This method is aimed at enhancing 
fishing vessel safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and 
property, by using a systematic risk based analysis. The proposed method can be viewed 
as a simplified version of the method discussed in section 4.2. 
I Define Generic Vessel I 
~r 
HAZID Meeting c::::> Determine accident categ ones 
~, 
Group into Risk c::::> Establish accident sub-cate Exposure Groups gones 
~, 
Hazard Screening c::::> Risk Matrix Approach 
~r ~ Rank Risk Generate Risk Matrix 
Table 
~r 
Calculate Equivalent total t--- ~Ir 
Recommendation to 
manage/reduce risk 
Figure -L3 Flowchart of proposed approach 
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Figure 4.4 Methods developed for the FSA framework of a generic fishing vessel 
4.3.1 Generic fishing vessel 
A generic model fishing vessel should be defined in order to describe the function, 
features, characteristics and attributes, which are common to all ships of the type, or 
relevant to the problem under study [MSC, 1998a]. The generic vessel facilitates an 
understanding of the subject under study and can be used to help identify relevant 
accidents and accident sub-categories, leading to an enhancement of the HAZID 
structuring. The description of the generic fishing vessel can be divided into several 
aspects as seen in figure 4.5 and explained here: 
Power/Propulsion - Auxiliary power of fishing vessels are normally provided by two or 
more diesel-electric generator sets or possibly main engine driven alternators on smaller 
vessels. Power distribution is by series switchboards, distribution panels and cabling 
systems. Emergency power sources are normally battery based. Medium speed engines 
(via a reduction gearing system) normally provide the propulsion power. 
Bunkering - Bunkering operation is normally undertaken with manual connection of 
fuel from shore to a receptor on the vessel. Fuel used for fishing vessels has a tlash 
point of no less that -1-3 degrees Celsius. 
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Communications - These are pre-dominantly external communication components. 
which consist of VHF, MF, HF and Satcom systems with EPIRBs (EmergencY Position 
~ . 
Indicating Radio Beacon) and SARTs (Search and Rescue Transponder) for 
emergencies. Larger deep-sea fishing vessels have internal communication components 
such as the public address system and telephone system to particular crew or operational 
area. 
Control - This covers the control of the entire ship. The bridge or wheelhouse is 
generally the central and often the only control centre on fishing vessels. The bridge has 
facilities for all round vision, communication, navigation, safety and ship control 
equipment. The main machinery spaces are periodically manned (during manoeuvring) 
and unmanned during fishing operations. Local control positions are available for all 
fishing gear with some limited remote controls on the bridge. 
Emergency response/control - The fishing vessel is expected to be equipped to react to 
emergencies such as rescue from water (either man overboard or third parties). Most 
vessels carryon board first-aid kits to administer first aid in case of an accident. 
Habitable environment - The crew of the fishing vessel are provided with a habitable 
environment. This may require consideration of ship motion, nOIse, vibration, 
ventilation, temperature and humidity. Most accommodation areas of the vessel are 
provided with intake and exhaust blowers. Where there is an engine control room fitted, 
it is provided with an air conditioning system as with the navigation bridge. 
Manoeuvring - Fishing vessels do not particularly need an accurate and sensitive 
manoeuvring system. However, when carrying out pair trawling (where two or more 
vessels are moving closely together), it could be vital to avoid collisions and contacts. 
Rudders are used with conventional propeller propulsion systems. There are no bow or 
stern thrusters fitted on fishing vessels. 
Mooring - Mooring during berthing operations is normally undertaken in a cOIl\'entionai 
manner lIsing rope mooring lines. fairleads. bollards and winches. 
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Anchoring - Anchoring arrangements are provided for all fishing \'cssels and comprise 
of light weight-high holding power anchors with wire or fibre ropes for the main anchor 
line. 
Navigation - Fishing vessels are normally fitted with a magnetic compass, a speed and 
distance measurement device, a depth of water indicator. one or more radar and an 
electronic positioning system. Vessel fixing procedures using visually observed 
bearings are generally carried out on deep-sea fishing vessels and not on smaller coastal 
fishing vessels. 
Payload - The payload of fishing vessels consists of both processed and pre-packed fish 
(vessels with fish factory on board) or loose fish stored in the cargo holds. The fishing 
gear on board the vessel is also considered to be part of the payload. Unloading is 
normally via shore cranes and forklifts - frozen fish packages are placed on pallets and 
then lifted by a shore crane from the ship to be placed on the docks. Once the fish 
pallets are on the dock, it is transferred either into a shore freezer holding area or 
directly onto a truck by the forklift. 
Pollution prevention - Oily bilge water is stored on board and discharged to a shore 
receptacle when the vessel berths for unloading. Oily water separators are rarely 
provided for smaller coastal vessels. Engine exhaust gases are normally visually 
monitored. 
Stability - The stability requirements of fishing vessels are normally assessed for a range 
of loading and operating conditions. They relate to intact and damage stability 
consideration including effects of wind, sea condition and loads on fishing gear during 
fishing operation. 
Structure - The material used for the construction of a fishing vessel include wood, 
aluminium, fibre-reinforced plastics, high tensile steel and ferro - cement. The 
arrangements of aluminium and steel structures normally consist of shell plating 
supported by longitudinal members and, in turn by transverse frames. The structure 
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must withstand the envIsage forces imposed, which include sea forces. dead loads, 
cyclic forces, towing, docking and general robustness criteria. 
Pollution 
~labilit0 
\ 
Habitable 
COthcrs~~ 
~---------------L ________ -L __ ~ 
prevention 
GChOri~}---- Generic fishing vessel 
~tructu0,un-k-e-ri-ng-/-st-Oring 
Figure 4.5 A generic fishing vessel 
The generic fishing vessel is epitomised to be a hypothetical vessel of any size and 
method of fishing. To summarise, it is an appraisal of the functions of operation that is 
necessary for any fishing vessel. Fishing being a combined production and transport 
operation, is cyclic with the following distinct phases of life: 
• Design, construction and commissioning. 
• Entering port, berthing, un-berthing and leaving port. 
• Fish loading 
• Fish unloading. 
• Passage. 
• Dry dock and maintenance period. 
• Decommissioning and scraping. 
A generic fishing vessel may also be thought of as being a combination of hard and soft 
systems as listed below: 
• COIllIllunications • Control 
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• Electrical • Management system 
• Human • Navigation 
• Lifting • Piping and pumping 
• Machinery • Safety 
4.3.2 HAZID 
The first step of the analysis is the hazard identification. This consists of determining 
'-
which hazards affect the fishing vessels' activities under consideration using 
'brainstorming' techniques involving trained and experienced personnel. In the HAZID 
phase, the combined experience and insight of engineers is required to systematically 
identify all potential failure events at each required indenture level with a view to 
assessing their influences on system safety and performance. Various safety analysis 
methods may be used individually or in a combination to identify the potential hazards 
of a system. These methods have been detailed in chapter 3. 
In the HAZID meeting, accident categories are determined for the safety analysis. As a 
guide, the accident categories determined by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
can be used [Loughran C.G. et. aI., 200 I]. These categories can be seen in chapter :2 
(section 2.5) and are summarised here: 
• Foundering and flooding • Machinery damage 
• Stranding and grounding • Heavy weather damage 
• Collisions and contact • Missing vessels 
• Capsizing and listing • Loss of hull integrity 
• Fires and explosions • Others 
Having identified the accident categories, the causes are then grouped into the follo\ving 
risk exposure groups: 
I. Human Errors 
Human Performance -Communication 
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-Navigation 
-Competency 
-Fishing 
-Anchoring 
-Mooring 
-Abandonment 
Commercial Pressures -Manning 
-Finance 
-Company or firm procedures 
Management Systems -Onboard management 
-Loading fish 
-Shore side systems 
2. Hardware failures 
-Material of construction 
-Structure 
-Propulsion 
-Steering 
-Piping and plumbing 
-Control 
-Electrical 
-Refri gerati on 
-Safety systems 
-Habitable environment 
-Emissions control 
-Bunkering and storage 
-Diagnostics systems 
-Maintenance systems 
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3. External Events 
Environment 
-Pollution prevention 
-Climatic variations 
Payload -Fish handling, loading and storage 
-Crane/lifting mechanisms 
-Berthing 
In order to sort the large amount of information collected at the HAZID meeti ng:. a set 
of accident sub-categories is established as follows: 
Collision and contact accident sub-category 
• Berthed • Arrival manoeuvnng close to the 
• Starting up berth 
• Loading and unloading in port Shutdown • 
• Departing and manoeuvring close to Abnormal operation • 
the berth 
• Maintenance 
• Manoeuvring In harbour and close Anchored • 
to harbour Dry-docked • 
• Passage in open sea 
• Loading fish at sea 
• Entering harbour 
Fire accident sub-category 
• Engine room 
• Fish room space 
• Wheelhouse 
• Accommodation 
• Galley 
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Loss of hull integrity accident sub-category 
• Hull Plating • Seals 
• Framing • Appendages 
• Bulkheads • Opening or failure of doors 
• Welds and joints • Opening or failure of scuttles 
• Penetrations • Other 
4.3.3 Hazard screening 
The risk matrix approach is used in the hazard screening process. For each appropriate 
combination, an assessment is made of the frequency (F) of the accident, and the 
severity (S) of the consequences in terms of human injuries/deaths, property 
damage/loss and the degradation of the environment. The corresponding Risk Ranking 
Number (RRN) is then selected from the risk matrix table. This method allows for 
expert judgements where detailed data is unavailable. Ranking of the various accidents 
determines their order in relation to one another. In short, the RRN is indicative of the 
relative order of magnitude of risk. 
Table 4.1 shows the risk matrix table that presents in a tabular format, a risk level 
related to the frequency and severity of an accident. RRN ranges from 1 (least frequent 
and least severe consequence) to 10 (most frequent and most severe consequence). 
Fl F2 F3 F4 FS F6 F7 
SI Minor Injuries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S2 Major injuries 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
S3 1 to 10 Deaths 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
S4 > 10 Deaths 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Table 4.1 Risk matrix table 
Table 4.2 gives the interpretation of the frequencies FI to F7 as determined by [\ISC. 
1998a]. in terms of a generic fishing vessel based on the following estimations: 
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1. Vessel life expectancy - 25 years 
2. Operational days per year - 250 
3. Operational hours per day - 13 
4. Major maintenance per year - 1 
Likely to happen General Interpretation Generic fishing vessel 
On a vessel once per Interpretation 
Frequency 
Fl 10000 - 100000 years Extremely remote to Likely to happen every 
extremely improbable 20 yrs in the industry 
F2 1000 - 10000 years Remote to extremely Likely to happen every :2 
remote yrs in the industry 
F3 100- 1000 years Remote Likely to happen 5 times 
per yr in the industry 
F4 10 - 100 years Reasonably probable to Likely up to 3 times per 
remote vessel life 
FS 1 - 10 years Reasonably probable Likely up to 15 times per 
vessel life 
F6 Yearly Reasonably probable to Likely annually per 
frequent vessel 
F7 Monthly Frequent Likely monthly per 
vessel 
Table 4.2 Key to risk matrix table 
Using the risk matrix approach, for each accident category, a ranked risk table is 
produced, listing all accident sub-categories against each generic location. An example 
of this is seen in table 4.3, where F is the frequency and S is the severity of the accident. 
The number in the brackets, (x), is the corresponding RRN obtained from table -1-.1. 
Upon completing the risk table, the next task is to determine the "Equivalent Total" for 
each accident category. 
